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1 Chapter 1Outline of the research project
1.1 Starting Point
This thesis addresses various topics on bank efficiency estimation.
Roughly speaking our endeavours diverge into two lines of research:
First, an argumentative framework discussing specific issues when setting
up models for bank efficiency estimation. This is what we call the problem
of adequate modelling in bank efficiency. And second, a methodological
part covering innovations in econometric efficiency estimation.
Basically, we do not consider it appropriate to mix up both issues, i.e.
to deal with methodological innovations and the adequation problem in
a single study: Readers familiar with contemporary literature on bank
efficiency1 expect the application of certain traditional schemes when
a survey announces to deal with the assessment of the performance of
financial institutions. Even though we remain critical of some aspects
of efficiency measurement especially in banks, we will stick to these
well-established models, though, when focusing on the application of
methodological innovations. First, this facilitates the comparability of
our formal results with those of the traditional bank efficiency literature,
and second, the methods we put forward are universally suitable in the
course of any efficiency analysis. The problem of adequate modelling in
bank efficiency has been split off. Consequently, this survey is composed
of several modules, each of which can be worked through separately. As a
matter of fact, occasional intersections of the basic elements of efficiency
estimation are not always avoidable.
In the next two subsections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 we will introduce our
two lines of research in more detail. To conclude this introductory
presentation of our research project, section 1.2 contains brief summaries
1For a recent survey, see Berger (2007), and also Berger et al. (1993).
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of our projects that are documented in detail in the respective chapters.
1.1.1 Adequate modelling
In the course of the public discussion on the economic and financial
crisis banks are given the characteristic of ’systemic relevance’. Accord-
ing to the German ’Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilität’ (SoFFin),
systemic relevance can be defined as follows2:
Systemic relevance arises when structures in the economy are tightly
interwoven and cannot be easily broken up or replaced, as it is the case
in the financial sector. In such structures the collapse of a company (e.g.
a bank) causes not only other companies within the structure to collapse,
but the entire economic system. To prevent a global breakdown of the
economy, the government has to intervene. The costs for society are
generally lower than the economic costs in the case of non-intervention.
So we see that in modern economies banks provide the basic infras-
tructure for capital transactions as well as the capital resources of the
non-monetary sectors. According to a traditional view on bank activ-
ities, financial institutions might be reduced to the task of collecting
deposits from surplus-spending units and lending those funds to deficit-
spending units (typically corporate clients) (Sealey and Lindley, 1977).
The transformation of many small short-term savings into a large long-
term exposure yields a positive interest margin for the banks. Porter
(1961) calls this the very essence of banking, which is to borrow short
and lend long.
Even modern empirical bank efficiency estimation is based on this
traditional view of financial intermediation. And the extent of the
available literature adequately adresses the outstanding importance of
an objective assessment of banks’ productivity and efficiency. As the
performance of single banks is rather uninteresting to the researchers,
the focus of most studies lies on the entirety of banks, usually equated
with the ’financial system’: Especially the consolidation of the banking
landscape in the European Union, the liberalization of markets in Central
and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Asian emerging markets (e.g. India)
2This is a translation following the frequently asked questions on the SoFFin website
http://www.soffin.de.
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drive the need to ’measure’ the impact of changing political and ecomonic
conditions on banks’ efficiency.
Nevertheless we see that banks are the main causes of the actual
financial crisis. Obviously, banks’ ability to manage portfolios of deriva-
tive products basically failed. This has not been foreseen in empirical
bank efficiency literature, because the applied intermediation theory does
not capture these aspects. As a result we learn about ’financial systems’
assumed to be highly efficient but which, as a matter of fact, only survive
with the aid of government interventions.
Following Grohmann (1988), we would like to call this discrepancy
between empirical results on the one side and observations in the real
world on the other side a ’problem of adequate modelling’. The dis-
cussion of statistical adequation in the context of the empirical bank
efficiency estimation thus constitutes the economic subject matter of our
research project. It is our aim to initiate a discussion reconsidering the
contemporary modelling of production processes in banking.
1.1.2 Methodological issues
The second focus of our research project is on the implementation of
methodical approaches to efficiency measurement by means of Stochastic
Frontier Analyses (SFA). The estimation of SFA-models differs from
classical linear models with respect to the assumptions imposed on the
noise term. In particular, we expect banks to fall short of the optimal
production level not only because of random environmental influences,
but also due to managerial inefficiency. Commonly, we assume that
the realization of firm-specific inefficiency is a random variable with
an asymmetric distribution. This makes sense as inefficiency can only
exert a negative influence on production and a positive influence on
costs, respectively. The assumption of a composed error term certainly
prohibits the estimation of the model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
It is therefore advisable to resort to Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE), or to correct a biased OLS-estimation by means of the Method
of Moments (MOM).
After estimation of a Stochastic Frontier the question remains in
how far the deviation between the actual production of a bank and the
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respective production frontier can be traced back to random noise or
inefficiency. Dealing with cross-sectional data this question cannot be
definitely answered and finally depends on the underlying assumption
regarding the specific random distribution of inefficiency. As nobody
ever observed inefficiency the choice of a one-sided distribution seems
to be arbitrary (Førsund et al., 1980, p.11). Unfortunately, this choice
conversely determines the estimated inefficiency. This is what one might
call a tautology.
The solution to this problem may be to abstain from the application of
SFA. Alternative methods are the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as
well as the Quantile Regression (QR). Both methods basically abandon
the existence of environmental random influences on production. In
consequence, the declared inefficiency is usually higher in DEA and QR
than in SFA. Not least for this reason SFA is still the preferred method
for efficiency estimation. Moreover, the above-mentioned problem of
tautology can be overcome in the case of panel data, i.e. the existence of
multiple observations per bank.
Since the pioneering work of Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van de
Broeck (1977) many outstanding econometricians developed advanced
methods in SFA. Besides the rather uninteresting problem of implement-
ing new inefficiency distributions, the main focus lies in the modelling of
time-variant inefficiency when dealing with panel data. Ideally, the trend
of firms’ efficiency can be estimated as a parametric function simplifying
the assessment of managerial learning effects or the success of economic
policy measures.
In the framework of our survey we cannot pursue the aim of developing
pioneering new methods in SFA. We rather observe that many of the
approaches that have already been introduced in literature have never
been applied in empirical studies. Indeed, this seems to be related to
the fact that standard statistical software packages presently only allow
estimation of basic SFA models.
Another approach to frontier estimation nearly unnoticed to date is
the Quantile Regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978, Koenker, 2005).
We already mentioned that due to the rejection of a random noise term
QR shares some disadvantages with DEA; but otherwise, QR provides
some very appealing opportunities remedying other shortcomings.
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We are about to show that it is possible to formally adapt complex
models in SFA and QR to specific empirical problems with panel data.
Basically, the optimization problems can be solved numerically with
statistical software, e.g. the R Environment (R Development Core Team,
2010). Nonetheless, we try to never lose track of econometric standard
methods, both robust and available to the wide range of authors with
mainly empirical research problems.
1.2 Our contributions
1.2.1 Discussion of the empirical assessment of bank
efficiency in the frame of a scheme of adequation
The empirical assessment of bank efficiency is a well-established
branch of economic research today. Against the backdrop of the current
economic crisis, however, the fact has become evident that no link can
be established between the fundamental failure of the financial system
and the results of these studies.
The discrepancy would seem to suggest that efficiency is assessed in
a sector of bank activity which is not (no longer) relevant for the success
of the institutions. In order to verify this supposition we have recourse
to the scheme of ’statistical adequation’ according to Grohmann (1988)
to ascertain to what extent and at which place the activities of banks as
laid down in the studies might deviate from the readers expectations.
As a result we observe that there exists a considerable adequation gap
between the claim of the studies to make statements on the efficiency of
financial systems on the one hand and the devices applied on the other
hand.
1.2.2 Methods of cross-sectional stochastic frontier analyses3
The stochastic frontier analysis (Aigner et al., 1977, Meeusen and
van de Broeck, 1977) is widely used to estimate firm-specific efficiency
scores. The fundamental difference to ordinary least squares is the intro-
duction of a two-part error term consisting of a noise and an inefficiency
3A first draft of this topic can be found in Behr and Tente (2008).
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term. Most often the assumption of a half-normal distributed inefficiency
term is applied, but other distributions are also discussed in the rele-
vant literature. The natural estimation method seems to be Maximum
Likelihood (ML) estimation because of the parametric assumptions. But
simulation results obtained for the half normal model indicate that a
method of moments approach (MOM) (Olson et al., 1980) is superior
for small and medium sized samples in combination with inefficiency
not strongly dominating noise (Coelli, 1995). In the frame of this paper
we provide detailed simulation results comparing the two estimation
approaches for both the half-normal and the exponential approach to
inefficiency.
Based on the simulation results we obtain decision rules for the choice
of the superior estimation approach taking into account the sample size
and the efficiency to noise ratio. Both estimation methods, ML and
MOM, are applied to a sample of German commercial banks based on
the Bankscope database for estimation of cost efficiency scores.
1.2.3 Cost efficiency trends in European and US banking
The assessment of bank efficiency in the course of empirical studies
dealing with international bank balance sheet and income statement data
has been a frequently discussed field of application in recent decades.
Based on firm-specifically estimated efficiency scores, the mean efficiency
scores per country are ranked against each other to finally gain insight
into the efficiency of national banking systems.
When ranking the banking systems of several countries against each
other, it is essential to set up a common internatinal benchmark for
all banks. With reference to the findings of Berger (2007), it is advis-
able furthermore to control for the national-specific (legal and social)
environment the banks operate in via selected macroeconomic variables.
As most studies deal with panel data covering several years, the
Stochastic Frontier Analysis SFA seems to be the preferred choice, as
it allows to incorporate certain functional patterns of efficiency change
over time. It is by now common pratice to control for country-specific
heterogeneity in the macroeconomic environment mentioned above, but,
to our best knowledge, there is not a single study allowing for country-
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specific heterogeneity in the efficiency trend parameters.
For this reason we put forward two modified methods based on main-
stream fixed effects and random effects approaches to SFA. Concerning
the fundamental understanding of efficiency of financial intermediation
processes, we followed the most recent studies, e.g. Girardone et al.
(2009). As a result we show that efficiency trends are in no way homoge-
neous across international banking systems.
1.2.4 Bank efficiency estimation based on quantile cost
functions with fixed effects
Cross-sectional Quantile Regression (QR) in bank efficiency estima-
tion has recently been proposed by Behr (2010). First, QR overcomes
the limitations of Stochastic Frontier Analyses, because the estimated
slope parameters of cost/production functions do not necessarily have to
resemble the conditional mean parameters (OLS). Second, QR is robust
against data outliers and violated assumptions regarding the noise term.
While first approaches were based on cross-sectional data, we venture
to put forward an extended model to measure firm-specific inefficiency
with panel data. Based on Koenker (2004), we estimate multiple con-
ditional quantile cost functions with fixed effects which indicate time-
specific location shift effects. This allows the cost level to vary from year
to year, while the slope parameters remain constant over time. We are
about to explore the new opportunities in the course of efficiency estima-
tions. In addition to obvious distance-to-frontier measures of inefficiency,
we propose a sector concept assigning efficiency classes to every firm.
2 Chapter 2Preliminary reflections onefficiency and banks
2.1 Introduction
Before expatiating on the special topics of bank efficiency estimation
in the following chapters we would like to acquaint the reader with the
basic tools and the mindset necessary to understand the possibilities and
limitations of bank efficiency estimation. As ’efficiency’ is a determinant
of performance, viz the degree of utilization of available resources1, some
preliminary reflections on various aspects of bank performance (section
2.2) – beyond the usual scope of the relevant empirical literature – are
meant to prepare the reader for our critical appreciation of the applied
adequation. To subsequently introduce our technical line of research,
section 2.3 lays down the reasons why empirical literature rather relies
on cost/profit frontier techniques than on traditional accounting ratios.
Finally, section 2.4 provides an illustrative example of how we deal
with the underlying Bankscope database. It is obvious that numerous
problems we encounter in bank efficiency estimation can be traced back
to the poor quality of publicly available data and the frequent occurence
of data cleansing procedures.
2.2 Aspects of bank performance
As we already mentioned in the outline of our research project bank
efficiency estimation rests upon rather entrenched structures targeted
on costs of financial intermediation on the one hand (the ’scientific
1Fried et al. (2008) enumerates other determinants of performance, namely the
production technology, the operating environment and the scale of operations.
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approach’) or shareholders’ returns on the other hand (the ’practitioners’
approach’). So literature database queries for the term ’bank efficiency’
usually lead us to studies dealing with concepts of elaborately estimated
cost functions or simple accounting ratios. At this point, we should
not like to expatiate on the term of ’efficiency’ yet. A definition of the
term ’efficiency’ will be developed in the subsequent section. For the
moment, we will rather employ the term ’efficiency’ as synonymous with
the generic term ’performance’.
In the course of the studies dealing with bank efficiency, the reader
gets no answer to the question whom the determined performance serves.
For example: Do customers of banks benefit from a high return on
equity (ROE)? Or is a high ROE a socially desired target? Probably
not: As single efficiency scores may imply inappropriate incentives (e.g.
indiscriminate cost-cutting, equity reduction etc.; we will discuss this
below in section 2.3), we observe against the background of the actual
financial crisis that finally society has to bear the burden in the case of
banks’ failure. So performance measured on the basis of the ROE does
not serve society, but rather, for instance, the managers – in the case
they receive bonus payments on the basis of ROE.
It is a typical characteristic of the available literature that a description
of banks’ objectives in the context of the respective research topic is being
withheld. Instead, efficiency scores serve as multi-purpose indicators of
banks’ performance in all aspects, ranging from an assessment of the
management’s skills to society’s interests concerning a sound and stable
financial system. We will systematically discuss this mismatch in detail
in chapter 3.
For the moment, we will try to shed some light on various and
alternative aspects under which banks’ performance might be assessed.
Banks considerably differ from conventional manufacturing industries in
various respects as they fulfil multiple and responsible roles in modern
economies. So the basic understanding of what constitutes an ’efficient
bank’ or even an ’efficient financial system’ may differ among a multitude
of interest groups. As a result, traditional bank efficiency assessments on
the basis of accounting ratios or cost functions are likely not to capture
all aspects of banks’ responsibilities.
We identified four groups exhibiting a cluster of interests of their own
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regarding financial institutions2. The groups comprise (1) the owners of
banks (shareholders in commercial banks, public bodies in savings banks
and members of cooperative banks), (2) private and business customers,
(3) the banks’ managements and (4) society, basically represented by the
banking supervision. As a matter of fact, the respective groups have to
be understood as stylized entities in the sense of ideal types. As every
person participating in business life typically belongs to multiple groups,
at least to ’society’, we are not talking about the fields of interest of
single persons or well-defined groups of people.
This assumption will enable us to exemplarily discuss conflicts of the
respective goals of the stylized groups. So we will not only think about
possibilities how to measure bank performance in each case – general
problems of data availability will be left aside here – but primarily consider
why advantages in one field may involve disadvantages for the interests
of another group. In other words, we will show that bank efficiency
represented by a single figure basically can only reflect unidimensional
aspects of performance, although bank efficiency literature typically does
not elaborate on this fact.
2.2.1 Interest groups
Shareholders
Owners of banks can basically be divided into two subgroups: Private
and public shareholders. Typically, private investors hold shares of
certain commercial banks that are listed on the stock exchange. They
are generally free in the choice of stocks, thereby pursuing the target of
optimizing their portfolio returns. In this way, investments in commercial
banks do not substantially differ from investments in other non-monetary
firms.
Public shareholders, on the other hand, typically participate in state
and savings banks. They cannot readily sell their shares or attempt to
increase portfolio value, as public banks are commissioned to uphold pub-
lic assignments. Generally, they are obliged to pursue the improvement
2It is here understood that ’financial institutions’ appear as so-called ’universal
banks’, providing the complete range of services defined in the German Gesetz
über das Kreditwesen (§ 1 KWG)
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of commercial structures in the respective regions even if this affects
profitability3.
Stable returns on their equity investment, i.e. the growth of share-
holder value4, are the basic objective of any shareholder and need no
further explanation. Beyond that, we will lay down why we think the
assumption of social responsibilities to be another subordinate, but nev-
ertheless important objective of shareholders5: While public banks are
obliged to meet certain responsibilities anyway, e.g. the provision of
financial services to the socially underprivileged, teaching young people
how to deal with money etc., commercial banks rather focus on presti-
gious projects like cultural sponsorship (Do good and tell people about it,
see, for instance, Deutsche Bank AG (2009)).
The motivation for corporate social responsibility is manifold. And
it is not quite clear whether the impetus comes from the owners or
from the management. But we can state that for every firm and their
owners involved in business especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, charity
has a compulsory (Puritan) tradition. Cotton Mather6 emphasizes a
cause-and-effect relationship between social piety and success: Honor
the Lord with thy substance; so shall thy barns be filled with plenty [...]
Obscure mechanics and husbandmen have risen to estates, of which once
they had not the most distant expectation7.
Whether there exists a ’divine dividend’ or not, it is not entirely
unjustifiable to expect certain positive effects on the business performance.
But just as it is the case for all investments in corporate identity, the
return cannot be calculated, because the link between social actions
and financial performance is not straightforward (Bansal, 2005). At
least, what definitely remains for the shareholders is a feeling Andreoni
(1990) calls ’Warm Glow’. Certainly, unlike this author resorting to
the uncountable microeconomic concept of household’s ’utility’ which is
3For details we refer to the laws of the German federal states (Sparkassengesetz).
4For definitions of how to measure shareholder value, see Hartmann-Wendels et al.
(2007, p. 351 f.).
5See Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) for an interesting survey on the different forms
of corporate social responsiblities in non-monetary firms.
6February 12th, 1663 – February 13th, 1728 in Boston; U.S. Christian leader who
was a Puritan (cp. Longman dictionary).
7Quoted from: Esmond Wright, Franklin’s Philadelphia, London, 1986.
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increased by philanthropic activities, we have to stick to more ’profane’
values in order to measure banks’ performance in this field: e.g. the
amount of funds donated, the number of artists, scientists, students,
schools subsidized, the foundation volume, the reduction of CO2 emissions,
the working hours in welfare services etc.
Customers
As banks typically have very heterogeneous groups of customers we
will limit our examination to the basic groups of private and business cus-
tomers. Referring to the traditional Intermediation Theory (Sealey and
Lindley, 1977), business customers are ’deficit spending units’, profitably
investing the savings of ’surplus spending units’, i.e. private customers.
Surely, the basic need for both groups of customers is the security of
their deposits. So normally, we should expect customers to assume the
role of a supervisor, compelling the banks to preserve market discipline, i.e.
to avoid high risk projects. Among other authors, Macey and Miller (1992)
note that in reality customers do not assume this responsibility. The
reason is that we have public and private deposit insurance schemes, so
that small savers’ deposits are supposed to be safe. But unfortunately, the
insurance does not only favour risk-taking behaviour of the shareholders,
but moreover, it only works when single banks default. Indeed, the actual
financial crisis made clear that banks are ’systemic institutions’, and
so they are likely to default collectively. In this case, nobody knows to
what extent the insurance scheme works. Against this background, the
security of the deposits is not a specific problem of the group we called
’customers’, but concerns the whole society and will be discussed later.
The provision of payment systems is the prerequisite for any com-
mercial transaction. This includes the supply of cash (access to cash
terminals), foreign currency exchange, the installation of networked sys-
tems of electronic cash and credit cards, booking of debits and transfers,
handling of acceptances and checks, as well as the preparation of account
statements. In developed economies, all these services are basically as-
sured although associated with different implicit and explicit costs for the
customers. Furthermore, there is a certain problem regarding the security
of the transactions: As we observe the direct customer contact becoming
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more and more rare in favour of self-service terminals or internet PCs,
new forms of electronic fraud occur (Bundeskriminalamt, 2009, section
4.2.2). So actually it is a primary objective of customers to safely conduct
banking transactions.
Both private and business customers may get into a situation in which
they need additional funds to acquire objects of higher value. Some
examples in the case of private customers are consumer credits, car
credits or real estate loans. Not only is a low interest rate of interest
to the customer but also, in the run-up, a detailed analysis on the side
of the bank whether the customer can afford the credit in the long run
at all. It is thereby acting as a ’delegated monitor’ on behalf of the
depositors (Diamond, 1984).
In the case of business customers, the services typically comprise
additional funds for investment purposes. If the interest rate is lower
than the expected return of the investment the firm will apply for a new
loan. So banks can actively determine the investment activity of their
customers by setting the interest margin, i.e. the difference between loan
and deposit rate. Regularly, the interest margin is subject to competitive
pressure. But we might expect customers who remain loyal to a single
main bank8 to pay more interest, because they benefit from competition
among banks to a lesser extent.
Customers interested in volatile financial investments need an asset
account. The bank provides the corresponding services, i.e. the admin-
istration of the shares, bonds, investment funds, certificates etc. for
account of a third party. Typically, the bank does not only provide access
to trading platforms and calculates the portfolio return but also offers
advice and consultancy. Private customers not familiar with portfolio
design and available products depend on objective advice on the side of
the bank. It is the task of the financial advisor to identify the customer’s
needs regarding risk attitude and time horizon. In practice, we observe
conflicts of interest between the recommendation of optimal products and
the recommendation of products with a higher premium for the bank/the
advisor. Thus, the resulting portfolio structure may be inappropriate
because it misses the customer’s objectives.
8’Relationship lending.’
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Management
A bank’s management is often seen as an intermediary between
shareholders and society: On the one hand, managers are obliged to
fulfill shareholders’ objectives (especially the maximization of value of
equity shares), and on the other hand, society restrains their attempts
by means of a restrictive regulatory system (especially risk control). In
this situation managers have to defend their position on both sides. As a
result, we do not only learn from the daily press but also from scientific
literature that ’managers are likely to maximize their own utilities by
engaging in perquisites consumption and/or other non-optimal expansion
of inputs and outputs’ (Pi and Timme, 1993). This behaviour might
result in less optimal decisions for both shareholders and society if no
precautions are taken.
So from the point of view of management, the first objective must
be the possibility to do business without interference from outside. The
lower the exertion of influence by the political sector or the shareholders,
the more opportunities for independent decisions managers will be able to
make. Not incidentally, the media do not only report on professional but
seemingly amicable relationships between bank managers and politicians.
This close relationship is often considered to be inappropriate, if not even
suspicious, by the public.
Managers’ objectives in the context of our considerations can be
reduced to outstanding earnings, i.e. an outstanding basic salary, bonus
payments, compensation payments in the case of resignation, and pension
claims. They may expect, moreover, non-monetary benefits, like an
efficient staff, cars and airplanes at their disposal, a prestigious official
residence, media presence, meetings with politicians etc.
Society
The interests of society do not focus on specific banks, but rather
on the whole banking system: As we mentioned above, the security of
deposits can only be assured against the background of a sound entirety
of banks. In fact, we often observe single banks merging on account
of financial distress. Normally, the public is not even being informed
about problems in the respective banks. And as long as banks solve
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critical incidents among themselves, the system only proves its stability
and reliability. But in the case that multiple banks simultaneously
default, the mutual insurance schemes are likely to become insufficient.
This is the point where society has to bail out the financial system
before the whole economy collapses due to the systemic importance
of banks. The resulting banking crisis costs for recapitalization and
restructuring can reach about 15-20% of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in highly developed countries, and even up to 55% in developing
countries (Hoggarth et al., 2001, Ioannidis et al., 2010). There are
also additional costs arising from an overall economic slowdown in the
subsequent years (unemployment, discontinuity in the flow of credits
for investment purposes etc.). Just recently, Haldane et al. (2010, p.87)
illustrate: ’The scars from the current crisis seem likely to be felt for a
generation.’
But the alternative would be to leave the banks on their own: In this
case, panic may lead to bank runs, i.e. the population tries to get their
money back from the bank in cash before the bank loses all its assets.
The resulting costs for the society are difficult to estimate, as panic might
result in chaos. Beyond doubt, real economic problems will arise because
even ’healthy’ banks can fail during a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983). So normally the costs for a ’taxpayer bailout’ are assumed to be
lower than the damage arising from unregulated bank runs.
Against the background of these threatening costs, the stability of
the banking system is the main objective of society. Stability is often
associated with banks’ soundness (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache,
2009). So consequently stability can be quantified by bank-specific
soundness scores that can serve as ’early warning indicators’ at the same
time. Ioannidis et al. (2010) propose and critically discuss several methods
how to assess bank soundness9. An obvious indicator of financial strength
is a rating score from Fitch, Moody’s, etc. Whereas the authors still
emphasize the accuracy of rating scores, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache
(2009) admit that the credibility of such ratings ’has diminished’ during
the financial crisis. Nevertheless, there do also exist other simple bank-
9The authors also argue that the literature on the examination of the systemic
banking risk at the country level is still ’problematic’.
16 2 Preliminary reflections on efficiency and banks
specific measures of performance, like the ratio of non-performing loans,
the Z-score10 or the so-called CAMEL-indicators11.
Surely banks do not only pose a threat to society. On the contrary,
banks’ services provide the basis for prosperity in the non-monetary
sectors by allocating funds for the most profitable use. Moreover, the
banking sector itself contributes value to the GDP. Only a few years ago,
the measurement of banks’ value added posed a serious problem to the
system of national accounts. The aim was to identify the value of services
the banks provide. As typically banks do not calculate explicit charges
on all services, but, to a larger extent, implicitely charge fees by interest
premia, an appropriate approach to measure banks’ production had to
be developed in recent decades: The Financial Intermediation Services
Indirectly Measured (FISIM) focuses on the intermediation activities of
banks (Eichmann, 2005, Haldane et al., 2010). Accordingly, the value
added of a single bank can be calculated as the positive interest margin
between loan interest income relative to an opportunity interest income
(e.g. measured on the basis of the inter-bank interest rate EURIBOR) plus
the positive interest margin between interest actually paid for deposits
relative to interest which would have to be paid on the basis of the
opportunity interest rate12. Recent discussions on the calculation of
FISIM expound on the problem of an appropriate opportunity interest
rate. In this context, Colangelo and Inklaar (2010) put forward their
objection that the low-risk inter-bank interest rates do not reflect the
appropriate risk levels banks are actually facing towards their customers.
In particular, FISIM is likely to be reported as too high, because ’bearing
risk is in general not a productive service as such’. Similarly, Haldane
et al. (2010) note that ’it is not clear that bearing risk is, in itself, a
productive activity.’ The authors show that the current statistical practice
of measuring FISIM leads to a surprising outcome13: In 2008 we observe
the ’paradox of a rapidly rising financial sector contribution to nominal
GDP.’ The explanation is simple: Due to the economy-wide increase in
10The number of standard deviations by which bank returns have to fall in order to
wipe out bank equity.
11The acronyms of Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity.
12For a numeric example, see Haldane et al. (2010, p.92).
13Cf. Colangelo and Inklaar (2010, figure 6).
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the expected level of defaults on loans, banks responded by increasing
interest rates. FISIM scores this as a rise in output. Otherwise, a default
risk adjusted FISIM adequately captures the pre-crisis ’productivity
mirage’ and the resulting peak in 2007 when the risks have materialized.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that society’s interest lies in
a sustainable form of value added. Unusual growth rates of banking
production do not contribute to society’s prosperity in the long run
if future generations of taxpayers have to bear the burden of banking
system defaults. On this note, the form of value added we are talking
about differs fundamentally from shareholder value: Shareholders are
able to benefit from occasional increases in value, but society does not.
2.2.2 A ’perverse incentive system’
As taxpayers are held responsible as a last resort for a banking bail-
out, soundness and stability of the financial system are of particular
interest to society. But remarkably, managers’ usual attempts to increase
shareholder value might jeopardise exactly this aim. Authors speak of a
’perverse incentive system’ (Macey and Miller, 1992): They refer to the
existence of a deposit insurance scheme that fundamentally sets banking
firms apart from any other types of firms. On the one hand, deposit
insurance prevents bank runs by instilling public confidence. Thus, the
public does not feel obliged to control banks. And on the other hand,
deposit insurance contributes to excessive risk taking incentives as long
as it does not penalize this attitude. Summing up, the authors complain
of a lack of market discipline. This induces shareholders ’to use their
control position to cause banks to engage in increasingly risky activities
in order to transfer wealth from creditors, depositors and the deposit
insurance to the shareholders.’ Park and Peristiani (2007) substantiate:
It depends on certain conditions that shareholders can turn into the
’enemies’ of regulators. The authors refer to the pioneering work of
Robert C. Merton and explain that deposit insurance gives shareholders
a put option, i.e. the right to sell the bank’s assets at the face value
of its liabilities. Option pricing theory taught us that the value of the
put option can be increased by raising a bank’s risk (e.g. low capital
ratio, volatile returns; for details, see Freixas and Rochet (2008, p.315)).
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So why do shareholders not always induce their managers to engage in
risky investments? The reason lies in the existence of a charter value.
This is an intangible value that disappears with the closure of the bank
and which cannot be recovered in liquidation. Typically, charter value
originates when the market value of the assets is higher than the book
value of assets. The usual measure for charter value is Tobin’s q, i.e. the
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Empirical
results support the moral hazard theory that shareholder value thus
takes a convex or even U-shaped form on risk (failure probability of
the bank). So if the market value of bank’s assets is high shareholders
penalize riskier strategies of the management. In consequence, they are
the ’allies’ of the regulator. If market value decreases the maximization
of the put option becomes more interesting and shareholders become the
’enemies’ of the regulator at exactly the point when the put option value
outweights charter value14. So the authors recommend that regulators
should intently observe stock price movements to acquire information
on the market values of the banks. From Keeley (1990) we learn that
against this background especially the degree competition is a crucial
factor to destabilize the banking system: Tobin’s q can be understood as
a kind of monopoly indicator: When the degree of competition is low,
market value and shareholder value decrease, and banks have incentives
to succumb to the temptation to increase risk, thus threatening the
stability of the financial system.
So what do we finally learn from this discussion in the context of
our consideration of possible conflicts? First, a high performance in
shareholder value is likely to threat society’s interest in a sound and
stable financial system. Second, the increase of shareholder value does
not necessarily conflict with customers’ concern to benefit from a high
degree of competition. And third, banks in a competitive environment
can threaten the stability of the financial system.
2.2.3 The pay-performance sensitivity
We are now describing a central principal-agent problem in banking:
Shareholders (principals) basically suspect a management (agents) of
14Park and Peristiani (2007) try to empirically identify the respective threshold.
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undertaking investment projects that increase their own reputation and
income but jeopardize shareholder value. Admittedly, this is a problem
which is not specific to banking firms, but deserves special interest in
such highly leveraged institutions which are of systemic importance. And
as a matter of course, the possibility to shift risk to the principals does
in fact exist. The issues that are being discussed in literature – see e.g.
John and Qian (2003), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey – deal
with the question whether governmental regulation substitutes or only
complements corporate incentive schemes which are meant to harmonize
the objectives of managers and owners. So obviously, management
compensation is not just a problem between shareholders and their
agents, but also concerns society and the regulator, respectively. One
can enlarge on the problem mentioned above: Assume that managers
have an information advantage over shareholders so that they can hide
the true risk of an investment project from the owners and the regulator.
Consequently, shareholders are unaware of the actual value of their put
option, and the regulator is not able to judge whether shareholders are
enemies or allies. Dropping the assumption of a risk-neutral deposit
insurance premium John et al. (2000) propose a model which explicitly
incorporates a bank’s management compensation in the risk-based fair
pricing of deposit insurance. As a result, the ’compensation structure
is optimal in that it would induce management to undertake Pareto-
optimal (value maximizing) investment policies, with no risk shifting.’
The compensation structure in turn depends on the level of leverage of
the bank.
So additionally to the discussion above, we gained new insights: First,
not only the objectives of shareholders, customers and society interact,
but also the management’s objectives interfere. Second, management
is the ’central interface’ among the other groups: Assuming that a
management’s incentive scheme is inadequate shareholders unwittingly
engage in high-risk projects, customers do not benefit from increasing
competition, and the regulator is left uncertain of the shareholders’
attitude. Third, literature provides solutions to harmonize the objectives.
And in fact, empirical studies support the hypothesis that shareholder
value and management compensation are positively linked, not least
because literature further agrees upon the fact that managerial ownership
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of equity and options in the bank serve to align managerial incentives
with shareholder interests. The index being used to assess this question
is the so-called pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS). It indicates the dollar
increase in a manager’s compensation for each 1000 dollars in shareholder
value. In most empirical applications, the PPS is positive and ranges
from several cents to about ten dollars.
2.2.4 The existence of social dividends
First, we have to clarify the question whether both shareholders’
objectives really complement one another. Normally, we should expect
the assumption of social responsibilities to put a strain on the growth
of bank’s equity shares: Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) point at the
opinion of Friedman (1970) that any funds that are not invested in
productive projects but in non-profit activities reduce a bank’s expected
payoff. But shareholders know that this view is rather myopic. First,
although the exact calculation of a monetary return of philanthropic
projects is neither morally desirable nor practically possible, the existence
of a return cannot be easily dismissed: Especially in the long run the
corporate identity is a crucial factor for any firm to improve its image
with customers. Second, shareholders know that the assumption of social
responsibilities is the basis for any responsible business in a developed
society. Not only against the Anglo-Saxon Puritan background, where
philanthropy has a deep-rooted tradition before God (and is expected to
be paid back) but also in the European tradition (where philanthropy is an
educational task and not expected to be paid back) wealth is inextricably
linked with social engagement. Thus, in the German Constitutional Law,
paragraph 14, number 2, it says: Eigentum verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch
soll zugleich dem Wohle der Allgemeinheit dienen. So after all, and
maybe unexpected at first sight, we have to state that both objectives
of shareholders do indeed coincide. Even Steve Forbes (publisher of
the list of the 400 wealthiest men and women in the U.S.) summarizes:
’In America, business and philanthropy are two sides of the same coin.
Commerce means meeting the needs of the people. Philanthropy is the
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same.’15
The assumption of social responsibilities can manifest itself in various
ways. Let us discuss the cases in which the objectives of customers
and shareholders coincide: At first glance, the assumption of social
responsibilities has nothing in common with the basic financial services
a bank offers to customers. But we already mentioned that especially
savings banks in Germany are legally obliged to provide low-priced or
even free banking services to the young and underprivileged. So indeed,
a positive interdependency between both objectives exists. In the case of
commercial banks we sometimes observe special conditions for students
and apprentices, too. But, in our opinion this has nothing do to with
social responsiblities, as it is rather some kind of promotion to finally
win young customers’ loyalty.
The credit availability for customers can be motivated by social
responsiblity, too: Recently, there has been a discussion in the media
concerning so-called microcredits for start-up entrepreneurs in developing
countries16. It is about support for the poor who cannot provide any
collateral. Normally, the interest rate even for small amounts of money
(often less than 100 USD) needed for investment purposes (e.g. grain
seed) exceeds expected returns so that the entrepreneurs are finally
trapped in debt. Specialized financial institutions, often non-profit
organizations, grant loans at better conditions in order to help the poor
to help themselves. Although the universal banks we are talking about
regularly do not participate in microcredit lending, there does exist the
possibility to harmonize the objectives of shareholders and applicants for
credit.
Finally, even a bank’s management participates in social and cultural
sponsorship: It is rather unlikely that the amount of funds donated
for charitable purposes has any effect on managers’ salaries. On the
contrary, Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) describe applied monetary
and non-monetary incentive schemes for managers which are meant to
support their ’intrinsic motivation’ to engage in social and ecological
15Quotation found in: Conor O´Clery, Buddy, Can You Spare a Dime? In: Newsweek,
March 15th, 2004, p. 14.
16Pioneered by Muhammad Yunus from Grameen Bank, Nobel Peace Prize recipient
in 2006.
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projects. Moreover, making an appearance at sponsored charity events
provides a possiblity to easily improve managers’ reputation and influence
by entering into talks with politicians and the media.
So we may conclude this section: If we (somewhat unusually) decide
to measure the bank’s performance on the basis of the amount of social
benefits, then it is most likely that we also take into account the aspiration
not only of shareholder but also of customers and management.
2.2.5 Bank performance assessments: A trade-off
In the preceding sections, we exemplarily discussed several possible
conflicts arising among the objectives which different groups might pursue
in regard to banks. We limited the description to specific fields of conflict
which can be substantiated by references to literature. There can be no
doubt that numerous additional conflicts of interest exist. For example:
• Do managers favour competition? Probably not because they know
that competition might result in market failure. Or do they rather
fear that competition might reduce profit margins and managers’
income?
• Do shareholders benefit from sustainable value added? Or do
shareholders rather seek for outstanding short-term profits and sell
their shares before long-term threats to the soundness of the bank
become obvious?
• Does society have to tolerate the outstanding income and political
influence of bank managers? Remarkably, bank managers earn
more money than can be explained by human capital theories. And
moreover, they are additionally rewarded with the possibility to
exert pressure on political decision-making processes without being
legitimated by a democratic election.
• In how far do customers have to pay higher fees to compensate the
bank for the assumption of social responsibilities? This leads back
to the question whether charity is another banking output which
can be ’sold’, or whether shareholders really assume the obligation
at their own expense?
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As it was to be expected, we found no relevant literature dealing with
these issues. So we avoid any further reflections on these topics. But after
all, the message has become clear: Any trustworthy statements on bank
efficiency have to account for either the complexity of competing goals
or have to focus on single, well-defined aspects of bank performance.
Economic incentives
Legal framework
Moral obligations
Shareholder value
Social responsibilitiesSustainable value added
Outstanding income
and reputation
Competition
Credit availability
Monetary transactions
Soundness and
stability
Figure 2.1: Conflicting interests in the assessment of bank performance
So in order to conclude this section, let us step back to get an
overview. Figure 2.1 displays some kind of birds-eye view: We arranged
all objectives mentioned above in an equal distance to make clear that
– without a concrete research topic – there can be no priority. And
in fact, we learned that the attempts to ’maximise’ the performance
in any field inevitably affects the other goals and the whole system of
competing interests is likely to enter a state of imbalance in the long
run. So what keeps the system finally together? In the course of our
discussion, we already identified three mechanisms that maintain the
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objectives in balance.
1. Economic incentive schemes are a subject of Institutional Eco-
nomics. They support the harmonization of competing objectives
by means of market mechanisms, i.e. some kind of self-selection:
Behaviour in conformity with the rules will be monetarily rewarded,
whereas divergence leads to financial disadvantages. We already
discussed this kind of incentive scheme in the context of the moral
hazard problem between shareholders and managers. Another
application is the assessment of credit risks: Ideally, customers
applying for loans are not tempted to conceal their true motives
from the bank because this would lead to financial disadvantages
in the long run.
2. Not only economic incentive schemes receive legitimation and en-
forceability on the basis of the legal framework. Wherever market
mechanisms, i.e. the incentives to get a reward, cannot be applied,
legal norms restrict or prohibit ruthless business activities. We can
think of, e.g., a ban on usurious interests, merger control, disclosure
requirements, salary limits, etc. In contrast to incentive schemes,
compliance with the rules is not being rewarded but violations are
being penalized.
3. Beyond the sphere of economy and law participants in the financial
markets are obliged to meet basic moral requirements. The achieve-
ment of ’moral standards’ is rewarded by social appreciation, the
under-achievement by social proscription. We already mentioned
that the assumption of a certain degree of social responsibility on
the part of the bank is self-evident. In contrast, a moral assessment
of the core banking activities is rather delicate: In mediaevel times,
Christians were even prohibited from granting interest-bearing
loans. Today, granting micro-credits to the poor is considered to
be charitable. Analogously, it is a matter for debate, for instance,
what interest rate is immoral or whether the top managers’ salaries
are immoral.
So in fact, we disclosed some of the factors Fried et al. (2008) among
other authors call ’environmental factors’ of performance. The assessment
2.3 Measuring efficiency 25
of these factors is surely an issue worth considering in an interdisciplinary
context (legal science, social science). But in the subsequent sections
(2.3 and also 5.2), we will lay down why these environmental factors have
to be strictly separated from the assessment of efficiency. Although both
are central determinants of performance, only efficiency is accessible to
an econometric approach. We will now have a closer look at the question
we have avoided so far: How can we define and classify ’efficiency’ in
the context of the generic term ’performance’ and how can we measure
efficiency?
2.3 Measuring efficiency
2.3.1 Common accounting ratios
Traditional accounting ratios are often used by analysts to measure
banks’ cost efficiency. They are easy to construct and to use, and basically
take the form (DeYoung, 1997):
Efficiency ratio = annual non-interest expendituresannual net revenue
Annual non-interest expenditures are, e.g., salaries, benefits, materials
etc. The annual net revenue is the sum of net interest income (≡ interest
income - interest expenses) plus non-interest income (especially fees17).
Thus, if a bank A has less expenditures per monetary unit earned than
another bank B, the respective efficiency ratio of A is smaller. In other
words, and under the assumption of constant returns to scale, bank A
is more efficient than bank B18. Of course, values ≥ 1 are a cause for
concern19.
17In recent decades, fee-based activities have increased: E.g. Mutual fund sales,
data processing, letters of credit, financial advice, mortgage servicing. Note that
alternative accounting ratios of the form non-interest expensestotal assets are biased by these
activities, because they induce labour costs and add nothing to assets.
18Assume again two banks, bank C with the efficiency ratio 60100 , bank D with
600
1000 .
Although the efficiency ratios equal each other, bank D is less efficient if the
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale.
19Typical values range between 60% and 70% (DeYoung, 1997).
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Despite the appealing simplicity of this approach to efficiency, DeY-
oung (1997), Colwell and Davis (1992), Moormann and Sottocornola
(2009) among other authors critizise several aspects of accounting ratios.
In particular, DeYoung (1997) admits that on- as well as off-balance-sheet
activities are captured, indeed, but he also mentions ’myopic’ incentives.
He indicates that excessive cost cutting surely ameliorates the efficiency
ratio, but on the other hand damages the quality of services. So in
the long run business policy oriented towards the minimization of the
efficiency ratio will probably go astray.
Moreover, the measure is susceptible to changes of external prices.
Normally, we expect efficiency measures to react only to active manage-
ment decisions (Fried et al., 2008). So if environmental factors exert
influence the measure loses its characteristic as an efficiency indicator.
DeYoung (1997) notes that a steepening of the yield curve20 enhances in-
terest margins and drives up net revenue, thereby improving the efficiency
ratio. Similarly, Moormann and Sottocornola (2009) point to salaries and
wages that are basically determined outside the banks’ control. Rising
wages affects the non-interest expenditures, worsening the efficiency in-
dex. The authors make proposals how to correct the respective efficiency
ratios.
Finally, all authors agree upon the need to form peer groups in
order to compare the firm-specific efficiency values, i.e. groups of banks
operating at the same scale and in the same region, where all banks follow
the same strategic objectives and are identically organized. All these
environmental factors severely affect revenues and expenses of banks so
that comparisons among multiple groups are meaningless. The natural
extension of the peer group idea is the regression of accounting ratios
conditional on all environmental factors of importance.
2.3.2 Conditional accounting ratio regressions
To circumvent the rather imprecise construction of peer groups within
which banks can be compared on the basis of the efficiency ratio DeYoung
(1997) suggests a linear regression of
20I.e. the term structure of interest rates.
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Efficiency ratio = f(assets, non-interest incomenet revenue )
where ’assets’ controls for the size of the firm to capture scale effects
(and the benefits of so-called ’too big to fail’ protections), and the ratio of
non-interest income to net revenue controls for the growing importance
of fee-based activities biasing traditional accounting ratios (see footnote
17 above). After OLS estimation of the parameters, the expected (mean)
efficiency ratio for every bank can be calculated, given the firm-specific
values of the respective explanatory variables. A comparison between
the conditional mean value and the actual value of the efficiency ratio
provides insight whether a bank is better or worse than the average.
In his own application with 330 observations the author achieves a
goodness-of-fit R2 of 19.78%. He admits that a log-specification might
lead to a higher explanatory power of the model. Further explanatory
variables can be added (even squared variables), but he mentiones that it
is important that they are beyond the control of the management. This
excludes, for instance, the nonperforming loan ratio.
We found another regression on accounting ratios in Goddard et al.
(2004). The authors focus on productivity rather than efficiency. Note
that the terms ’productivity’ and ’efficiency’ are often interchanged
in the context of performance measurement. We will see in the next
sections that ’efficiency’ in scientific literature can also be understood as
a target-to-actual comparison.
In the context of accounting ratios, productivity is represented by a
ratio of output to input. So the most familiar productivity measure in
banking is the Return on Equity ROE. The ROE shares the same short-
comings with the efficiency ratio, i.e. myopic incentives (e.g. reduction
of equity, cost-cutting, risky transactions), external price-sensitivity and
comparability only within the same peer group.
Nevertheless, as the ROE is the key figure for banks’ management,
Goddard et al. (2004) discuss a linear model for the determinants of
profitability in the form:
ROE = f(ROE last period,CAR,OBS ratio, assets, ownership dummies)
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where the new explanatory variables are the capital-to-asset ratio CAR
indicating the risk attitude of the bank, the ratio of the nominal value
of off-balance-sheet activities to the sum of off-balance-sheet activities
plus total assets indicating the extent of fee-based activities, as well
as ownership dummies indicating commercial, cooperative and savings
banks.
As conditional accounting ratio regressions indeed offer the possibility
to compare banks among each other, they certainly provide a rough
guidance for practitioners. For scientific purposes, the above-mentioned
shortcomings prevail. Moreover, the use of the term ’efficiency’ has still
remained rather vague so far. We are now going to clarify the basic
concepts.
2.3.3 The concept of efficiency frontiers
According to the pioneering work of Farrell (1957), for the first
time ’efficiency’ was defined within a theory of production based on
a microeconomic framework (Kopp, 1981). The author constructed
optimal output-isoquants21 from production data, and defined the radial
distance between observed input combination and minimal/optimal input
combination as inefficiency, i.e. the waste of resources22. Thus, he defined
an efficiency measure as:
Input based efficiency = minimal inputs|output levelobserved inputs|output level ∈ (0, 1]
As observed inputs can only be equal to or greater than minimal
inputs, the efficiency measure ranges between zero and one, with an
efficiency score of 100% for the best firms. The optimum isoquant is
called a ’frontier function’ in the sense of ’undominated performance’
(Fried et al., 2008). Figuratively speaking, the frontier constitutes a lower
envelope bordering the data cloud. Aigner and Chu (1968) enumerate
21I.e. he determined minimal necessary input combinations for a given output level.
22To a certain extent this idea was the precursor of the Data Envelopment Analysis
DEA with the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS).
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three reasons why firms do not operate on the frontier, but above optimal
costs23:
1. The existence of random shocks outside the management’s control.
In the case of the agricultural sector, the authors certainly imply
environmental factors such as weather, plagues of insects etc. In
the case of financial firms it is worth considering what external
factors might be. Surely one may argue that the actual financial
crisis is an external shock to the banks. Upon closer inspection
it is indeed self-inflicted, although unexpected. We consider ’real’
external shocks to be, e.g. wars, revolutions and crime (robbery,
fraud). Furthermore, there also exists the possibility that costs
are lower than expected: The number of staff on sick leave, for
example, may be below average.
Random shocks surely bias the calculated firm-specific inefficiency
scores, because they are not ’real’ self-inflicted inefficieny. Insofar,
they are unwanted in the course of efficiency estimations. In the
case that we have only one observation per firm at hand, a serious
problem arises. Only longitudinal observations per firm can give the
researcher some indication of single randomly biased observations
which do not adequately reflect the management’s true ability.
2. The second reason mentioned by Aigner and Chu (1968) is technical
inefficiency. The authors hint at input factors technologically no
longer viable. In the case of banks the most important input factor
is the quality of labour. Generally, the authors assume big firms to
have advantages in developing employees’ qualifications through
extensive training. But we have seen in the course of the financial
crisis that even in big banks employees tended to be overstrained
by the management of complex financial portfolios. Moreover, also
intangible assets such as economic models for the assessment of
the risk of credit portfolios can be outdated: We have seen that
risk management based on BASEL II specifications basically under-
estimates the risk of a simultaneous default of multiple creditors.
This, together with insufficiently qualified employees, inevitably
23Or below optimal production, depending on the context.
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results in a poor quality of the outputs, i.e. the banks miss a
well-balanced asset structure. Consequently, in order to be insured
against unforeseen credit losses (either by equity or by insurance
companies) further resources have to be tied up.
3. Economic inefficiency reflects the firms’ inability to adjust the
output mix to the market situation. Assume that all firms – given
a certain market situation – operate on the frontier. After a while
the situation might change and some firms constitute a new frontier
with lower costs. Now the firms that do not quickly adjust their
business plans find themselves with an unfavourably allocated
input mix. So what are these ’market situations’ the authors
vaguely speak of in the case of banks? We can think of increased
performance of single input factors, e.g. faster computers and
electronic networks, higher educated employees from abroad etc. If
the bank is not able to adapt the new input mix soon it will incur
higher costs than necessary.
Another interesting question arises: Does the frontier have to belong
to the data or is it allowed to run outside the data? Farrell and subsequent
authors to date have assumed that the optimum can be delineated by
the available data. Consequently, the frontier itself is constituted by
observations, implying that the optimum firm(s) can be always found
among the data. Although econometricians basically have no choice but
to work with the data they have – and can only speculate about the
data they do not have – this question is worth considering. In particular,
it is about the question whether efficiency should be understood as a
normative or a descriptive concept.
All econometric and mathematical methods that constitute an efficient
frontier surely imply that efficiency is assessed in a descriptive sense.
The fundamental problem that possibly there are no efficient firms in
the data sample at all is typically left aside. A reference to asymptotics,
i.e. the case of sample size growing to infinity24, technically solves the
problem in such a manner that we have to assume the ’real’ efficient firm
to be somewhere in infinity. Practically, nobody knows what ’infinity’
24See e.g. Wooldrigde (2002, p.7).
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means, and, first and foremost, this assumption does not promote the
credibility of calculated efficiency scores. So finally, we have to state that
efficiency is a relative concept; always relative to the best observed firms
(Fried et al. (2008, p.11) call this: ’benchmarking the performance of the
rest against that of the best’).
Even though beyond econometrics, efficiency can also be considered
in a normative sense. What performance level are firms supposed to
achieve? We have seen in section 2.2 that multiple groups are in a position
to impose certain requirements on banks. As long as the expectations
can be quantified and the respective firm-specific performance can be
measured, the above-given definition by Farrell still holds. Only the
data-inherent estimated frontier is replaced by the groups’ expectations.
A problem arises when the objectives are given as legal norms. For
example, German savings banks are subject to the above-mentioned
Sparkassengesetze. So when it is said, for instance, that savings banks
are obliged to support the financial responsibility of young people, the
objective cannot be quantified. Eventually, the decision on normative
aspects of bank efficiency rests upon moral sense or jurisdiction.
2.3.4 Parametric cost frontiers in banking
Now we take a closer look to the question of how to constitute the
efficient frontier (in the case that banks’ performance can be measured).
Basically, there are two ways to describe the frontier: The paramet-
ric and the non-parametric approach. Due to a convenient economic
interpretability against the background of microeconomic theory we
will exclusively refer to parametric frontiers in the course of this study.
Moreover, non-parametric approaches are more or less a topic of the
Operations Research while we will strictly focus on econometric methods.
A parametric frontier is given in a functional form. The question
arises what variables are on the left-hand side and on the right-hand
side, respectively. On the basis of the original approach to efficiency
by Farrell (1957), it is an obvious solution to refer to microeconomic
concepts of production theory. In particular, Farrell’s idea of input
based efficiency can be generalized to the concept of cost functions. Cost
functions represent the locations of minimum costs given relative prices
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of the input factors and output quantities25.
costs = f(input prices, output quantities)
In fact, in most applications cost frontiers are estimated. They do not
only serve as efficiency standard, but can additionally provide information
on the features of the best practice technology as well (Kopp, 1981). As
typically all variables are measured in logs, the respective estimated linear
coefficients indicate the input price elasticities and the output elasticities.
Especially the sum of the output elasticities gives information about the
economies of scale in a particular industry (Coelli et al., 2005, p.18 f.).
We found many applications focusing on economies of scale in banking
and therefore estimating cost functions, e.g. Allen and Liu (2007),
Benston et al. (1982), Berger and Humphrey (1991), Clark and Speaker
(1994), Toby (2006). Especially against the background of the actual
financial crisis this is an essential question: If there is evidence that
big banks benefit from decreasing average costs26 and privileged access
to resources, in a way that they pass the cost advantages on to the
customers, it might be the objective of policy makers to support banks’
growth. This can be done by tolerantly allowing bank mergers, thereby
repressing competition in the financial markets in favour of monopoly
structures. Although the authors try to find out the optimal bank size
– DeYoung (1997) assumes between 100 and 300 million USD of assets,
Clark and Speaker (1994) beyond 1 billion USD of assets – cost functions
do not answer the urgent question when banks are too big to fail. In
this case, banks are of relevance to the system and will be bailed out
by society if they default. Even long before the recent financial crisis,
McAllister and McManus (1993) remarked that big banks, in any event,
generally follow business strategies that expose them to higher risks.
So obviously, efficiency assessments via cost frontiers serve two pur-
poses: First to establish the cost benchmark in order to measure the
’inefficiency distance’ of single firms, and second to derive new insight
25Refer to an appropriate textbook on microeconomics, e.g. Beatti and Taylor (1985,
p.203 f.).
26I.e. reducing costs per unit output by spreading fixed costs over a larger amount of
outputs (DeYoung, 1997).
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into production technologies from the characteristics of the benchmark
that in turn can serve as guidance to policy makers. Now that we have
concretized technical characteristics of the frontier, the above-given enu-
meration of reasons why observations differ from minimal costs can be
supplemented by adding technical aspects not considered by Aigner and
Chu (1968). Surely, just as random (economic, political) shocks, they
are unwanted because they bias the calculated efficiency scores.
4. An obvious reason are measurement errors. Whenever data are
collected, mistakes occur. And the researcher has no opportunity
to verify the correctness of individual data. Just as in the case of
random shocks, only multiple observations (over time) can help to
reveal the existence of erroneous data. Moreover, as we will see
in the next chapters, stochastic frontier methods exhibit a certain
fault tolerance.
5. The cost frontier according to the above-given definition is a func-
tion of inputs and outputs of firms. As a matter of course, to
appropriately assess the performance of firms, all inputs and out-
puts the firms employ have to be covered by the function. For
example, in the case of bottling plants, inputs are labour hours, one
or more conveyors, syrup and water. Very easily, we can count the
output in litres of lemonade. A firm with more litres of lemonade
output than another firm given the same amounts of inputs is ob-
viously more efficient. The situation is different if, in the firm with
less output of lemonade, milk is bottled, too. Analogously, in the
case of banks, we will learn that exactly the determination of inputs
and outputs poses an ongoing problem to literature (Girardone
et al., 2004): Whenever firms are benchmarked against the same
frontier function, we have to assume that they are using exactly
the same inputs and outputs.
The last point mentioned is a very crucial one. Especially in banking
we are not only not able to determine a definite set of inputs and outputs,
we moreover have to deal with numerous financial institutions that
have highly specialized in few products employing very specific inputs.
Normally, the researcher is not in a position to subordinate all more or
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less unique banks in his data set to a single frontier. This would lead to
efficiency differences among the banks that are not at all justified. In fact,
this discussion has a long history in efficiency estimation – though not
specifically in the case of banks. Stigler (1976), in a reply to Leibenstein
(1966), vehemently argues that our approach to efficiency resembles
a ’tunnel vision of outputs’: We impose one person’s goal upon firms
that have never accepted that goal. Tracing back efficiency changes to
employees’ motivation and management’s ability on the basis of (external)
objectives the firms are not even aware of is some kind of a ’shotgun
marriage’ (Stigler, 1976, p.214). Fried et al. (2008), Førsund et al. (1980)
summarize Stigler’s statement in the conclusion that every measured
inefficiency may be a reflection of the analyst’s failure to incorporate
all relevant variables. In particular, Stigler mentions the concept of
’producing utility’. According to this, a decrease in output may surely
be traced back to a change in motivation. But even the wish to avoid
unpleasant tasks eventually serves the producer’s utility. So at last, there
is always an output we can call ’corporate culture’. Stigler’s criticism is
certainly essential, but has never been picked up in empirical literature.
After all, it is not amenable to empirical proof or disproof (Førsund et al.,
1980).
Just as we explained in section 2.3.2, facing the unresolvable problem
of omitted and immeasurable variables, the authors have recourse to
further conditional variables controlling for environmental factors. Surely
this does not account for all aspects of banks’ specialization and individ-
ual product ’preferences’, but there is agreement in literature that an
appropriate set of control variables justifies a common frontier for a set
of banks27. So we will complete our list:
6. Banks operating in different competitive environments are subject
to a different competitive pressure. On the one hand we expect
banks in a lively competition to be in a weak position on the factor
27To our knowledge, nobody has ever checked the impact of auxiliary environmental
variables on the parameters of a ’pure technical’ cost function so far. Cost functions
are a microeconomically-founded closed system, whereas ’control variables’ are
an econometric peculiarity without any theoretical foundation. In particular, we
expect the choice of environmental control variables to considerably influence the
estimation of cost elasticities and scale economies.
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markets (labour, capital), i.e. they have to accept higher costs for
inputs. Consequently, they may not reach the minimum frontier
costs of banks with high market power. On the other hand, high
competitive pressure forces the banks to use inputs very efficiently to
stay in competition, because newcomers might capture their market
share. Not surprisingly we cannot make any overall assumption
concerning the impact of a control variable for the competitive
environment (e.g. Herfindahl-Index HHI, Concentration Ratio CR,
Lerner Index). Casu and Girardone (2009), for example, found in
empirical studies that the degree of competition and efficiency is
indeed positively related.
7. The regulatory environment affects firms’ possibilities to mix out-
puts and substitute inputs among each other. So for instance,
banks obliged to hold more equity or more deposits at the central
bank as reserve than other banks submitted to another regulatory
environment cannot reach the same output level with given inputs.
In other words, the regulatory framework ties up resources in a non-
productive use in favour of systemic stability. Moreover, certain
groups of banks might be forbidden to hold only securities without
granting loans, although the efficient frontier might be constituted
by banks investing only in securities. Even restrictive employment
laws belong to the regulatory environment as they can prevent
the banks from adjusting/reducing the number of employees if
necessary.
8. The last point often mentioned in literature and which affects banks’
efficiency is ownership structure. As we already discussed in section
2.2.1, different owners impose individual objectives upon banks. In
short, it is reasonable to assume banks obliged to take into account
social responsibilities to bear higher costs. It is not surprising,
though, that banks exhibiting a totally different ownership structure
are rarely benchmarked against the same frontier in literature.
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2.3.5 The meaning of ’average frontier’
There remains one big issue that we have not addressed yet. Up to
now, we have simply assumed the existence of a frontier constituted by the
best firms in the sample. But how are the coefficients of a parametrical
frontier determined in practice? Although this is not the place to discuss
the estimation techniques in detail28, we would like to shed some light
on the basic procedure and the issues arising.
Basically, the estimation of a cost function linear in parameters as
given in section 2.3.4 by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in-
dicates the average values of costs given output mix and input prices.
With reference to Marshall (1920) – mentioned in Stigler (1976) – this
characterizes the technology of the representative firm, neither excep-
tionally successfull nor just struggling. In so far, Marshall argues that
firms with fair success and managed with normal ability constitute the
production possibility. But literature never followed his proposition. The
idea of a Farrell-type frontier does not conceptually coincide with an
average function. It is all the more astonishing that even modern frontier
analyses are generally based upon average cost functions that are simply
shifted to an extreme.
The model usually takes the form:
costs = f(input prices, output quantities) + inefficiency
where the function f(...) contains the average technological parameters
(output and input price elasticities) and the inefficiency-term is a vertical
shift-parameter indicating the firm-specific deviation from the unknown
frontier. The first simple idea to determine the shift-parameter dates
back to Winsten (1957). The author suggested a two-step procedure:
First estimating the model by OLS, and second, shifting the regression
line downwards so that it passes through the conditionally lowermost
observation point of costs. As a result, there is (at least) one firm
without inefficiency, i.e. constituting the position of the frontier. The
other strictly positive residuals directly indicate the inefficiency of the
other firms.
28We will turn to this topic in the methodological part.
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Together with other studies, e.g. Aigner and Chu (1968), this approach
introduced the class of deterministic frontier methods. The authors soon
recognized the dependency of their models towards outliers. This attitude
arises from the fact that a deterministic frontier basically requires that
every detail of the production process is observed (and recorded without
mistakes) (Førsund et al., 1980). As this is virtually impossible – we
discussed this above – Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van de Broeck
(1977) put forward the class of stochastic frontiers (SFA): The assumption
that conditional minimal costs are a distribution rather than a fixed value
opens the possibility to account for random shocks and omitted variables.
Technically, this can be achieved by adding a random variable (usually
normally distributed) to the deterministic part f(...) of the cost frontier29.
This random variable is assumed to be independent of inefficiency, so
the estimation of the model requires another assumption regarding the
parametrical distribution of inefficiency30. Not only Førsund et al. (1980,
p.11) note that ’there do not appear to be good a priori arguments for
any particular distribution’, but we additionally encounter the problem
of disentangling random noise and inefficiency for specific firms after the
estimation (Jondrow et al., 1982).
Førsund et al. (1980) further substantiate the point that both aver-
age cost functions and frontier cost functions reflect one and the same
production technology, i.e. that both are conceptually identical. So
benchmarking firms against a cost function ’estimated by a novel but
complicated method’ and not against the simple average does not pro-
vide any new insight. In fact, as the authors speak of ’red herring’ in
this context, we get the impression that parts of the relevant literature
consider frontier analyses to be meaningless behind a smoke screen of
technical details.
We conclude this part of our preliminary notes with the announcement
that we will stick to stochastic frontiers in the course of the next chapters.
As they are a standard procedure in literature and excellently developed
29Random shocks even allow single observations to lie below the cost frontier.
30The possibility to estimate a deterministic frontier under the assumption of a specific
inefficiency distribution in a one-step Maximum-Likelihood procedure has been
discussed earlier in literature, e.g. Afriat (1972). But Greene (1980) showed that
this approach is likely to violate statistical properties.
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by renowned authors, we cannot ignore this field of application. Although
admittedly stochastic frontiers provide certain achievements – e.g. the
estimation of efficiency trend parameters (chapter 5) – we will keep the
criticisms in mind. In our opinion the application of the newly-discovered
Quantile Regression in the course of efficiency assessments overcomes
certain drawbacks mentioned above (chapter 6).
2.4 Introduction of the database
2.4.1 Relevance of the Bankscope database
A lot of empirical studies covering bank efficiency estimation are
based on balance sheet data provided by the Bankscope database31,
e.g. Girardone et al. (2009), Casu and Molyneux (2003), Pastor and
Serrano (2006), Bos and Schmiedel (2003), Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002),
Casu and Girardone (2006), Pastor et al. (1997), Weill (2004), Goddard
et al. (2004). The publisher claims that the benefit of this comprehensive
database is the harmonization of financial accounting standards across
the world, as well as the convenient statement in a common currency.
This provides a basis to any comparative study assessing the relative
efficiency ranking of national bank systems.
Nevertheless, authors working on Bankscope data will soon notice
a rather poor data quality: Basically, detailed balance sheet items are
hardly maintained. Simple tests for consistency of the remaining data
reveal, e.g., that balance sheet items do not add up to total assets or
liabilities, the differences of income and expenses do not match profits, or
some items are implausibly high or low (or even negative). Consequently,
users of Bankscope data implement individual forms of ’data cleansing’
before performing their estimation methods. As a matter of fact, the
subset of ’clean’ data resembles a random sample of observations even
across studies covering the same subject. It is no surprise that results
show little reproducibility.
Alternatively, authors focusing on specific countries often access high-
quality institutional databases provided by central banks. For instance,
31Bureau van Dijk, www.bvdep.com.
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the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago freely provides the Reports of Income
and Condition (Call Reports) covering numerous banks in the U.S. on the
internet32 (Al-Sharkas et al., 2008, Feng and Serletis, 2009, Kumbhakar
and Tsionas, 2008). On the other hand, the German Bundesbank restricts
their data to a privileged number of authors, e.g. Koetter and Poghosyan
(2009).
In the course of this synopsis, we put forward our approach how to
prepare Bankscope data before estimating cost functions for commercial
banks in detail33. For demonstrative purposes, we exclude savings and
cooperative banks from our study. So we circumvent the discussion
whether the assumption of a three-pillar banking system – as in Germany
– holds for other countries. Moreover, we try to include as many banks in
as many countries as possible to exhaust the possibilities in the data set.
2.4.2 Selection of variables
For the sake of example we prepared a dataset of commercial banks in
17 countries with a major occurence of observations in Bankscope: It is
Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Canada (CA), Switzerland (CH), Germany
(DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Italy
(IT), Japan (JP), Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO),
Russia (RU), Sweden (SE) and the USA (US). We assorted a total of 231
variables, including an identifier, the name, the specialization, the country
code etc., as well as all balance sheet items and income and expenses
statements listed in the so-called ’Bankscope Global Format’. When we
first restrict our observations to hold a positive figure in total assets, we
count a number of 3144 banks. The resulting number of observations
over the years 2000–2007 add up to 14780 and are distributed as given
in table 2.1.
As the number of observations strongly differ from country to country,
it is most likely that some countries will be excluded from further analyses
when imposing additional restrictions on the data. Moreover, we see
that the overall growth of observations over the years is considerably
32http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/
33Note that this is an illustrating example. Our procedure in the subsequent chapters
may slightly differ, according to the respective research objectives.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 SUM
AT 40 46 51 55 65 68 71 62 458
AU 8 8 6 4 8 21 21 18 94
CA 17 13 12 11 11 12 12 4 92
CH 154 155 159 155 162 166 154 132 1237
DE 175 177 173 167 165 170 179 158 1364
DK 45 43 39 39 50 56 58 57 387
ES 23 23 20 15 28 67 59 39 274
FR 150 146 140 136 142 155 137 102 1108
GB 77 76 79 78 111 128 118 83 750
IT 38 36 27 21 93 140 133 100 588
JP 144 143 139 136 137 135 132 128 1094
LU 98 86 83 79 80 79 80 67 652
NL 15 18 20 17 33 31 31 27 192
NO 8 8 8 8 9 9 11 8 69
RU 86 107 114 141 520 721 915 924 3528
SE 5 15 15 14 17 17 18 13 114
US 411 396 374 357 330 324 309 278 2779
SUM 1494 1496 1459 1433 1961 2299 2438 2200 14780
Table 2.1: Observed banks per year and country
biased by the increasing number of observations in Russia. But, as Russia
is the only non-OECD country in our dataset, we doubt the economic
comparability to the other banking systems. So Russian banks, too, will
soon be excluded from our analysis.
Needless to say, only few variables are fully maintained. So the number
of banks with a full set of 231 variables will be very small. It is our aim
to select the minimum full set of variables which allows us to reconstruct
simple balance sheet and income statement schemes and to finally set up
common pratice cost functions. In particular, the variables given in table
2.2 are the minium requirement for a reasonably meaningful analysis of
bank behaviour.
The table contains the Bankscope description of the variable and the
status of maintenance in percent. Wherever applicable, we used variables
with an availability of over 90% in our dataset. As it is required all
variables to be non-missing, the resulting number of observations is given
in table 2.3 on page 42. Astonishingly, only Russian banks still hold a
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Variable Availability
Identifier 100.00 %
Year 100.00 %
Country Code 100.00 %
Specialisation 100.00 %
Equity to Total Assets 99.99 %
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 99.68 %
Cost to Income Ratio 98.65 %
Total Assets th USD 100.00 %
Deposits and Short term funding th USD 99.30 %
Equity th USD 99.99 %
Loans th USD 98.48 %
Other Earning Assets th USD 99.79 %
Total Earning Assets th USD 99.99 %
Non Earning Assets th USD 99.89 %
Other Funding th USD 89.36 %
Non Interest bearing Funding th USD 99.92 %
Net Interest Revenue th USD 99.52 %
Other Operating Income th USD 99.29 %
Profit before Tax th USD 99.66 %
Liquid Assets th USD 99.91 %
Total Risk Assets th USD 99.96 %
Total Fixed Assets th USD 97.50 %
Total Deposits th USD 98.95 %
Total Borrowed Funds th USD 76.87 %
Other Liabilities th USD 99.92 %
Total Liabilities th USD 99.97 %
Total Capital Funds th USD 99.99 %
Total Liabilities and Equity th USD 100.00 %
Interest Income th USD 99.33 %
Total Revenue th USD 99.55 %
Interest Expenses th USD 98.55 %
Personnel Expenses th USD 89.52 %
Other Operating Expenses th USD 81.95 %
Total Expenses th USD 99.53 %
Operating Income th USD 99.57 %
Table 2.2: Observed variables and availability
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very high number of observations.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 SUM
AT 17 17 18 14 16 18 19 21 140
AU 2 3 3 1 5 12 17 16 59
CA 4 3 1 1 9
CH 93 77 78 70 69 63 70 66 586
DE 67 70 75 68 77 76 75 67 575
DK 9 3 3 3 11 18 26 31 104
ES 23 23 20 15 22 27 26 23 179
FR 1 1 1 18 28 34 29 112
GB 17 17 19 16 40 46 37 32 224
IT 29 28 18 16 73 114 109 87 474
JP 5 4 5 7 8 8 9 5 51
LU 1 9 14 17 13 54
NL 3 3 3 4 13 13 16 14 69
NO 6 5 8 6 6 6 8 6 51
RU 52 64 75 94 480 693 891 909 3258
SE 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 4 26
US 405 387 365 347 321 315 298 269 2707
SUM 736 708 694 665 1172 1455 1656 1592 8678
Table 2.3: Observed banks per year and country w/o imputation
2.4.3 Data validation and imputation
The reconstruction of some simple balance sheet and income statement
schemata offers the possibility of validating a part of the observed values
and of imputing some of the missing values. We found the following two
schemata for the balance sheet
Assets Liabilities & Equity
loans deposits & short term funding
other earning assets other funding
non-earning assets other non interest bearing
fixed assets equity
total assets total liabilities and equity
or alternatively
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Assets Liabilities & Equity
liquid assets total borrowed funds
total risk assets other liabilities
fixed assets total capital funds
total assets total liabilities and equity
And for the income statement:
Income Expenses
interest income interest expenses
fee + commission income fee + commission expenses
other operating income other operating expenses
personnel expenses
loan loss provisions
other admin expenses
total revenue total expenses
Some simple algebra on the basis of these schemata allows us to
unambiguously recover some of the missing values which were curiously
’forgotten’ by the Bankscope publishers. Additionally, we are offered the
possibility of correcting implausible values. Nevertheless, we found few
negative or zero entries in balance sheet items that did not make sense.
This is a point where the authors’ individual decisions determine the
set of banks in the final sample. Usually, the procedure is rather poorly
documented, so it is virtually impossible to reproduce any published
empirical study. To avoid losing too many observations, we adjusted
values < 0 to exactly zero. Table 2.4 shows the remaining number of
observations.
Now it is obvious that only few countries can be considered in the
course of further analyses. In particular, we chose the six countries with
most observations (Russia excluded): CH, DE, ES, GB, IT, US. The
resulting dataset comprises a total of 1031 banks.
The application of methods for panel data places high demands on
the number of years each bank is observed (individual panel length).
Table 2.5 shows how many of the banks are observed in how many years.
We see that especially in Spain and Italy none of the banks have records
for more than six years, whereas in Switzerland, Germany and the USA
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 SUM
AT 19 17 18 15 18 21 23 23 154
AU 3 4 3 3 6 14 19 16 68
CA 4 3 1 1 1 2 2 14
CH 96 86 92 87 87 85 84 76 693
DE 68 75 80 72 80 79 78 69 601
DK 9 3 3 3 12 20 27 35 112
ES 23 23 20 15 24 44 39 30 218
FR 2 3 3 3 20 30 35 30 126
GB 22 21 23 18 46 59 56 43 288
IT 33 29 19 18 82 125 123 96 525
JP 6 6 7 8 12 12 12 6 69
LU 1 12 17 19 17 66
NL 5 6 5 6 22 21 22 20 107
NO 7 6 8 7 8 8 10 7 61
RU 62 81 89 107 476 693 898 910 3316
SE 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 5 28
US 409 391 368 350 324 319 302 273 2736
SUM 772 757 742 716 1234 1552 1753 1656 9182
Table 2.4: Remaining observed banks per year and country
the majority of banks are fully observed. Unfortunately, all banks with
only a single or two occurences have to be excluded from our dataset to
ensure the full functionality of advanced panel data methods in efficiency
estimation. After all, only 793 commercial banks in six countries stand
the test of our data cleansing. The respective observations are distributed
as given in table 2.6.
Comparing our results to the total number of commercial banks as
reported by the Source OECD statistical database34, we encounter the
degree of coverage shown in table 2.7.
2.4.4 Descriptive statistics
Now that we have the full set of observations on the variables given
in table 2.2 on page 41, we try to find out something about the banks’
34Note that the definitions of what constitutes a ’commercial bank’ in both sources
do not necessarily have to coincide.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 SUM
CH 16 17 6 7 10 16 13 45 130
DE 22 22 15 13 12 14 10 28 136
ES 11 12 21 20 8 0 0 0 72
GB 8 16 18 26 5 3 1 5 82
IT 22 43 54 54 3 4 0 0 180
US 23 26 30 31 16 21 31 253 431
SUM 102 136 144 151 54 58 55 331 1031
Table 2.5: Number of banks observed over a period of 1-8 years
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 SUM
CH 73 77 89 84 85 83 79 73 643
DE 58 69 72 66 73 70 67 60 535
ES 19 19 20 15 24 28 29 29 183
GB 17 18 20 16 43 49 47 38 248
IT 13 14 15 13 74 104 99 85 417
US 362 365 367 350 324 319 302 272 2661
SUM 542 562 583 544 623 653 623 557 4687
Table 2.6: Observed banks per year and country, final dataset
size, profitability, balance sheet and income statement structure per
country and year. All data are given in thousands of US-Dollar; national
currencies were converted by means of a single exchange rate to exclude
floating effects. Moreover, to avoid the measurement of inflation effects
over the years, we have corrected all nominal values by OECD consumer
price indices in relation to the base year 2005.
Bank size
First, we set out to learn something about the size of banks in the
different countries. For this reason, we defined four classes of bank size
between zero and the value of total assets of the biggest bank in the
dataset (overall maximum). All class limits are equidistant in logs. The
relative share of banks per country and year belonging to each class is
shown in figure 2.2. To keep the information clearly arranged, we restrict
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CH 31.60 33.19 39.21 38.71 39.53 38.60 37.80 34.93
DE 28.43 34.67 37.89 37.29 43.45 42.94 41.10 36.59
ES 13.48 13.10 13.99 10.87 17.65 20.14 20.42 19.21
GB 4.16 4.68 5.26 4.49 12.43 14.63 13.99 11.34
IT 4.36 4.49 4.79 4.26 24.50 33.66 31.03 25.91
US 4.31 4.46 4.60 4.46 4.21 4.20 4.04 3.70
Table 2.7: Net coverage final dataset (in percent)
the diagram to the first and the last year in the dataset.
Obviously, the number of small banks decreased between 2000 and
2007. On the other hand, the share of huge and big banks strongly
increased, especially in Spain, Great Britain and Italy. In Switzerland,
Germany and the USA, the structure of the relative bank size remained
more or less unchanged. Unfortunately, as our data represent only a
fragmentary subset of the entire number of banks of each country, no
further conclusions about bank consolidation and merger activities can
be drawn. Some interesting ideas of how to illustrate the distribution
of bank size can be found in Ennis (2001). For example, the author
refers to ’Gibrat’s Law’: In the 1930s, Robert Gibrat was the first to
formalize a theory of a long-run distribution of firm size. As he assumes
the number of firms to be stable over time, and the growth rate of firms
to be characterized by an i.i.d. random variable independent of firm size,
the distribution of the logarithms of firm size will converge to the normal
distribution (convergence of a Random Walk). Ennis (2001) asks whether
Gibrat’s Law holds for the banking sector. For the sake of simplicity, he
avoids the application of extensive tests of Gibrat’s assumptions. The
author just checks whether the logarithmic size distribution of banks
resembles the normal distribution in terms of skewness and kurtosis.
We performed the same tests in table 2.8. Obviously, the distribution
is positively skewed and has heavier tails. The Jarque-Bera test for
normality is rejected every year of our sample. So just like Ennis (2001),
we cannot infer any relevance of Gibrat’s Law for the banking sector,
either.
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Figure 2.2: Bank size classes
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skewness kurtosis mean/median jbtest
2000 0.1903 3.5958 0.9993 0.0035
2001 0.2892 3.3708 1.0003 0.0040
2002 0.2692 3.3151 0.9978 0.0089
2003 0.3848 3.2173 1.0109 0.0007
2004 0.4074 3.0486 1.0125 0.0002
2005 0.3994 3.1361 1.0108 0.0001
2006 0.2862 3.4142 1.0061 0.0015
2007 0.3782 3.2027 1.0089 0.0008
normal 0.0000 3.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Table 2.8: Test for normality of log total assets
Balance sheet structure
Another interesting point is the structure of the particular balance
sheets in an international comparison. To shed some light on the re-
spective weights of different sources of funds on the one hand and the
allocation of capital in banking firms on the other hand we turn to the
simple balance sheet schemata given above. Summing up all particular
items per country and dividing by total assets delivers a stylized mean
balance sheet structure for each country. We rejected the consideration
of the time structure in favour of a pooled calculation to focus on the
differences across countries. Figure 2.3 shows the result.
We basically observe four sources of funding according to Bankscope
data availability: Equity, funds at no charge, other funds from the
money market, and deposits from customers. Usually, equity is the most
expensive source of funding, but also the most persistent. On the other
hand, deposits are a bank’s favourite as they are usually cheap, but
exhibit a high fluctuation. We associate the traditional intermediation
business with a high share of deposit funding. In fact, the commercial
banks in Switzerland and the USA primarily draw upon deposits as they
represent more than 80% of total liabilities and equity. Together with
a mean equity share of about 10%, the US-banks seem to display the
most conservative funding concept in our sample. On the other hand,
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Figure 2.3: Mean balance sheet structure
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banks in Italy, Great Britain and Spain lean on money market funding
to a greater extent. It is startling to observe that banks in Switzerland,
Germany and Great Britain do not even reach a 5% equity coverage of
total assets on average.
As for the assets, we expect financial intermediaries to basically
provide loans to customers. Actually, only in Spain, Italy and the USA
loans represent more than half of total assets. Especially in Switzerland
and Germany, we observe banks rather investing in other earning assets,
i.e. investment-grade securities, derivatives and insurance assets. The risk
structure of money market assets may be much more complex than the
credit risk, but the expected surplus yield causes banks to abandon the
classical credit business. Not surprisingly, non-earning assets, especially
cash and due from banks, should be held in as little quantity as possible
to just provide sufficient liquidity. Finally, although always considered to
serve as an important input factor in the context of financial production
functions, the amount of fixed assets turns out to be rather negligible.
Summing up, our rough guess would be to rate the Swiss and the
German banks in our dataset as most vulnerable, while the US banks
seem to exhibit a rather conservative balance sheet structure.
Profitability and risk
As the distribution of banks’ balance sheet data usually shows a very
high variance, the mean balance sheet structures given above might be
biased by some single extreme values. To gain some deeper insight into
banks’ profitability and risk, we calculated the robust median values of
Return on Equity (ROE), Cost to Income Ratio35 (CIR) and Equity
Ratio (EQR). The EQR is typically employed as a risk proxy in bank
efficiency literature. As is customary, a higher EQR implies less risk, a
higher CIR implies higher costs per unit earned and consequently less
efficiency36 and a higher ROE implies higher productivity.
35Sometimes called ’efficiency ratio’, see above (section 2.3).
36Remember that Burger et al. (2008) express doubts that the CIR delivers an
authentic reflection of banks’ efficiency, as the CIR is – due to its construction –
biased by input and output prices outside the management’s control, e.g. the price
of labour, the interest margin etc.
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The respective results per year and country are given in tables 2.9,
2.10 and 2.11. At first sight, it is rather difficult to detect any clear
trend over time or any advantages in certain countries. In fact, we
observe several breaks that point to data discontinuity rather than to
fundamental economic changes. For example, our data show a very
volatile trend in ROE for Spain and Italy. In 2003, ROE in Italy is
0.6%, and in the following year, ROE increases to 7.62%. We found no
confirmative remarks for this phenomenon in alternative sources. In fact,
with reference to table 2.4 on page 44, the reason might be the extremely
low number of observations in 2003. Nevertheless, one cannot dismiss the
impression that the years 2002 and 2003 are the least productive across
all countries. In an overall view, the US banks in our dataset seem to be
the most productive, as the ROE remains relatively stable at about 13%,
whereas productivity in German banks hardly exceeds 7% in median.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CH 9.28 6.41 5.17 5.76 5.46 5.65 6.93 6.55
DE 6.38 4.08 3.00 4.12 3.93 6.31 7.37 6.46
ES 4.80 4.29 3.35 5.33 7.11 11.09 11.45 14.69
GB 7.47 7.56 6.83 6.78 11.12 11.86 14.03 10.55
IT 5.00 4.38 2.01 0.60 7.62 8.88 9.85 9.84
US 14.41 13.81 13.95 13.32 13.41 13.56 12.73 10.59
Table 2.9: Return on equity, median values
As the values of the efficiency ratio are somewhat reciprocal to pro-
ductivity, one should expect high ROE values to be associated with
low CIR values. And in fact, in direct comparison tables 2.9 and 2.10
resemble each other like some kind of mirror image. Even the outliers
we reported – especially 2003 in Italy – are mirrored. So at least, we can
assume our data to be maintained correctly. Our sample might be of low
representability in some cases indeed.
The reported values of the equity ratio in table 2.11 are difficult to
associate with the tables above. In particular, we cannot confirm the
assumption of a negative correlation between ROE and EQR. Whereas in
Switzerland, Germany and the USA, EQR values exibit low volatility, we
notice a break between 2003 and 2004 in the other countries. Especially
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CH 56.43 61.02 65.86 63.92 62.86 61.70 60.74 60.00
DE 69.15 72.70 71.79 72.79 71.65 73.55 70.43 70.07
ES 68.06 70.46 65.45 61.05 55.11 51.01 47.17 45.34
GB 61.10 57.97 70.21 62.03 54.52 55.82 54.10 57.82
IT 73.08 78.70 83.64 94.02 68.70 63.54 60.85 59.42
US 57.52 58.37 56.54 58.73 58.17 57.23 57.92 60.03
Table 2.10: Cost income ratio, median values
the 10 percentage points loss of EQR in Spain seems rather implausible.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CH 9.21 8.69 8.71 8.44 8.88 8.40 8.38 8.24
DE 5.04 5.71 5.69 5.79 5.69 5.75 5.38 5.10
ES 13.60 12.53 11.21 18.81 8.22 7.17 6.81 6.46
GB 14.59 15.57 16.89 15.53 8.04 7.69 6.83 6.53
IT 11.48 9.95 13.68 13.29 8.00 7.75 7.33 6.88
US 8.54 8.73 9.00 9.00 9.13 9.37 9.50 9.81
Table 2.11: Equity ratio, median values
To confirm the impressions given above, we calculated the correlation
coefficients between all three variables on the basis of the full data, and
not just the median values. Table 2.12 shows the result. In fact, the EQR
is only negligibly correlated to CIR and ROE. Note that the R-squared
of the respective regressions would be only 1%. The correlation between
CIR and ROE is marginally higher, as was to be expected.
EQR ROE CIR
EQR 1.00 -0.10 0.12
ROE -0.10 1.00 -0.45
CIR 0.12 -0.45 1.00
Table 2.12: Correlation matrix: EQR, ROE, CIR
Finally, we learned that our dataset has behaved more regularly over
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the last years. Any further analyses based on cross sectional data should
refer to the years from 2004 to 2007.
Interest margin
After the description of balance sheet structures and commonly used
performance ratios we now turn to the discussion of income statement
components. Unfortunately, our data prohibit the inspection of detailed
income and expense components. So we restrict our analysis to operating
results, particularly the interest margin.
According to the idea of financial intermediation banks’ primary
source of value added is the interest margin between interest paid on
deposits and interest received on loans. To give a sense of the evolution
of interest margins in our dataset, we calculated the ratio of interest
payments to deposit volume per bank. In this way we obtain a proxy for
the respective deposit rate. Analogously, the loan interest rate can be
approximated by the ratio of interest income to loan volume. The results
are given as median values per year and country and are visualized in
figure 2.4.
The distance between the upper dashed line and the lower solid line is
the positive interest margin. Three characteristics should be commented
on: First, all lines exibit a U-shape with a minimum in 2004. As this
feature is very striking, we compared our calculated interest rates to the
EURIBOR 6-months rate published by the German Bundesbank. Figure
2.5 confirms the minimum interest level in 2004 and 2005. Thus, our
dataset seems to contain plausible information on banks’ interest income
and expenses, reflecting the historical economic situation.
The second feature attracting our attention is the solid line running
above the dashed line. This abnormal behaviour occurs in Switzerland
(2000, 2005 – 2007) and Italy (2004 – 2007). But as the negative interest
margin is not very distinctive, we can also assume slight inaccuracies
in the data. It is most likely that in both countries the interest margin
was very small. In the case of Switzerland – remember the balance sheet
structures given in figure 2.3 on page 49 – low deposit and loan rates
become manifest in a large share of deposit financing and little lending
activity. This connection does not hold for Italy though. As typically
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Figure 2.4: Interest margin
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Figure 2.5: Interest level EURIBOR (6 months)
mean interest rates range between 2% and 5%, we observe a very high
loan rate surplus in Germany and the UK. Together with a rather low
share of loans on the asset side of the balance sheet in figure 2.3, one can
guess that lending is limited by the consumers’ demand.
The third peculiarity worth mentioning is the absolute interest level
in an inter-country comparison. In particular, arbitrage dealers may
realize predictable yields by borrowing money in Switzerland or Italy
and placing funds in Germany or Great Britain. As we do not expect
simple interest arbitrage to be at customers’ disposal, we again assume
data discontinuity.
2.4.5 Final remarks on data quality
In empirical literature on bank efficiency estimation the presentation
of methods and results is usually rated much more highly than the de-
scription of the data preparation. Although it is general knowledge in
empirical analyses that the treatment of data strongly affects the estima-
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tion results, most authors do not give any details on data adjustment
nor deletion of observations. Hence, it is virtually impossible for other
authors to reproduce the emprirical findings on their own. Finally, the
informative value of empirical studies on bank efficiency is questionable.
This short report aims at closing the gap by means of a detailed and
comprehensible proposal of how to prepare Bankscope accounting data
in order to set up cost functions for efficiency estimation. We showed
that the number of usable observations rapidly decreases when imposing
certain restrictions on the integrity and plausibility of the data. Our
final dataset comprises six countries in the years 2000 to 2007 with 4687
observations on 1031 commercial banks. This is far away from what one
may call ’representability’.
We used the resulting sample to learn something about the banking
systems in the countries and years we covered. After the presentation
of descriptive statistics on banks’ size, asset and liability structure,
profitability and interest margin in each country, we soon reached the
limits of explanatory possibilities. Nevertheless, our data contain enough
information to set up commonly applied cost functions for banking firms
in the course of the methodical chapters 4 to 6.
3 Chapter 3Discussion of the empiricalassessment of bank efficiency
in the frame of a Scheme of
Adequation
3.1 Introduction
In the public discussion of the current financial crisis banks are termed
’institutions of systemic relevance’. There is no consistent definition
of relevance to the system, though; it apparently goes together with
intricate financial links between banks and the other economic sectors.
As a consequence this means: if the banks fail, the whole economy fails.
In order to prevent the failure of banks policy-maker discuss whether it
can thus be legitimate to place on the shoulders of the population and
of future generations a burden of additional debts on an unprecedented
scale.
The current devices to overcome the financial crisis thus lead to the
conclusion that banks belong to the most important economic institutions
in the world. In the relevant literature we find a vast amount of studies
treating the efficiency of these very institutions. So one might expect a
large contribution to the explanation of the current occurences. One must
bear in mind that they are the expression of a fundamental failure of
the performance of banks. For some decades authors have been aware of
the rising importance of banks and the financial interrelations connected
with it. On the other hand the results of these studies have never gained
public, political or management interest.
In view of the bulk of publications and the lively discussions among
renowned authors one cannot presume the research on bank efficiency
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to be at an early stage of development or its being impaired by funda-
mental logical flaws. On the contrary: an overview of the wide field of
relevant literature provides the reader with a totally consistent picture of
bank production in general, of special economic demands on production
processes, and of the methods of econometric assessment of efficiency.
The whole literature on bank efficiency, however, seems to thrive in
an ’academic bubble’ so to speak beside reality. Strangely enough even
recent publications do not contain any hints at, explanations for, or
perhaps even warnings against the financial crisis. Thus the reader gets
the impression that the institutions dealt with in literature are not those
banks he reads about in the newspapers. Obviously something about
banks is being assessed which does not appear to be real.
How can we ascertain with scientific methods the supposition just put
forward? Within the frame of this chapter we would like to enlarge upon
the problem and have recourse to ’statistical adequation’. In accordance
with Grohmann (1988) we apply a scheme which may prove to be a
touchstone of any empirical analysis. By means of this scheme we would
like to show if and where in the frame of the analyses the description
of banks in a scientific form differs from the image of banks prevailing
in politics and economy. In doing so we assume a basic knowledge of
the relevant literature on bank efficiency. Alternatively, in order to
provide insight into the matter, we refer to the articles available to us by
Girardone et al. (2009), Pastor and Serrano (2006) and Fitzpatrick and
McQuinn (2005).
It is our aim to provide new impulses to a scientific discussion on the
improvement of the meaning of studies on bank efficiency. In view of
the current situation of the financial markets we believe research on the
activities of banks to be essential as it can provide help to economic policy.
On account of the detailed accounting regulations for banks scientists
dispose of a rich fund of data especially in central banks and authorities1.
The methods of efficiency assessment on the basis of contributions of
leading econometricians and mathematicians have been implemented
in statistical programs in the meantime so that the access to empirical
1However also commercial bank data like Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk, Fitch Ratings)
are available which are most suitable for the international comparison on account
of the consolidation of national accounting standards.
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efficiency analyses is open to a wider public. The use of this source ought
not to be restricted to the repetition of views perhaps already outdated.
We subdivide this chapter as follows: in section 3.2 we comment
on the fundamentals of statistical adequation and the principle of an
ideal-type conceptualization in view of the questions to be asked. In
section 3.3 we ascertain how to assess the empirical studies on bank
efficiency available to us in the context of the schemes laid down. Section
3.4 contains the summary and the outlook.
3.2 Concrete reality and ideal concept
The way of describing objects of research of economic and social
analyses shows qualitative differences. First and foremost it is important
to differentiate between concrete reality and ideal concepts or, more
specifically, to answer the question how appropriately a scientific and
concrete description of banks matches an ideal and implicitly underlying
concept of banks in the frame of an empirical investigation.
These terms become understandable if one tries to get a general
idea of the way social phenomena are characterized: let us assume
that in the context of an analysis a scientist sets out to count the
number of households in Germany. The scientist is confronted with an
unsurmountable problem: on principle ’households’ cannot be observed
and, thus, are not countable. Although society has an idea of what
is characteristic of a household2 the idea itself cannot be formally laid
down. If the scientist, though, operationalizes his endeavor in such a way
as to count all German apartments in which according to the residents’
registration office a family lives with children, then a definite number
can be given. Now it is the task of the scientist who evaluates the
data to judge if, to his mind, the value obtained reflects the number of
’households’ adequately.
Numerous examples show that this assessment – Menges (1982) talks
of a ’semantic recolouring’ – is by no means a trivial problem. In those ex-
amples no adequate auxiliary quantities of social phenomena are recorded.
This corresponds to a dissatisfaction of society which becomes apparent
2Thus for instance living in a partnership, with a common budget.
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in a fundamental distrust of ’statistical surveys’: Brachinger (2007) e.g.
quotes the difficulties of an objective assessment of an inflation rate which
at the same time serves as a basis for wage negotiations and thus directly
determines the purchasing power of the population. Overcoming the
’information deficit observed’ 3 between quantities measured and intended
objects of research is henceforth to be defined as the criterion of success
of the adequation task. A fundamental reasoning has to be undertaken
which at first sight does not seem to be related to the literature on bank
efficiency. It is the goal of the paper, though, to outline this relevance.
3.2.1 Statistical adequation
A lengthy discussion of the ’statistical adequation’ would be out of
place in this survey. So we here confine ourselves to a short survey
only; for a comprising treatment we refer to Hartwig (1956), Menges
(1982), Grohmann (1988) and Litz (1990). Fundamentally, the procedure
of adequation describes the task of transforming a real problem into a
formal one. Part of this reasoning is not only operationalization in a
narrower sense, but first and foremost the decision how the object to
be described can be characterized. Or in other words: What is to be
assessed. In the reality of social science one uses terms which can be
understood as ideal types. What the characteristic features of ideal types
are will be expatiated on with reference to the works of Max Weber
further down.
Figure 3.1 shows our concept of a comprising adequation ’cycle’ in
the sense of Grohmann (1988): The operationalization, i.e. the choice
of appropriate unities of measurement in order to quantify problems
of economic science poses the greatest challenge to the economist. As
we shall see later the question in practice is not only which data are
desirable but also which data are at all available. With the data at
hand the next steps are the choice of an appropriate statistical method
and the estimation of an econometric model. As a rule one obtains as
a result estimated parameters which in the first place are only figures.
With the aid of economic know-how and against the background of
operationalization one must succeed in interpreting those figures as a
3Brachinger (2007, pp. 10).
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solution to the initial question. If no connection can be established with
the initial question4 the operationalization has to be modified and the
model has eventually to be re-estimated.
In the course of this paper the scheme described will be applied
repeatedly. It is our goal to examine the pros and cons of the existing
adequation in assessing bank efficiency as well as alternative possibilities
in the scope of this scheme.
adequation - diagram
real sector formal sector
real problem formal problem
NORMS / VALUES FIGURES
operationalization
interpretation formal solutionreal solution
adjustment
argumentatively
optimization
methodically
Figure 3.1: Adequation scheme in accordance with Grohmann (1988)
Just one more remark on the term of ’adequation’: it goes back to the
idea adaequata in the sense of De Spinoza5. It reflects less the literally
’appropriate idea’ rather than the ’perfect idea’ in order to characterize
the object of investigation. This idea is set apart by its being not only
4This need not mean that the figures only contradict the assumption put forward in
the description of the problem.
5Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677), dutch philosopher and rationalist.
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’true’ – more ideally possible than able to be observed – (idea vera), but
moreover carries ideal-type features which in this purity can never be met
with in reality. This very term of ideal type which marks the beginning
of every adequation will now be placed into the focus of our attention.
3.2.2 Ideal-type conceptualization
What exactly is characteristic of those ideal-type social terms already
alluded to several times?
In modern research one has recourse to the very detailed investigations
of Max Weber. In his fundamental article The objectivity of social science
and social policy dated 1904 Weber6 lays down the demands on the still
recent social and economic sciences. He rejects the expectation empirical
sciences can establish ’binding ideals and norms in order to provide advice
for practical life’ (p. 149) . In other words: it is the goal of social research
to provide information free from value-judgements on the ’general cultural
meaning of the socioeconomic structure of human social life’ (p. 165).
This information can be interpreted by the decision-makers themselves
and may serve as a basis for political aspirations and changes. Of course,
the ’providers’ of scientific knowledge are never free from judgements,
either. Hence, they ought ’first and at every moment to make very clear
to the reader and to themselves which7 are the criteria applied to reality
and from which the value-judgement is derived [...]. Hence, in such cases,
the second fundamental condition of scientific impartiality is to let the
reader always know that and where the active scientist ends and man
with his wishes begins to speak, where arguments are addressed to reason
and where they are addressed to the emotions’ (pp. 156). This is a sharp
distinction between social science as a ’thoughtful ordering of facts’ and
social policy as ’an exposition of ideals’ (p. 157). If scientists neglect the
two demands they intermingle science and policy which constitutes ’the
most harmful element of our discipline’ (p. 157).
So at an early stage Weber is aware of the fact that in the case of
uncritical argumentation social sciences may become a mere platform
for views and discussions. Therefore he is particulary interested in
6The subsequent quotations refer to Weber (1988).
7Underlined words are spaced out in the German original.
3.2 Concrete reality and ideal concept 63
establishing ’objectivity’ in economic and social sciences. This does not
mean at all to reject value-judgements in a society: ’The transcendental
presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain
culture or any ’culture’ in general to be valuable but rather in the fact
that we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and a will to
take a deliberate attitude toward the world and to lend it significance’
(p. 180).
A way out of the dilemma between the identity of cultural being
and social scientist is provided by laws as they determine the natural
sciences. Weber uses the term as ’a return of certain causal relationships’
(p. 171). He is aware, however, of the uselessness of looking for these
very connections within the social sciences. The causes and significance
of cultural phenomena are not subject to a description of causes and
effects: Weber talks of the ’futility of [...] the idea that it might be the
goal however remote of cultural science to create a coherent system of
concepts which reality might be summarized in and out of which it might
then be derived again’ (p. 184).
Now we are still faced with the problem of providing the economic and
social sciences with an objective touchstone8 if values and laws cannot
become the object of investigations. This is the context in which Weber
introduces the above-mentioned term of ideal type.
An ideal-type concept is not created as a kind of theoretical average
construct of observations of which we dispose. On the contrary, we
attempt an abstraction of reality, the achievement of which remains
unattainable under the restrictions of society and thus leads to a ’utopia’
(p. 190). This is the distinction between ideal type and generic term
which endeavours to give us a classification of existing phenomena. No
observations can be summarized under an ideal type as it does not contain
a general description of features. ’It is a thought construct which is not
[...] actual reality and which much less is meant as a scheme in which
reality ought to be classified as an illustration’ (p. 194). Individual
phenomena are selected and undergo a process of abstraction9. On
8’As emergency harbours so to speak until one had learned to find one’s way on the
immense ocean of empirical facts’ (p. 206).
9’For everywhere it is the purpose of ideal-type conceptualization clearly to bring out
not traits common to elements of reality but on the contrary the characteristics of
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closer examination therefore all thought constructs of social sciences are
ideal-type concepts.
It has already been mentioned that ’objectivity’ implies the absence
of personal judgements. ’An ideal type is completely indifferent to
evaluation, it has nothing to do with any ’perfection’ but a purely logical
one’ (p. 200). It is this purity which enables us to conceive and describe
the essence of things so that a consensus can be achieved which imparts
the same concept of the ideal to every observer.
The deliberate accentuation of reality presupposes an imagination
which borders on wishful thinking, but at least establishes relationships
objectively accessible to reason or, respectively, ’appear to be adequate
to our nomological knowledge’ (p. 192). Apart from the absence of
values there must remain a portion of judgement connected with the
ideal type: ’If however we relate this concept (exchange) to the concept
of marginal utility for instance, and construct the concept of ’economic
exchange’ as an economically rational event, this then contains, as every
concept does which is logically elaborated, a judgement concerning the
’typical’ conditions of exchange’ (p. 202). In this process each participant
is influenced in his judgement by the society around him, so that the
’idea of modern historically given society based on exchange economy’
(pp. 191) must become apparent in the concept of the ideal type. It may
assume the aspiration to constitute a model.
In scientific research, ultimatively, the ideal type proves not to be an
end in itself10. After detailed considerations of the characteristic features
of the ideal type we must finally clarify once again its purpose in so far
as it has not been discussed in the context of adequation: According
to Weber it is the task of research to ’confront empirical reality with
the ideal type’ (p. 212). A glance at divergencies between ideal type
and reality in the aspects mentioned arouses the scientist’s interest. So
for example an investigation of ’perfect competition’ is never of interest,
but only the question why in some markets these very conditions do not
prevail. The account of deficient competition can only be illustrated with
reference to the ideal type. ’All constructions of an essence [...] are ideal
cultural phenomena’ (p. 202).
10’The concept of abstract ideal types must be considered not as a goal, but as a
means to an end’ (p. 193).
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types [...] of high heuristic value for research and high systematic value
for the construction if they are employed solely as a conceptual means
for the comparison and evaluation of reality against their background’
(pp. 198).
3.3 Adequation within the empirical assessment of
bank efficiency
What purpose do the fundamentals of adequation and ideal type as
laid down above serve in the context of an essay on the public acceptance
of the assessment of bank efficiency? It is of course apparent at once
that the endeavour to assess bank efficiency of whatever kind can only
originate from an ideal-tpye classification of what can be conceived of a
bank and what its ’efficient’ performance may be. Only in view of this
ideal-type conception is it possible to investigate into the divergencies
why some banks do not exhibit the characteristics which we tend to
define as efficient bank activities. As long as this ideal-type conception
has not been laid down or at least implicitly understood the attempt
at assessing efficiency must be regarded as vain. As social values and
legal norms conflict with an objective view of the characteristics of banks
one reaches here the initial problem of adequation in the context of
the empirical assessment of bank efficiency. If the social agreement on
the essence of banks fails it becomes impossible to expose the figures
obtained (estimated) by the assessment of efficiency as a solution to the
real problem.
3.3.1 Banks as a producing business
We now aim at tracing back the attempts at a solution of the task
of adequation following the example of the current literature on bank
efficiency. As a model we would like to point out the research done by
Girardone et al. (2009). We do so not because this research exhibits
any particularities but because, on the contrary, in our view and after
examination of numerous articles on the subject it constitutes an excellent
synthesis of adequation as it is usually done in today’s assessment of
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bank efficiency. Moreover, the article is the most recent study available
to us published in a renowned journal. In recent years, the authors have
participated in numerous further projects on the subject.
All studies on bank efficiency agree on seeing in banks a kind of ’pro-
ducing’ business with financial products. Thus, whatever the production
process may be like the question of input and output factors in this
context arises. Girardone et al. (2004) state the problem: ’While the
multiproduct nature of the banking firm is widely recognized, there is
still no agreement as to the explicit definition and measurement of banks’
inputs and outputs’.
Usually there are two well-established solutions describing the pro-
duction process in banks (Tortosa-Ausina, 2002): the so called Asset
Approach according to Sealey and Lindley (1977) and the Value Added
Approach according to Berger et al. (1987). In what follows we shall
briefly describe either approach having recourse to the findings of Berger
and Humphrey (1992)11.
The Asset Approach according to Sealey/Lindley (1977)
The authors Sealey and Lindley (1977) for the first time set out to
delineate a universal concept of banks which they have missed in literature
so far12. This concept of banks denotes them as institutions aiming at
optimizing profits in the sense of production theory. A production
process is here characterized as a transformation of input achievements
into outputs of higher value. Thus, the component parts of the purely
technical outputs (management services, administration, advisory service,
trusteeship activities) can be differentiated from the economic output
which provides ’genuine’ additional value. In the case of banks the
process of value added is defined by the borrowing of monetary funds
from surplus spending units and the lending of funds to deficit spending
units (financial intermediation). If the lending interest rate lies above the
11Their statements also contain a reference to the User Cost Approach according to
Hancock (1991). We do not know of any empirical application, though, so that a
comment on user costs may be discarded here.
12Authors like Benston (1965) advocated the view a definition of banks could be
adapted to any research project.
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borrowing interest rate a value added for the bank is created. Typically,
this interest margin is based on a transformation from cheap (usually
short-term) money into expensive (usually long-term) money. Porter
(1961) calls this ’the very essence of banking, which is to borrow short
and lend long’.
Thus the pivotal factor of bank production is the value of the customer
deposits. It is characteristic of an input that it causes costs at once but
does itself not yet generate yield. This is in fact in accordance with the
characteristics of deposits which, on the one hand, must be managed and
which, on the other hand, must be lent with interest to customers. One
could object that a further characteristic of an input factor should be that
in the course of the production process it is deprived of its independent
existence. As far as customer deposits are concerned this is of course not
the case. Similarly, in order to collect deposits from customers one needs
genuine production factors (labour, capital). Hence the authors describe
a production process going on in two steps in which customer deposits
exhibit the features both of inputs and of outputs as well. In the context
of empirical analyses this point is discarded, however, and deposits are
given a pure input character.
Berger and Humphrey (1992) note that in this view of banks the
aspect of service is completely neglected. Basically, we have to do with
accounting and advisory services for the customer. Hence, the Asset
Approach they continue is barely appropriate to describe big banks which
buy deposits from other banks and important investors in order to grant
these funds as credits.
In empirical analyses the Asset Approach (occasionally also called
Intermediation Approach) is defined in the following way (Girardone
et al., 2009): One can consider as outputs of the production process of
banks the value of credits and investment items as listed in the balance
sheet. As inputs the authors consider the value of deposits, the value of
labour as well as tangible assets. Sometimes, in recent times, one comes
across the additional output ’value of off-balance sheet items’ (Casu and
Girardone, 2005). Hence it is implicitely understood that the study by
Sealey and Lindley (1977) published already 30 years ago by means of
this modification might be adapted to a modern view of banks. Usually,
the above three-input three-output constellation is defined as ’Modified
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Intermediation Approach’.
There seems to be a contradiction to the usual conception of produc-
tion processes in so far as the record kept of production is associated
with floating quantities and not with stock values recorded in the bal-
ance sheet at a closing date. In this case one might suppose that given
an unaltered balance sheet from one year to the next no production
has taken place. Still, employees were active who must have achieved
a performance. The authors overcome this problem by means of the
statement that maintaining the value of the balance sheet item alone
can be considered as a performance. Thus one presupposes a steady flow
of new investments and allocations of funds in analogy to a bucket full
of holes the water level of which would sink if water were not steadily
added.
The Value Added Approach according to Berger (1987)
Put in the context of other theories on bank production we find
a description of the Value Added Approach in Berger et al. (1987)
and Berger and Humphrey (1992). Whereas the Asset Approach or
the Intermediation Approach respectively invariably record outputs as
assets and inputs as liabilities, there is no such classification with the
Value Added Approach: all considerable items in the balance sheet are
investigated in view of examining whether the surpluses generated from
them exceed the opportunity costs or not (Pastor et al., 1997). In the
first case we speak of an output. In principle, it is possible in this
context to distinguish between ’important’ and ’unimportant’ outputs or
intermediate products. If the costs exceed the yield we have to do with
an input.
In practice the application of this principle is mostly impossible as we
seldom dispose of such detailed data from internal bank controlling. For
this reason, most authors have recourse to the fundamental results of
Berger and Humphrey (1992): Consequently, the two balance sheet items
originating from bank production, i.e. deposits and loans exhibit the cost
structure of outputs13. All kinds of acquired funds (from the financial
13In the context of the Intermediation Approach we have already stated that customer
deposits also exhibit the characteristics of outputs (an an intermediate product).
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markets, from the central bank) are inputs. Moreover, we distinguish
the original input factors labour and capital.
Value Added and Asset Approach: a comparison
In view of the empirical studies the difference for the reader between
the two approaches lies only in the fact that the item deposits is treated as
input in one paper and as output in the other14. Must these approaches
then be dealt with differently in an ideal-type description of banks?
Surely one may argue that the Value Added Approach is based on
another idea of bank activity as no longer the transformation of deposits
into loans is the main purpose after all. A problem arises, though, if
one tries to uncover the concept of banks as it is alternatively implied
by the authors. In the relevant literature there is no hint at an equally
reasonable argumentation as that of Sealey and Lindley (1977). In
fact, the remarks of Berger and Humphrey (1992) make sense only if
one is aware of the reflections on the Asset Approach. Concretely, the
uninformed reader would be surprised how one can at all conceive the
idea of modelling input and output factors of a production process by
means of balance sheet figures.
In the context of our comments on the problem of adequation we
can therefore see no advantage in the Value Added Approach itself for
the comprehension of bank activities. The pivotal point of the two
approaches is the conception that bank activities can be described as
the acquisition of ’cheap money’ which increases by means of skilful
management and ’refinement’, so to speak. As all economic production
is characterized by refinement the analogy arises to assume in banks, too,
a classical production process, which may sufficiently be described by
the microeconomic optimization of profits.
Comment on the use of the approaches in literature
Against the background of the two approaches outlined above Tortosa-
Ausina (2002) highlights the adequation problem which literature is
14Equally, in the context of the User Cost Approach according to Hancock (1991) the
decisive question is whether to classify deposits as output or input.
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clearly confronted with: hence the problem may be focused around the
question which of the two production approaches an author must choose
in order to visualize the idea of banks as he conceives it: ’There is no
consensus on this point [...] to measure efficiency’. In particular, most
authors, as is well known, are concerned with the definition of outputs:
Mlima and Hjalmarsson (2002) remark: ’This unresolved question has
handicapped the research effort when comparing results from different
studies’. Tortosa-Ausina (2002), in fact, no longer restricts himself to the
characteristics of deposits, but adds in his final remarks that if only one
had more data one would be in a position to measure more products and
services. The author is fully aware of the fact that every new definition
of production must lead to different results in the context of empirical
assessments. He draws the following conclusion from a comparison of
efficiency measurements carried out on the basis of the Value Added and
the Asset Approach: ’When deposits are also treated as output, savings
bank’s efficiency is always higher than that of commercial banks [...].
However, the pattern is reversed [...] according to the Asset Approach’.
His recommendation runs as follows: ’Consequently, conclusions relative
to the efficiency [...] could depend on the model chosen. Our final
comments should at least be followed by ’according to our definition of
bank output’, as our models may not capture the whole range of products
and services provided by the banking firm’.
Obviously, the dilemma of the measurement of bank efficiency is well
known: We are faced with a complete irregularity of results which can
undermine every serious statement on bank efficiency. Astonishingly
enough, no conclusion has ever been drawn so far from this state of
affairs. At least an attempt might have been undertaken to examine on
the basis of some banks which model is adequate to the activities of the
banks concerned.
In our view the adequation problem does not lie in the choice of the
outputs in the balance sheet of banks. We are not in a position to provide
good reasons for deposits to be listed as input or output in a financial
production process. The authors in literature as well are obviously faced
with a problem which cannot be solved as for decades no consensus has
been achieved on a question which appears to be trivial at first sight.
It is worth mentioning that Sealey and Lindley (1977) are the first
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to criticize the attitude in literature which seems to allow of an ideal
picture of banks individually conceived according to one’s research project
(Benston, 1965). It cannot have been the authors’ intention that on the
basis of their own proposals new interpretations keep coming up motivated
more by the greater availability of data than by serious reflections on
the tasks of banks. The reader of studies on bank efficiency needs some
practice indeed to perceive how a production process is modelled out
of a balance sheet. Incomprehension and general distrust of empirical
results arise of course when reading further studies one learns that the
choice of balance sheet items can be perfomed in whatever manner.
We suggest to return to Max Werber’s ideal-type conceptualization:
The approach by Sealey and Lindley (1977) was a well-founded attempt
to firmly establish the image of banks prevalent in society. The attempts
at modifications by different authors in subsequent years only reveal
that the Intermediation Approach no longer appeared to be ’adequate’
and that literature tried to adapt itself to a new social image of banks.
What was lacking though was to motivate and sufficiently corrobarate
the modifications.
3.3.2 Operationalization and estimation
After having expatiated on the starting point of every adequation cycle
which consists in the description of the ideal-type conception of what is
to be measured we ought to continue with the process of measurement
and estimation usually found in literature. These activities are to be
classified under ’formal sector’ in illustration 3.1.
Concretely, for a judgement on efficiency a production optimum must
be identified, e.g. in the manner of a production function. The gap
between the under-achievement of firms and their optimal production
can then be defined as inefficiency. The usual methods of efficiency
measurement on the basis of this concept of efficiency are the parametric
Stochastic Frontier Analysis SFA and the non-parametric, non-stochastic
Data Envelopment Analysis DEA.
Here again we find numerous aspects which may be dealt with in the
context of an evaluation of the validity of bank efficiency studies. On
the one hand we have to consider the quality and availability of data
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(hence the operationalization of an ideal picture by means of appropriate
auxiliary ’proxy’ variables), on the other hand the choice of a parametric
or non-parametric estimation of the respective model.
At this point, however, we should not like to interrupt the purely
verbal argumentation by formal aspects. As part of an outlook we
would just like to mention that a formal assessment is the motivation
for a future paper on specific problems of adequation in the context of
efficiency estimation. The reader interested in these questions may refer
to Hjalmarsson et al. (1996), Bauer et al. (1998) and Weill (2004) as
examples. The authors clearly demonstrate in bank efficiency estimation
that with identical data and extreme censorship it is not possible to
establish any correlation worth mentioning between efficiency scores
derived from different methods. Similar inconsistencies between the
results of different methods are reported by Berger et al. (1993).
3.3.3 Interpretation and comparison
We now deal with the last stage of the adequation scheme in figure
3.1. If for every bank concerned we dispose of efficiency values on the
basis of the Value Added or the Asset Approach, then these values must
be put in relation with the relevant set of problems in the ’real world’.
In particular, it must be elucidated whether the values obtained answer
the initial question posed by the researcher.
Usually the available data sets are based on some hundreds of banks
so that a comment on results of particular banks is unusual. Instead
the efficiency scores of certain bank groups of interest are averaged and
compared to other groups. Thus typical kinds of questions may run as
follows: Which banks are more efficient, public or private ones? Are big
banks more efficient than smaller ones? Which (European) country has
the most efficient banking system?
As examples we quote from comments on results of some studies
available to us:
• Both parametric approaches suggest that UK credit institutions are
more efficient than their Irish counterparts [...] We empirically test
the apparent differences in the mean efficiency scores (i) between
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big and small credit institutions and (ii) between UK and Irish
credit institutions. A t-test of no significant difference between the
two sets of mean efficiency levels is rejected for all models at the 1
per cent level (Fitzpatrick and McQuinn, 2005).
• Banks from Germany, Denmark and France (in 1998, 0.659, 0.762
and 0.553 respectively) [...] are the most efficient and banks in
Greece, Spain and Italy are [...] among the most inefficient. How-
ever, the differences are smaller after discounting the effect of
specialisation (Pastor and Serrano, 2006).
• Overall, our analysis suggests that differences in cost efficiency
across bank types can often be explained by the prevailing financial
system in each economy. This evidence illustrates the national
diversity of corporate governance systems in Europe and can be im-
portant to policy makers who are concerned with the full integration
of the European financial system (Girardone et al., 2009).
These results quoted as examples of empirical bank efficiency studies
are indeed answers to the above mentioned typical set of questions.
Hence if we wonder for example which financial system was the most
efficient in Europe in 1998, we obtain the answer from literature – a
litte overdone: Denmark first (76, 2%), Germany second (65, 9%) etc.
These differences in average figures are ’statistically significant’ which is
apparently meant to exclude that the efficiency scores across countries
originate from identical data generating processes. And on the basis of
the results obtained policy makers are called upon to choose the financial
system – in reality only the totality of banks – of the most efficient
country as a model for reform in their own country.
At this point, it is necessary however to raise the question in which
way the problem is presented in the studies. Usually institutional changes
of political and economic conditions in particular countries or unions of
countries (EU) are an occasion to examine the effects on the efficiency of
banks. By ’efficiency’, in most cases, one implicitly understands the mean
efficiency of single institutions as one group, although in a generalizing
way one often talks of a ’financial system’. And this efficiency, as stated
above, is measured from the point of view of business administration and
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production theory. Thus, a question initially comprising the economy as
a whole is reduced to the production problem of a single firm which may
additionally be described as controversial. All other interesting questions
as for example concerning the stability of banks can of course not be
tackled by the Value Added and Asset Approaches.
Hence between the kind of question and the efficiency values obtained
a gap of understanding becomes apparent which must lead to such strange
conclusions of authors as quoted above. The deficiency barely lies in
the fact if under certain assumptions one can interpret a given figure as
the efficiency of a bank. In a particular case, one may even consider it
as a plausible characteristic of a bank. But to assume that this idea of
production is common to a conglomerate of banks and their common
competitive benchmark is more subject to doubt than generally believed.
If in particular cases the authors even talk about investigations into
the efficiency of world-wide financial systems, and if in actual fact only
production mechanisms of individual institutes are meant, the reader is
expected to make a considerable effort when comparing the goal of the
investigations with his own expectations. Against this background it is
no wonder that the results published do not meet with public interest.
3.4 Conclusion
We should now like to bring to an end our comment on the adequation
approach as it is usually employed in literature to measure bank efficiency.
In conclusion we have acquired some knowledge of banks which represents
them from the point of view of a profit oriented firm in a microeconomic
sense. The fundamental idea is that of a production process which can
be quantified by means of balance sheet items. A surplus is brought
about by the purchase of short-term financial funds which in a different
use (long-term loans) enable the bank to realize a profit. Concretely, in
literature we come across an operationalization which considers labour
and capital as input factors, credits and investment papers as outputs,
and deposits inconsistently as input or output.
We are of course faced here with an ideal-type conceptualization of
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things the realization of which we cannot be expected to observe15. We
notice as important the social consensus on these assumptions which
obviously does not exist. In fact, during the financial crisis banks are
perceived by society more as (unsuccessful) merchants of risks on the
financial markets and less as producers aiming at profits in the field of
credits and securities. In the empirical studies this obvious adequation
gap becomes evident in the wish – sometimes somewhat unexpectedly –
to take more into account activities beyond the balance sheet.
Here, too, the problem arises that these values as per period end do
not allow of a statement about the inherent risk. The grant of a credit or
a purchase beyond the balance sheet of a derivative product is assigned
a particular nominal value and therewith becomes part of the bank’s
output of the same accounting period. On this basis the efficiency is
measured. If it becomes evident that in the following accounting period
this item is without value any more adjustments can be performed. This
is done irrespective of the estimation of the preceding period although
the wrong decision on the investment was taken then.
Motivated by these deficiencies of the empirical bank efficiency esti-
mation and against the background of the immanent importance of an
objective measurement of bank efficiency we have pursued the aim in
this study to trigger a debate on the reliability of bank efficiency studies.
For this purpose we defined our touchstone, i.e. the principles of an
ideal-type conceptualization in the context of an adequation scheme in
the first part of our paper. Although the comment on this aspect has
led the reader a little away from the goal of bank efficiency estimation
we could nevertheless, in the second part of our paper, have recourse to
this knowledge in order to faciliate the understanding of the processes.
Thus we can identify the adequation problem in bank efficiency esti-
mation as a fundamental gap of understanding between the claim laid
down in recent empirical studies and the expectations of a society eager to
obtain an explanation for proceedings observed in reality. The target of
many of the studies available to us and destined to compare the efficiency
of international financial systems is of course so vague that every reader
15We remind the reader of the discussion on the distinction between an ideal type
and a generic term.
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not acquainted with this branch of literature may develop another idea of
’efficient financial systems’. If in the course of a study it becomes evident
that the authors quantify an ideal picture of banks which presupposes an
attitude of banks intent on their own individual economic succes and on
maximizing profits the reader can be no means recognize the relevance
of the results in view of the systemic importance of the entirety of banks.
In many cases it may in fact be doubtful whether maximizing short-term
profits is economically desirable.
So in accordance with literature, we advocate the view that the
classical conception of production processes in banks is outdated given the
economic questions we have to raise today. Nevertheless, this discovery
may not serve as a licence to occasionally change the operationalization,
guided by data availability: The fundamental link between the ideal type
formulation of a real economic problem and the adequate measurement
of the respective problem must not be interrupted.
Moreover, the very measurement of production on the basis of balance
sheet figures at a particular date does not convey the impression of the
dynamism of decisions how to allocate funds. Banks are involved today
in highly complex financial markets which did not exist when Sealey
and Lindley (1977) carried out their research. In this context we would
like to draw attention to a paper by Allen and Santomero (1998): The
authors identify an ideal of banks as the central risk managers of the
national economy. If one pursues this idea the efficiency of a bank can be
derived from its ability to generate portfolios with a stable and balanced
yield over a period of time. Presumably this approach might meet public
interest, although the question of how to operationalize this idea remains
a topic for further research.
4 Chapter 4Methods of cross-sectionalstochastic frontier analyses
4.1 Introduction
We will start the methodical part of this survey with a formal de-
scription of the basic tools necessary for efficiency estimation: The
stochastic frontier analysis SFA is widely used to estimate firm-specific
efficiency scores. It is based on the pioneering work of Aigner et al.
(1977) and Meeusen and van de Broeck (1977). Kumbhakar and Lovell
(2003) provide a comprehensive overview. The fundamental difference
to ordinary least squares is the introduction of a two-part error term
consisting of a noise and an inefficiency term. For the error as well as
the inefficiency term distributional assumptions are made. Most often
the half normal assumption is applied, but the exponential, truncated
normal and gamma cases are also discussed in the specific literature.
While the two-parameter distributions – the truncated normal and the
gamma – potentially increase the flexibility of the model, in practical
applications, however, problems of identification seem to outweigh the
potential gains for either distribution (Greene, 1997, pp. 103), (Ritter
and Simar, 1997a,b).
The natural estimation method seems to be Maximum Likelihood
(ML) estimation because of the parametric assumptions. But simulation
results obtained for the normal-half normal model indicate that a method
of moments approach (MOM) (Olson et al., 1980) is superior for small
and medium sized samples in combination with inefficiency not strongly
dominating noise (Coelli, 1995).
In this chapter we provide detailed simulation results comparing the
two estimation methods for both the half-normal and the exponential
approach to inefficiency. Furthermore, we compare the sensitivity of the
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estimation approaches towards misspecification. Our simulations widen
those of Coelli (1995) and Olson et al. (1980) for the normal-half normal
model in matters of sample size and comprise also the exponential model.
The extensive simulation results allow the formulation of rules of thumb
for deciding on the estimation approach for normally and exponentially
distributed inefficiency terms.
The paper is composed as follows: In section 4.2 we discuss the
underlying concept of efficiency and the different approaches to calculate
inefficiency scores. In section 4.3 we lay down the results of our extensive
simulation studies, especially the suggestions obtained for the choice
of the competing estimation approaches in the form of parametrical
rules of thumb. Section 4.4 introduces our field of application by first
describing the well-established operationalization procedures to obtain
efficiency scores for banking institutions in the relevant literature. Next
we expose an exemplifying application to a Bankscope dataset for German
commercial banks without further expatiating on the preceding discussion
of ’Adequation’. Section 4.5 contains the conclusion.
4.2 Efficiency and the stochastic frontier models
In this section we briefly describe the concept of efficiency in the
framework of stochastic frontier models based on the half-normal dis-
tribution for the inefficiency term. Alternatively, we also specify the
exponential model 1.
4.2.1 The concept of output-based efficiency
Farrell (1957) introduced the idea of an empirical approach to rel-
ative efficiency by the firm specific quotient of observed production yi
1A closer look at the relevant literature reveals another ’truncated’ approach (Bos and
Kool, 2006, Battese et al., 2000, Fitzpatrick and McQuinn, 2005): ui ∼ N+(µ, σu)
with µ ≥ 0. Referring to Greene (1990), Weill (2004) is the only one using a
gamma-distributed inefficiency term. But the selection of an adequate distribution
of ui does not have to be overvalued, as Greene (1990) reported extremely high
correlations in the efficieny estimates between the half normal, truncated, gamma
and exponential models. So obviously there is no need to make use of two-parameter
distributions.
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to optimal production y∗i . In conformity with microeconomic theory,
production processes are technical relations of employed inputs to max-
imum attainable output. So when assuming cross sectional data for n
units indexed by i (i = 1, ..., n) using K (k = 1, ...,K) different inputs –
contained in the input vector xi – to produce a single output yi, we can
formulate Farrell’s idea of technical efficiency:
TEi =
yi
y∗i
= yi
g(xi;β)
∈ [0, 1]
with g(xi;β) as a deterministic production function. It is the aim of
the stochastic frontier approach to estimate the underlying technology
constituting the production possibilities of a set of firms. We allow a
parametric form for the output including stochastic terms
yi = g(xi;β) · evi · e−ui
which in logs is
log(yi) = log (g(xi;β)) + vi − ui
vi is considered as a normal error vi ∼ N(µv;σ2v), and ui ≥ 0 repre-
senting inefficiency.
In the following we assume a simple Cobb-Douglas production function
g(xi;β) = eβ0
K∏
k=1
xβkik
which in logs is
log [g(xi;β)] = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βk log(xik)
So the output model is given by
log(yi) = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βk log(xik) + vi − ui
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This leads to firm-specific efficiency scores
TEi =
g(xi;β) · evi · e−ui
g(xi;β) · evi = e
−ui
4.2.2 The normal-half normal model
The component ui is assumed to be positive representing production
inefficiency. Most often ui is assumed to be half-sided normal
ui
iid∼ N+(0, σ2u)
The density of u is given as
f(u) = 2
σu
√
2pi
exp
(
− u
2
2σ2u
)
with the moments
E(u) =
√
2√
pi
σu and V (u) =
(
pi − 2
pi
)
σ2u
The ML approach for the normal-half normal model
Assuming independence of the error terms v und u the joint density
function results as the product of individual density functions
f(u, v) = f(u) · f(v) = 2
σuσv2pi
exp
(
− u
2
2σ2u
− v
2
2σ2v
)
To obtain the density of the composed error term ε = v − u, we first
obtain the joint density f(u, ε). Integration over u results in
f(ε) =
∫ ∞
0
f(u, ε)du = 2
σ
φ
(
εσ−1
) [
1− Φ
(
ελσ−1
)]
where σ2 = σ2v + σ2u and λ = σu/σv.
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The density distribution of ε is asymmetric and characterized by
E(ε) = E(v − u) = E(−u) = −
√
2√
pi
σu
The variance of ε is given by
V (ε) = σ2ε = V (u) + V (v) =
(
pi − 2
pi
)
σ2u + σ2v
The log-likelihood finally is
lnL(ε|λ, σ2) = n ln
(√
2√
pi
)
+ n ln
( 1
σ
)
+
n∑
i=1
ln
[
1− Φ
(
εiλσ
−1)]− 12σ2
n∑
i=1
ε2i
using εi = log yi − β log xi.
Having obtained the estimates βˆ, σˆ2 = σˆ2u + σˆ2v and λˆ = σˆu/σˆv, the
estimates of the variance components can be recovered:
σˆ2v =
σˆ2
1 + λˆ2
and σˆ2u = σˆ2 −
σˆ2
1 + λˆ2
The MOM approach to the normal-half normal model
Estimating the production model when using ordinary least squares
OLS results in consistent estimates of the slope parameters β1, ..., βK ,
but in a biased estimate of the intercept β0. As we assume E(ε) = 0
in OLS by definition, the bias is E(ε) = −E(u) = −σu
√
2
pi . Applying
the method of moments approach we use the obtained OLS residuals to
estimate the central moments m2 and m3 in order to adjust the expected
bias. The aim is to simply shift the regression line.
m2 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(εi − ε¯i)2 and m3 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(εi − ε¯i)3
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which correspond to the moment equations (Greene, 1997)
m2 =
pi − 2
pi
σ2u + σ2v and m3 =
√
2
pi
(
1− 4
pi
)
σ3u
Solving for the variance components results in
σ2u =
 m3√
2
pi
(
1− 4pi
)

2
3
and σ2v = m2 −
pi − 2
pi
σ2u
The biased OLS estimate of the intercept βˆOLS0 can be adjusted on
the basis of the estimate of the standard deviation of the inefficiency
term
βˆMOM0 = βˆOLS0 + E(uˆ) = βˆOLS0 + σˆu
√
2
pi
Although the MOM-Estimator is easy to calculate, even without
numerical optimization, Olson et al. (1980) note two types of errors
occuring when either m3 is positive (Type I error) or m2 ≤ ((pi−2)/pi)σ2u
(Type II error). A Type I error is likely to occur when σu is small (λ→ 0).
This immediately leads to the estimation of a negative variance σˆu and
prevents further calculations. In the latter case, a Type II error does
not prevent the estimation of βMOM0 , but causes implausible values of
λˆ→ ±∞.
Estimates of individual inefficiencies
As it is impossible to obtain estimates for ui and vi simultaneously
for each individual firm i, the inefficiency ratio TEi is obtained as the
exponential conditional expectation of −u given the composed error term
ε:
T̂Ei = eE(−ui|εi)
The conditional density of u given ε is
f(u|ε) = f(u, ε)
f(ε) =
1
σ∗
√
2pi
exp
(
−(u− µ
∗)2
2σ∗2
)[
1− Φ
(
−µ
∗
σ∗
)]−1
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Hence, the distribution of u conditional on ε is N+(µ∗, σ∗), where
µ∗ = −εσ
2
u
σ2
= −εγ
σ∗2 = σ
2
uσ
2
v
σ2
= σ2σ
2
u(σ2 − σ2u)
σ2σ2
= σ2γ(1− γ)
using γ = σ2u/σ2, i.e. the fraction of the variance of the inefficiency
to the total variance.
Having obtained the distribution of u|ε, the expected value E(u|ε)
can be used as point estimators for ui (Jondrow et al., 1982):2
uˆi = E(u|ε) =
(
σλ
1 + λ2
)(
zi +
φ (zi)
Φ (zi)
)
zi =
−εiλ
σ
4.2.3 The exponential model
The inefficiency component ui is assumed to be exponentially dis-
tributed. Using the parameterization θ = 1/σu the density is given
as
f(u) =

1
σu
exp
(
− uσu
)
u ≥ 0
0 u < 0
The moments are
E(u) = σu and V (u) = σ2u
2Instead of obtaining firm-specific efficiencies from exp[−E(u|ε)], Battese and Coelli
(1988) propose the alternative estimator:
ˆTEi = E(exp(−ui)|εi) =
[
Φ
(
u∗i
σ∗
− σ∗
)
/Φ
(
u∗i
σ∗
)]
exp
(
σ2∗
2 − ui∗
)
where u∗i = −(log yi − x′β)σ2u/σ2 and σ2∗ = σ2vσ2u/σ2. Note that in general
exp[−E(u|ε)] 6= E(exp(−ui)|εi). Furthermore, both estimators are unbiased, but
inconsistent estimators because V ar(uˆi) 6= 0 for N →∞.
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The ML approach for the normal-exponential model
Assuming again the independence of the error terms v und u the joint
density simply results in the product of the two density functions
f(u, v) = f(u)f(v) = 2
σuσv2pi
exp
(
− u
σu
− v
2
2σ2v
)
To obtain the density of the composed error term ε = v − u, we first
obtain the joint density f(u, ε) and integrate out u from the joint density
f(ε) =
∫ ∞
0
f(u, ε)du = 1
σu
Φ
(
− ε
σv
− σv
σu
)
exp
(
ε
σu
+ 12
σ2v
σ2u
)
The density distribution of ε is asymmetric and characterized by
E(ε) = E(v − u) = E(−u) = −σu
The variance of ε is given by
V (ε) = σ2ε = V (u) + V (v) = σ2u + σ2v
Assuming independence across subjects i, the likelihood is the product
of the individual densities f(ε):
L(log y|σ2u, σ2v) =
1
σnu
exp
(
1
2
σ2v
σ2u
)n n∏
i=1
[
Φ
(
− εi
σv
− σv
σu
)
exp
(
εi
σu
)]
And the log-likelihood is
lnL(log y|β, σ2u, σ2v) = −n log (σu) + n
1
2
σ2v
σ2u
+
n∑
i=1
[
log Φ
(
− log yi − log x
′
iβ
σv
− σv
σu
)
+ log yi − log x
′
iβ
σu
]
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The MOM approach to the normal-exponential model
Just as in the case of the method of moments approach discussed
above, OLS residuals are used to estimate the central moments m2 and
m3, which correspond to (Greene, 1997)
m2 = σ2u + σ2v and m3 = −2σ3u
Solving for the variance components results in
σ2u =
(
−m32
) 2
3
and σ2v = m2 − σ2u
Analogous to the half-normal case, a Type I error occurs whenm3 < 0,
and a Type II error when m2 < σ2u (virtually impossible). The biased
OLS estimate of the intercept βˆOLS0 can be adjusted using the estimate
of the standard deviation (equal to the mean value) of the inefficiency
term
βˆMOM0 = βˆOLS0 + σˆu
Estimates of individual inefficiencies
As the conditional distribution f(u|ε) is N+(µ˜, σ2v) and given by
f(u|ε) = f(u, ε)
f(ε) =
exp[−(u− µ˜2)/2σ2]√
2piσvΦ(−µ˜/σv)
with
µ˜ = −ε− σ
2
v
σu
the expected value of inefficiency u – given the residual ε in the normal-
exponential model – can be written as (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003):
E [ui|εi] = µ˜i + σv
[
φ(−µ˜i/σv)
Φ(µ˜i/σv)
]
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4.3 Simulation
We apply the two estimation approaches outlined above to obtain
estimates of individual efficiencies T̂Ei = exp[E(−ui|εi)]. To assess the
performance of the efficiency score estimation we calculate the mean
square error and the mean average error
mse = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
T̂Ei − TEi
)2
mae = 1
n
n∑
i=1
|T̂Ei − TEi|
using true TEi and estimated efficiency scores T̂Ei.
Our simulation study allows to assess the relative performance of the
ML and MOM estimators for different n. Additionally, we analyse the
effect of λ, i.e. the relation of inefficiency variance to variance of the
normal noise, on the appropriate choice of the estimation method.
4.3.1 Simulation design
Now we analyze the estimation of individual inefficiency scores by
means of Monte Carlo simulations based on m = 2000 replications using
a standard simulation setting:
yi = 1 + x1 + x2 + vi − ui
with
vi ∼ N(0, σv) and ui ∼ N(0, σu) or ui ∼ Exp(σu)
σu = {0.283, 0.447, 0.526, 0.566, 0.587, 0.600, 0.614, 0.620}
σv =
√
0.4− σ2u and λ = (0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0)
The inputs x1, x2 are drawn independently from a uniform distribution
on the interval (0, 1). Sample sizes are
n = {25, 50, 75, 100, 150, 250, 500, 1000}
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The computations are performed by means of the R Environment (R
Development Core Team, 2010).
To assess the robustness of the half normal and the exponential
models towards misspecification, we add two misspecification scenarios.
In scenario M1 we (falsly) apply the half normal model on data generated
under the exponential assumption. Conversely in scenario M2 we (falsly)
estimate the exponential model despite inefficiency terms ui in fact drawn
from the half normal distribution.
4.3.2 Simulation results in comparison
The normal-half normal case
n 25 50 75 100 150 250 500 1000
λ method of moments
0.5 0.1801 0.1742 0.1727 0.1686 0.1637 0.1568 0.1503 0.1426
1.0 0.1964 0.1877 0.1780 0.1758 0.1685 0.1590 0.1459 0.1348
1.5 0.1879 0.1697 0.1584 0.1521 0.1390 0.1298 0.1214 0.1183
2.0 0.1752 0.1499 0.1368 0.1267 0.1188 0.1113 0.1073 0.1054
2.5 0.1649 0.1308 0.1184 0.1092 0.1028 0.0981 0.0952 0.0935
3.0 0.1531 0.1185 0.1049 0.0991 0.0931 0.0884 0.0853 0.0838
4.0 0.1375 0.1028 0.0896 0.0841 0.0787 0.0741 0.0708 0.0686
5.0 0.1253 0.0938 0.0808 0.0751 0.0697 0.0643 0.0604 0.0582
λ maximum likelihood
0.5 0.2440 0.2114 0.1962 0.1883 0.1774 0.1627 0.1496 0.1362
1.0 0.2460 0.2123 0.1935 0.1883 0.1743 0.1584 0.1442 0.1330
1.5 0.2172 0.1809 0.1645 0.1553 0.1395 0.1294 0.1212 0.1181
2.0 0.1898 0.1535 0.1374 0.1259 0.1177 0.1101 0.1067 0.1052
2.5 0.1724 0.1299 0.1152 0.1057 0.1000 0.0961 0.0944 0.0932
3.0 0.1523 0.1141 0.0997 0.0939 0.0891 0.0857 0.0838 0.0833
4.0 0.1290 0.0925 0.0804 0.0762 0.0726 0.0701 0.0687 0.0679
5.0 0.1118 0.0788 0.0693 0.0653 0.0618 0.0598 0.0579 0.0576
λ advantage
0.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE
1.0 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE
1.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE
2.0 MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.5 MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
3.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
4.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
5.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
Table 4.1: Mean Average Error normal-halfnormal approach
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To assess the accuracy of the estimation of the inefficiency terms, we
calculate mean absolute differences between estimated and true efficiency
scores (mae, corresponding mean squared deviations mse are reported
in the appendix.) for all sample sizes n and λ. Table 4.1 shows the
results subdivided into three blocks: The first block gives the mae in
the MOM-case, the second block in the ML-case and the third block
indicates the superior estimation method in terms of a smaller error. Our
findings confirm the results of Coelli (1995) and Olson et al. (1980). Due
to improved computer capacity in the last decade, we were in a position
to perform more extensive computations. Based on these extended simu-
lation results including larger sample sizes and more simulation runs, we
confirm their main findings: MOM-estimation is found strongly superior
for rather small n and small λ. This is in conformity with intuition,
because a small λ implies negligible inefficiency σu in comparison with
dominating σv, which comes close to the classical OLS assumption. In
this case, OLS provides the best linear unbiased estimators for β1, ..., βk,
while β0 is just slightly biased. ML-estimation should be preferred for
larger n and larger λ. But a look at the simulation results reveals only
small differences in performance for larger n, rendering the choice of
estimation methods rather unimportant.
In general, the mean average error between estimated and true ef-
ficiency scores decreases with increasing sample sizes as well as with
increasing λ. For small sample sizes n = 25 and λ = 0.5 we find a
mean average deviation about three times the size compared to the case
n = 1000 and λ = 5.0 for the MOM approach. In case of ML-estimation,
which is found considerably inferior for small n, mean average deviations
for small n, λ-combinations are about four times the value obtained for
large n, λ.
The normal-exponential case
The results of the normal-exponential model are illustrated in table
4.2. The findings of the normal-half normal and the normal-exponential
model resemble each other. Again small sample sizes and a small variance
ratio λ strongly suggest application of MOM-estimation. But obviously,
we observe more n, λ-combinations for which ML-estimation is superior.
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n 25 50 75 100 150 250 500 1000
λ method of moments
0.5 0.1630 0.1598 0.1566 0.1535 0.1509 0.1443 0.1378 0.1324
1.0 0.1806 0.1622 0.1503 0.1453 0.1412 0.1370 0.1349 0.1338
1.5 0.1669 0.1422 0.1341 0.1291 0.1250 0.1217 0.1195 0.1180
2.0 0.1551 0.1305 0.1209 0.1169 0.1125 0.1086 0.1053 0.1032
2.5 0.1489 0.1197 0.1118 0.1075 0.1022 0.0977 0.0938 0.0913
3.0 0.1419 0.1137 0.1051 0.1002 0.0950 0.0894 0.0850 0.0820
4.0 0.1355 0.1069 0.0972 0.0909 0.0843 0.0779 0.0722 0.0683
5.0 0.1355 0.1023 0.0930 0.0857 0.0781 0.0709 0.0640 0.0594
λ maximum likelihood
0.5 0.1888 0.1729 0.1655 0.1616 0.1557 0.1470 0.1385 0.1326
1.0 0.2006 0.1695 0.1539 0.1471 0.1410 0.1366 0.1343 0.1336
1.5 0.1729 0.1408 0.1303 0.1246 0.1210 0.1188 0.1175 0.1170
2.0 0.1534 0.1211 0.1111 0.1078 0.1047 0.1030 0.1017 0.1012
2.5 0.1376 0.1057 0.0976 0.0945 0.0920 0.0901 0.0888 0.0883
3.0 0.1234 0.0948 0.0878 0.0845 0.0820 0.0800 0.0785 0.0780
4.0 0.1076 0.0793 0.0728 0.0698 0.0666 0.0648 0.0636 0.0630
5.0 0.0980 0.0694 0.0630 0.0598 0.0566 0.0547 0.0534 0.0527
λ advantage
0.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM
1.0 MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE
1.5 MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.5 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
3.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
4.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
5.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
Table 4.2: Mean Average Error normal-exponential approach
Again, the mean average deviation between estimated and true ef-
ficiency scores decreases with increasing sample sizes as well as with
increasing λ. Similar results were obtained for the half normal model.
We also find for small sample sizes n = 25 and λ = 0.5 a mean average
deviation about three times the size compared to n = 1000 and λ = 5.0.
Just as in the normal-half normal case MOM strongly outperforms ML-
estimation for very small λ, while the preferability of ML is based on
very small performance differences only.
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Misspecification scenarios
As it is an impossible task to determine any real inefficiency dis-
tribution across an industry, we can basically assume an underlying
misspecification in every applied Stochastic Frontier Analysis. To exem-
plify the impacts of misspecification against the background of MOM
vs. ML-estimation, we interchanged the data generating processes of the
normal-exponential and normal-halfnormal case. So table 4.9 given in the
appendix shows the mae of an exponential model estimated as halfnor-
mal (misspecification scenario M1), and table 4.10 in the appendix
contains the results of a halfnormal model estimated as exponential
(misspecification M2).
The findings are straightforward: The exponential model M1 shows
the predominant advantage of ML-estimation, even more clearly than
in the correctly specified case. Obviously, the mae of MOM-estimation
improves with increasing n or λ, but does not decrease in jointly larger
n, λ-combinations. The indications in the halfnormal model M2 suggest
slight advantages of MOM-estimation in the face of an overall lower error.
Rules of thumb
To summarize the particular advantages of ML- or MOM-estimation,
we estimated multiple linear regressions based on tables 4.1 and 4.2 for
the normal and exponential cases, respectively. As we do not observe any
hints for a non-linear relationship, the estimation of a linear probability
model allows us to determine rules of thumb more easily:
yk = β0 + β1k · λ+ β2k · n+ µk
with
y =
{
0 if MOM implies a smaller error
1 if ML implies a smaller error
and µk as an error term in all k possible combinations of sample size n
and λ. Predicted values yˆk > 0.5 imply an advantage of ML- over MOM-
estimation. Figure 4.1 illustrates the separating lines between either
approach in the half normal and exponential cases. The corresponding
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parameter estimates are shown in table 4.3.
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4.4 An application to German banks
4.4.1 Methodological issues
Inputs and Outputs
In order to illustrate our methodical approach we reviewed the most
relevant literature covering bank efficiency estimation on the basis of
stochastic frontier analyses. One of the most frequently cited articles in
contemporary bank efficiency literature is Mester (1996). The author’s
procedure reflects the main features of current efficiency analyses via
frontier cost functions. Furthermore, resorting to cost functions instead
of production functions is inevitable in the case of multiple outputs.
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
normal-half normal
Intercept 0.0602 0.0900 0.67 0.5062
λ 0.1908 0.0292 6.53 0.0000
n 0.0006 0.0001 4.52 0.0000
normal-exponential
Intercept 0.3338 0.0874 3.82 0.0003
λ 0.1710 0.0284 6.02 0.0000
n 0.0002 0.0001 1.33 0.1897
Table 4.3: Parameter estimates rules of thumb
Beside the methodical problems discussed above, we find another key
question of empirical bank efficiency estimation in modelling inputs and
outputs of the production process3. As Girardone et al. (2004) state:
While the multiproduct nature of the banking firm is widely recognized,
there is still no agreement as to the explicit definition and measurement
of banks’ inputs and outputs. Pasiouras (2008) observes that it is common
practice to operationalise bank production according to the fundamental
idea of the Intermediation Approach proposed by Sealey and Lindley
(1977): The authors proposed a multistage production process of the
financial firm, using capital, labour and material to acquire customer
deposits in a first step. Lending these funds in a (virtual) second step
to deficit spending units, as well as issuing securities and other earning
assets involve in general an interest profit. So financial production for
intermediation purposes is about adding value to deposits.
Obviously, the use of multiple outputs does not apply to the single-
output production functions described above. But, referring to Duality
Theory4, one can, under certain regularity conditions5, prove the equiva-
3Note that we announced in the outline of the research project (chapter 1) that
we will refrain from the discussion of ’Adequation’ in the course of this and the
subsequent methodical chapters, too.
4Cp. Beatti and Taylor (1985), chapter 6.
5In particular, linear homogeneity and weak concavity in input prices if the implicit
production technology is strictly quasi-convex.
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lence of indirect cost functions tc = tc(y, c) and the underlying technology
F (y,x) = 0 with tc total operating costs, y′ a vector of outputs, and c′
a vector of prices of the inputs x′. The technique to estimate restricted
stochastic cost frontiers is virtually the same as the estimation of pro-
duction frontiers, as the lower stochastic frontier of the ’data cloud’ is
simply defined by turning the sign of ui, using the symmetry of vi:
log(tci) = log (g(yi, ci);β)) + vi + ui |vi symmetric
⇔ − log(tci) = − log (g(yi, ci);β)) + vi − ui
In the context of cost functions efficiency is definded in terms of cost
efficiency CE instead of technical efficiency TE. An advantage over
considerations of ’pure’ technologies is the possibility to evaluate scale
economies, i.e. the existence of decreasing average costs in conjunction
with the firm’s size.
Thus, Mester proposes a basic cost function with outputs being real
estate loans, commercial/industrial and other loans as well as loans
to individuals. Inputs, input-prices respectively, are prices of labour,
physical capital and deposits (borrowed money). Furthermore, she
included two bank quality proxies: The average volume of nonperforming
loans and the average volume of equity capital. Because of a highly
homogeneous dataset no further specific regional/economic distinction
had to be drawn. Bos and Kool (2006) investigate small cooperative
banks in the Netherlands and confine themselves to just control for
a bank-specific solvency measure provided by Rabobank Netherlands,
which is added to the cost function. The authors’ interpretation of the
Intermediation approach imply inputs such as public relations, labour,
physical capital and financial capital. Outputs are retail loans, wholesale
loans, mortgages and provisions. This is a slight modification of the
intermediation idea, but Lang and Welzel (1996) go even further while
modelling the outputs short-term and long-term loans to non-banks, loans
to banks, bonds, cash and real estate investments, fees and commissions,
and revenue from sales of commodities. Obviously, some studies justify
more or less distinctive alterations of the value-adding idea by Sealey
and Lindley. On the other hand, authors like Altunbas et al. (2000),
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Perera et al. (2007), Girardone et al. (2004) are able to adopt the classical
idea of banking intermediation. Table 4.11 in the appendix shows some
different approaches at a glance.
Based on this discussion we put forward the opinion that an adequate
idea of banking activity in the course of a simulation study can be
deduced by the basic intermediation approach, without adding any
control variables.
Our cross sectional data set is obtained from Bankscope6 and com-
prises n = 56 German commercial banks. The annual statements of
account refer to the end of 2005.
In line with the above-mentioned literature we assume banks to mini-
mize total costs rather than operating costs (Pasiouras, 2008) and set
up a basic cost function with outputs y1 interbank loans, y2 commer-
cial loans, and y3 securities. Inputs are x1 fixed assets, x2 number of
employees, and x3 borrowed funds (deposits). Input prices ck can be
approximated by the ratio of the costs of the inputs xk to the amount of
the particular input. In the case of c1, c2 we obtain percentaged values,
while c3 is average cost per employee per year. Table 4.4 shows the
descriptive statistics of bank size in terms of total assets ta, inputs x,
input prices c and outputs y.
Var Description Mean St.Dev. Median
ta Total assets (BEUR) 3894.079 9043.181 1017.800
tc Total costs (BEUR) 246.205 615.106 58.150
y1 Interbank loans (BEUR) 614.568 1374.506 145.650
y2 Commercial loans (BEUR) 2646.856 7734.673 374.150
y3 Securities (BEUR) 179.694 561.050 10.200
x1 Fixed assets (BEUR) 54.552 264.650 5.950
x2 Employees 645.39 1888.22 142.50
x3 Borrowed funds (BEUR) 2107.203 5420.554 486.800
c1 Cost of fixed assets (% depreciation) 0.160 0.089 0.141
c2 Cost of labour (TEUR/employee) 80.671 64.654 65.621
c3 Price of funds (% interest expenses) 0.049 0.058 0.031
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of inputs, outputs, prices and bank size
6Bureau van Dijk, www.bvdep.com.
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Shape of the cost function
As for the formal issues, one can state that most authors apply a
’regular’ translog cost frontier. In most cases the translog form offers an
appropriate balance between flexibility (in price and output elasticities),
parameters to estimate, and global fit. The exceptions among the re-
viewed literature are Altunbas et al. (2000), Altunbas and Chakravarty
(2001), Girardone et al. (2004), and Weill (2004), using a Fourier Flexible
form with additional trigonometric terms. Otherwise, Fitzpatrick and
McQuinn (2005) had to restrict themselves to a simple Cobb-Douglas
form due to an insufficient number of observations.
As we, too, work on a small-sized dataset (n = 56), we encountered
severe multicollinearity in the flexible translog form. So we opt for a log
linear Cobb-Douglas cost function (Kumbhakar and Tsionas, 2008). To
ensure linear homogeneity in input prices tc(y, k · c) = k1 · tc(y, c) with
k > 0, we normalize total costs and input prices by the price of labour
c2 (Lang and Welzel, 1996).
log tc(y, c) = β0 +
3∑
i=1
βi log yi +
3∑
j=1
γj log cj + v + u s.t.
3∑
i=j
γj = 1
The homogeneity-constrained cost frontier results in:
log tc(y, c)
c2
= β0 +
3∑
i=1
βi log yi +
∑
j=1,3
γj log
cj
c2
+ v + u
4.4.2 Empirical evidence
To our knowledge there is not a single bank efficiency study applying
the method of moments estimator we discussed. Conventionally, authors
prefer Maximum Likelihood Estimation with the Jondrow et al. (1982)
exp[−E(u|ε)] estimator mentioned above7.
As our sample is rather small-sized, we expect the method of moments
7Studies applying FRONTIER 4.1 software by Coelli (1996) make implicit use of
the alternative point estimator E(exp(−u)|ε) (Girardone et al., 2004, Perera et al.,
2007, Battese et al., 2000).
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approach to deliver more reliable efficiency scores. Table 4.5 shows the
results of all scenarios under discussion. Our ’rules of thumb’-indicator
gives rather ambivalent recommendations: Predicted values of the binary
variable exceeding 0.5 point to MLE application. But especially in the
normal-exponential case we are facing values ≈ 0.5. So we should expect
rather similar results in both MOM and ML-estimation. In fact, the
correlation table 4.6 confirms a ρ(ĈEMOM , ĈEMLE) ≈ 0.99. Mean
efficiencies 1n
∑
i ĈEi differ only between varying inefficiency distribution
assumptions. Moreover, the strong correlations ρ > 0.95 between the
half normal and exponential approach to inefficiency are in line with the
findings of Greene (1990).
normal-half normal normal-exponential
MLE MOM MLE MOM
Intercept 0.760 1.526 2.096 1.819
y1 0.107 0.157 0.117 0.157
y2 0.543 0.505 0.552 0.505
y3 0.055 0.060 0.050 0.060
c1 0.208 0.233 0.254 0.233
c3 0.289 0.388 0.418 0.388
λ 2.696 2.804 1.158 0.933
σv 0.326 0.325 0.416 0.467
σu 0.880 0.913 0.481 0.436
mean ĈE 0.537 0.531 0.655 0.673
rule of thumb 0.608 0.629 0.541 0.503
Table 4.5: Estimation results, all cases
nhn-mle nhn-mom exp-mle exp-mom
nhn-mle 1.000
nhn-mom 0.987 1.000
exp-mle 0.957 0.952 1.000
exp-mom 0.951 0.952 0.988 1.000
Table 4.6: Correlation table, cost efficiencies
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Comparing the parameter estimates, we observe slight differences in
the estimated output and price elasticities (note that γ2 = 1− γ1 − γ3).
The overall scale economies are calculated as c =
(∑
i
∂ log tc(y,c)
∂ log βi
)−1
. As
c > 1 in all cases, the results hint at increasing returns to scale in the
German banking industry.
4.5 Conclusion
We put forward the MOM-approach to stochastic frontiers in bank
efficiency analysis. An extensive simulation study confirmed and extended
the findings of Coelli (1995) and Olson et al. (1980): Rules of thumb
suggest that the MOM-estimation of parametrical frontiers assuming
a half normal inefficiency distribution can be favourable in terms of
mse(T̂E, TE) and mae(T̂E, TE) if the sample size is of medium scale
(≤ 700 observations) and inefficiency does not strongly dominate noise
(λ < 2).
In summary, we propose that the method of moment estimation
should be considered an alternative to maximum likelihood estimation,
especially when efficiency estimation is based on a small sample of banks
(Fitzpatrick and McQuinn, 2005). Furthermore, we also recommend the
application of MOM-estimation additionally to the ML-procedure even
in larger samples as the bias correction based on moments might indicate
strong violations of the distributional assumptions (type I and type II
errors).
Another practical advantage of MOM-estimation is obvious: When-
ever Newton-like numerical optimization is unavailable or fails due to
awkward data structure, MOM provides a loophole both robust and easy
to implement. A simple two-step procedure (OLS-fitting and bias correc-
tion based on estimated residuals) is available within every statistical
environment.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Derivatives of the log-likelihood: half-normal
lnL(y|β, λ, σ2) = n ln
(√
2√
pi
)
+ n ln
(
σ−1
)
+
n∑
i=1
ln
[
1− Φ
([
yi − x′iβ
]
λσ−1
)]
− 12σ2
n∑
i=1
(yi − x′iβ)2
The derivatives are given by
∂ lnL
∂β
= − n
σ2
n∑
i=1
(yi − x′iβ)xi +
λ
σ
n∑
i=1
φ∗i
(1− F ∗i )
xi
∂ lnL
∂σ2
= − n2σ2 +
1
2σ4
n∑
i=1
(yi − x′iβ)2
+ 12σ3
n∑
i=1
φ∗i
(1− Φ∗i )
(yi − x′iβ)
∂ lnL
∂λ
= − 1
σ
+ 12σ4
n∑
i=1
φ∗i
(1− Φ∗i )
(yi − x′iβ)
where
φ∗i = φ(
[
ln yi − x′iβ
]
λσ−1)
Φ∗i = Φ(
[
ln yi − x′iβ
]
λσ−1)
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4.6.2 Derivatives of the log-likelihood: exponential
lnL(y|β, σ2u, σ2v) = −n ln (σu) + n
1
2
σ2v
σ2u
+
n∑
i=1
ln Φ
(
− 1
σv
(yi − x′iβ)−
σv
σu
)
+
n∑
i=1
1
σu
(yi − x′iβ)
d
dβ
n∑
i=1
ln Φ
(
− 1
σv
(yi − x′iβ)−
σv
σu
)
∂ lnL
∂β
=
n∑
i=1
x′i/σvφ
(
− 1σv (yi − x′iβ)− σvσu
)
Φ
(
− 1σv (yi − x′iβ)− σvσu
) − n∑
i=1
x′i/σu
∂ lnL
∂σu
= − n
σu
−nσ
2
v
σ3u
+
n∑
i=1
σvφ
(
− 1σv (yi − x′iβ)− σvσu
)
σ2uΦ
(
− 1σv (yi − x′iβ)− σvσu
) − n∑
i=1
1
σ2u
(yi−x′iβ)
∂ lnL
∂σv
= nσv
σ2u
+
n∑
i=1
(
σ−2v (yi − x′iβ)−
1
σu
) φ (− 1σv (yi − x′iβ)− σvσu)
Φ
(
− 1σv (yi − x′iβ)− σvσu
)
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4.6.3 Tables
n 25 50 75 100 150 250 500 1000
λ method of moments
0.5 0.0516 0.0475 0.0464 0.0441 0.0416 0.0383 0.0351 0.0318
1.0 0.0612 0.0565 0.0513 0.0502 0.0464 0.0412 0.0343 0.0284
1.5 0.0588 0.0485 0.0425 0.0390 0.0319 0.0269 0.0226 0.0212
2.0 0.0531 0.0391 0.0319 0.0269 0.0228 0.0192 0.0177 0.0171
2.5 0.0480 0.0299 0.0235 0.0192 0.0166 0.0150 0.0142 0.0137
3.0 0.0424 0.0246 0.0181 0.0158 0.0136 0.0123 0.0115 0.0111
4.0 0.0345 0.0182 0.0131 0.0112 0.0098 0.0087 0.0080 0.0076
5.0 0.0291 0.0150 0.0106 0.0090 0.0077 0.0066 0.0059 0.0055
λ maximum likelihood
0.5 0.1370 0.0928 0.0746 0.0639 0.0546 0.0455 0.0359 0.0294
1.0 0.1191 0.0800 0.0667 0.0614 0.0520 0.0414 0.0333 0.0274
1.5 0.0891 0.0578 0.0471 0.0417 0.0323 0.0268 0.0225 0.0211
2.0 0.0654 0.0426 0.0331 0.0269 0.0226 0.0188 0.0176 0.0171
2.5 0.0571 0.0308 0.0229 0.0184 0.0159 0.0145 0.0140 0.0136
3.0 0.0464 0.0240 0.0171 0.0145 0.0127 0.0116 0.0111 0.0110
4.0 0.0348 0.0159 0.0110 0.0095 0.0085 0.0079 0.0076 0.0075
5.0 0.0274 0.0118 0.0082 0.0071 0.0062 0.0059 0.0055 0.0054
λ advantage
0.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE
1.0 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE
1.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE
2.0 MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.5 MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
3.0 MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
4.0 MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
5.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
Table 4.7: Mean Square Error normal-halfnormal approach
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n 25 50 75 100 150 250 500 1000
λ method of moments
0.5 0.0461 0.0441 0.0421 0.0403 0.0387 0.0348 0.0307 0.0274
1.0 0.0566 0.0443 0.0368 0.0339 0.0313 0.0288 0.0278 0.0272
1.5 0.0478 0.0331 0.0287 0.0262 0.0245 0.0232 0.0224 0.0218
2.0 0.0407 0.0274 0.0233 0.0216 0.0201 0.0188 0.0178 0.0172
2.5 0.0372 0.0229 0.0198 0.0184 0.0167 0.0154 0.0143 0.0136
3.0 0.0338 0.0207 0.0176 0.0160 0.0146 0.0129 0.0119 0.0111
4.0 0.0308 0.0182 0.0150 0.0132 0.0115 0.0099 0.0087 0.0078
5.0 0.0305 0.0168 0.0138 0.0116 0.0098 0.0082 0.0068 0.0059
λ maximum likelihood
0.5 0.0612 0.0515 0.0469 0.0446 0.0413 0.0363 0.0311 0.0275
1.0 0.0692 0.0490 0.0393 0.0353 0.0314 0.0288 0.0275 0.0272
1.5 0.0535 0.0339 0.0279 0.0249 0.0232 0.0222 0.0217 0.0215
2.0 0.0434 0.0250 0.0204 0.0189 0.0177 0.0171 0.0167 0.0165
2.5 0.0358 0.0193 0.0159 0.0148 0.0139 0.0134 0.0130 0.0128
3.0 0.0297 0.0156 0.0130 0.0120 0.0113 0.0107 0.0103 0.0102
4.0 0.0239 0.0111 0.0091 0.0084 0.0076 0.0072 0.0069 0.0068
5.0 0.0206 0.0088 0.0069 0.0062 0.0055 0.0052 0.0049 0.0048
λ advantage
0.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM
1.0 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MOM
1.5 MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.0 MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.5 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
3.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
4.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
5.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
Table 4.8: Mean Square Error normal-exponential approach
102 4 Methods of cross-sectional stochastic frontier analyses
n 25 50 75 100 150 250 500 1000
λ method of moments
0.5 0.2035 0.2022 0.1992 0.1963 0.1933 0.1874 0.1850 0.1801
1.0 0.2100 0.2013 0.1931 0.1923 0.1938 0.1934 0.1965 0.1969
1.5 0.1896 0.1817 0.1841 0.1845 0.1895 0.1931 0.1967 0.1982
2.0 0.1748 0.1745 0.1775 0.1787 0.1858 0.1910 0.1953 0.1966
2.5 0.1680 0.1685 0.1734 0.1775 0.1830 0.1871 0.1935 0.1945
3.0 0.1639 0.1670 0.1724 0.1746 0.1821 0.1875 0.1945 0.1975
4.0 0.1554 0.1622 0.1665 0.1744 0.1829 0.1894 0.1969 0.1995
5.0 0.1532 0.1592 0.1660 0.1703 0.1816 0.1906 0.1980 0.2011
λ maximum likelihood
0.5 0.2537 0.2280 0.2139 0.2078 0.1934 0.1846 0.1785 0.1756
1.0 0.2291 0.1960 0.1840 0.1800 0.1763 0.1736 0.1738 0.1736
1.5 0.1834 0.1614 0.1555 0.1536 0.1513 0.1508 0.1503 0.1502
2.0 0.1533 0.1381 0.1343 0.1317 0.1309 0.1303 0.1297 0.1295
2.5 0.1321 0.1197 0.1170 0.1165 0.1142 0.1136 0.1128 0.1124
3.0 0.1176 0.1058 0.1049 0.1032 0.1018 0.1005 0.0997 0.0995
4.0 0.0964 0.0861 0.0841 0.0841 0.0825 0.0815 0.0808 0.0804
5.0 0.0858 0.0724 0.0713 0.0707 0.0700 0.0689 0.0679 0.0674
λ advantage
0.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE
1.0 MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
1.5 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.5 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
3.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
4.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
5.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
Table 4.9: Mean Average Error misspecification 1
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n 25 50 75 100 150 250 500 1000
λ method of moments
0.5 0.1451 0.1409 0.1382 0.1377 0.1351 0.1331 0.1300 0.1281
1.0 0.1884 0.1813 0.1742 0.1728 0.1690 0.1638 0.1559 0.1479
1.5 0.1964 0.1823 0.1739 0.1698 0.1608 0.1538 0.1474 0.1450
2.0 0.1962 0.1758 0.1664 0.1587 0.1525 0.1466 0.1433 0.1412
2.5 0.1935 0.1677 0.1590 0.1510 0.1454 0.1423 0.1392 0.1379
3.0 0.1902 0.1628 0.1514 0.1472 0.1434 0.1391 0.1361 0.1352
4.0 0.1829 0.1571 0.1475 0.1430 0.1389 0.1355 0.1327 0.1320
5.0 0.1773 0.1537 0.1445 0.1419 0.1367 0.1342 0.1316 0.1304
λ maximum likelihood
0.5 0.1688 0.1548 0.1488 0.1469 0.1425 0.1392 0.1351 0.1322
1.0 0.2117 0.1959 0.1865 0.1837 0.1780 0.1706 0.1612 0.1510
1.5 0.2124 0.1921 0.1798 0.1749 0.1644 0.1554 0.1472 0.1440
2.0 0.2044 0.1781 0.1666 0.1554 0.1485 0.1410 0.1363 0.1338
2.5 0.1954 0.1612 0.1511 0.1408 0.1322 0.1289 0.1252 0.1235
3.0 0.1838 0.1489 0.1348 0.1284 0.1234 0.1180 0.1152 0.1140
4.0 0.1669 0.1312 0.1168 0.1107 0.1056 0.1022 0.0994 0.0982
5.0 0.1525 0.1168 0.1036 0.0982 0.0932 0.0903 0.0877 0.0862
λ advantage
0.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM
1.0 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM
1.5 MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE
2.0 MOM MOM MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
2.5 MOM MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
3.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
4.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
5.0 MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE
Table 4.10: Mean Average Error misspecification 2
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Inputs Outputs Reference
Altunbas and Chakravarty (2001)
labour, total funds,
physical capital
all types of loans, total aggregate
securities, off-balance sheet
activities
Intermediation
(varied)
Battese et al. (2000)
public loans, guarantees,
deposits, number of
branches, value of
inventories
costs of labour use Input-
requirement
model
Bos and Kool (2006)
public relations, labour,
housing, physical capital
retail loans, wholesale loans,
mortgages, provisions
Intermediation
(varied)
Ferrier and Lovell (1990)
employees, occupancy
costs, materials
demand deposit accounts, time
deposit accounts, real estate loans,
real estate loans, installment
loans, commercial loans
Production
Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2005)
labour, physical capital,
financial capital
consumer/commercial/other loans,
non-interest revenue
Intermediation
(varied)
Girardone et al. (2004)
employees, total customer
deposits, total fixed assets
total customer loans, other
earning assets
Intermediation
Lang and Welzel (1996)
employees, fixed assets,
deposits
short-term and long-term loans to
non-banks, loans to banks,
bonds/cash/real estate
investments, fees and commissions,
revenue from sales of commodities
Intermediation
(varied)
Mester (1996)
labour, physical capital,
deposits
real estate loans, commer-
cial/industrial/government/...
loans, loans to individuals
Intermediation
Pasiouras (2008)
total deposits, total costs,
equity
loans, other earning assets,
non-interest income
Intermediation
(varied)
Perera et al. (2007)
funds, labour, capital net total loans, other earning
assets
Intermediation
Weill (2004)
labour, physical capital,
borrowed funds
loans, investment assets Intermediation
Table 4.11: Input and output-modelling in selected bank efficiency studies
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5.1 Introduction
In recent decades we have observed a vast number of articles covering
bank efficiency assessments. Especially studies dealing with international
bank data mostly end in an efficiency ranking on the basis of mean
efficiency scores in the respective country. We tend to call this a ’static’
ranking, since the conventional methodological treatment of the time
dimension of the underlying panel structure implies the assumption
of a common trend in efficiency for all banks in the sample. So the
relative position of the countries’ banking systems remains unaffected
over the years. To our knowledge, the opportunity of ’dynamic’ rankings
of banking systems per country and year has never been performed
in literature, although the methods are available, e.g. Cuesta (2000),
Cornwell et al. (1990). So we propose that the abandonment of the
assumption of a common trend in efficiency in favour of country-specific
trends may reveal new findings.
Since the first cross sectional approaches to a Stochastic Frontier
Analysis (SFA) by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van de Broeck
(1977) the methodology is now technically mature. We picked out two
entirely different methods in panel SFA and developed the estimation
of group-specific efficiency trends. With respect to the SFA methods
implemented within most statistical software packages there exists only
the option of estimating a common trend parameter for the whole sample.
This leads to an unchanged efficiency structure over time for all firms in
the data set: Consequently, the efficiency ranking is static. On the other
hand, partitioning the data in subsamples per group allows for group-
specific trends, but one loses the possibility of group rankings against
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the background of the same benchmark. The methods we put forward
combine the option of estimating group-specific time trend parameters –
allowing for more heterogeneity – and the validity of inter-group efficiency
comparisons.
For these purposes our study is composed as follows: In chapter 5.2,
we provide an overview of a sample of recent and most cited studies on
international bank efficiency comparisons. Eventually, we try to stick
as closely as possible to the established procedures in bank efficiency
studies to ensure the basic comparability of our formal results with
preceding studies. In chapter 5.3, we describe two SFA approaches
(fixed and random effects) and develop the possibility to estimate group-
specific time trends within the panel structure. The aim is to motivate
the implementation of the (numerical) optimization procedures within
statistical programming environments. Chapter 5.4 contains descriptive
statistics on the compilation of our database, comprising Bankscope and
OECD data. In chapter 5.5, we discuss the dynamic efficiency ranking
we estimated. Chapter 5.6 finally contains the conclusion.
5.2 Literature overview
Despite the fact that the majority of efficiency studies focus on in-
dividual countries, several comparative studies of efficiency in financial
institutions have been undertaken. Among them we reviewed Al-Sharkas
et al. (2008), Altunbas et al. (2001), Bos and Schmiedel (2003), Casu and
Molyneux (2003), Casu and Girardone (2006), Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas
(2000), Girardone et al. (2009), Goddard et al. (2004), Lozano-Vivas
et al. (2002), Oliveira and Tabak (2005), Pastor et al. (1997), Pastor and
Serrano (2006), Weill (2004). Table 5.8 in the appendix shows the basic
information on countries and years covered as well as methods applied.
Obviously, European and US banking systems on the turn of the
millenium constitute the focus of interest. Especially the ongoing process
of European financial integration has aroused the need for an impartial
’yardstick’ regarding the potential gains on banking competition and
costs.
With respect to methodological issues, we counted an approximately
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balanced number of applications of either parametrical SFA or non-
parametrical Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and only few applica-
tions of the Distribution Free Approach (DFA) (Berger, 1993). As the
underlying motivation for bank efficiency studies is basically twofold –
besides economic questions several authors discuss the implications of dif-
ferent methodological approaches – we sometimes encounter simultaneous
application of multiple methods (Al-Sharkas et al., 2008, Lozano-Vivas
et al., 2002, Weill, 2004).
The key to bank efficiency estimation is the definition of typical bank-
ing activities, i.e. the delienation for some kind of production process.
The standard approach is the assumption of financial transformation
processes described by the ’idea of intermediation’ (Sealey and Lindley,
1977)1. It concerns a multistage production process of the financial firm,
using capital, labour and material to acquire customer deposits in a first
step. Lending these funds in a (virtual) second step to deficit spending
units and issuing securities and other earning assets involve in general
an interest profit. So financial production for intermediation purposes is
about adding value to deposits. As most bank efficiency studies are based
on Bankscope balance sheet data, the authors have access to the same set
of multiple input and output variables. In particular, we most frequently
find as outputs (1) all kinds of loans and (2) securities/investments, and
sometimes (3) off-balance sheet items (OBS), e.g. contingent liabilities.
Although OBS activities do not accord with the classical understanding
of financial intermediation processes, most authors see the growing impor-
tance of considering non-traditional banking activities2. Inputs are (1)
labour (number of employees or personnel expenses),(2) physical capital,
and (3) borrowed funds/deposits (Al-Sharkas et al., 2008, Altunbas et al.,
2001, Bos and Schmiedel, 2003, Casu and Molyneux, 2003, Casu and
Girardone, 2006, Girardone et al., 2009, Pastor and Serrano, 2006, Weill,
2004).
Alternatively, some studies refer to the ’added value’ approach by
1This reasoning is sometimes referred to as the asset approach to defining bank output
since funds intermediation is the focus rather than deposit service production
(Hancock, 1991, p.16).
2Casu and Girardone (2005) showed that omitting OBS activities may lead to biased
productivity estimates.
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Berger et al. (1993). This implies treating a balance sheet item (whether
liability or asset) as an output, if the returns on the product are higher
than its opportunity cost (Pastor et al., 1997). As such detailed informa-
tion on banks’ activities and opportunity costs are typically unavailable,
most authors resort to the pioneering results by Berger and Humphrey
(1992): Thus, (1) all kinds of deposits (demand, savings and time), (2)
loans, and (3) other productive assets, i.e. investments or deposits with
banks, generate more added value and ought to be treated as outputs.
Inputs are (1) personnel expenses and (2) other non-interest expenses
(Pastor et al., 1997, Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002). Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas (2000) suggest inputs (1) labour, (2) physical capital ≡ (capital
equipment + occupancy expenses)/fixed assets and (3) a financial factor
≡ total interest expenses/total interest bearing liabilities.
Application of SFA methods allows for the presence of just one de-
pendent variable. In the context of multiple-output multiple-input pro-
duction processes, we can deal with the problem by resorting to cost
or profit functions. Incorporating the conditions of Duality Theory3,
cost functions contain the full information about the underlying produc-
tion technology. Authors applying DEA can circumvent these issues by
directly setting up weighted input-output-ratios (Casu and Molyneux,
2003, Casu and Girardone, 2006, Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002, Pastor et al.,
1997, Pastor and Serrano, 2006).
Apart from these two standard procedures (intermediation approach
and added value approach), we observe two exceptions within the reviewed
literature: Goddard et al. (2004) and Oliveira and Tabak (2005) do not
necessarily link bank efficiency with considerations about bank production
processes. They alternatively take common profitability measures, i.e.
the return on equity (ROE), as a reference. Goddard et al. (2004) regress
the ROE on total assets, the share of off-balance sheet activities, the
capital-to-asset ratio as well as dummies identifying public or commercial
banks. As the authors aim at reporting a significant relationship between
dependent and explanatory variables, the application of OLS and common
panel methods serves the purpose. Oliveira and Tabak (2005) accessed
Datastream and Bloomberg financial data to constitute a DEA frontier
3Cp. Beatti and Taylor (1985), chapter 6.
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assessing banks’ ROE given country-specific stock market characteristics.
As their study covers an impressive number of 41 countries worldwide
the authors can classify their results according to the specific market
development in several stages.
Basically, it is difficult to compare results of international bank effi-
ciency studies. As the obtained DEA and SFA efficiency scores are only
weakly correlated between each other, even though based on identical
data (Weill, 2004), we have to assume the absence of any coherence among
studies applying different methods on different data. Another reason for
noticeable differences is the treatment of country-specific technologies.
On the one hand, estimation of separate frontiers for each country per-
fectly accounts for technological and environmental particularities (Weill,
2004). But unfortunately this prevents the cross-national comparison of
efficiency scores with the objective of country rankings. On the other
hand, estimation of a common frontier is the traditional approach. As-
suming an identical benchmark technology across different countries is
obviously a violation of sample homogeneity as it tends to generate too
much inefficiency: First, Casu and Molyneux (2003) confirm that most of
the efficiency differences found across European banking systems are due
to country-specific aspects of the banking technology. And second, Bos
and Schmiedel (2003) substantiate the fact that EU banking institutions
do not always have access to the same benchmark technology. Thus,
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) are the first to suggest selecting a set
of environmental variables to account for country-specific conditions4.
Unfortunately, Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002) confirm that no theoretical
studies exist as for the choice of the appropriate environmental control
variables. In consequence, most authors rely on previous empirical stud-
ies or data availability. A typical set of commonly used environmental
variables can be salary per capita, population density, density of demand,
the Herfindahl-Index indicating the degree of competition among banks,
intermediation ratio, branch density, ownership characteristics or even
the level of financial development according to the World Bank Financial
4Berger (2007) confirms that Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) is the first ’improved’
study on the turn of the century specifying better controls for differences in
economic environments.
110 5 Cost efficiency trends in European and US Banking
Structure Database5. Alternatively, a simple country-specific dummy
variable accounts for most of the observed heterogeneity, but eliminates
any differences in inefficiency levels.
Besides country-specific heterogeneity, we additionally encounter dif-
ferences due to specialization and/or ownership characteristics. On this
account, most studies deal with homogenized bank data sets: Either
adjusted by similar bank size in terms of total assets (Pastor and Ser-
rano, 2006), or considering only commercial banks assuming a common
profit-maximizing behaviour (Pastor et al., 1997, Lozano-Vivas et al.,
2002, Bos and Schmiedel, 2003, Goddard et al., 2004), or incorporating
a specialization dummy to distinguish commercial/private banks from
savings/public banks (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). As Oliveira and Tabak
(2005) use stock and market risk data, the authors confine themselves
to market disciplined institutions. Pastor and Serrano (2006) take an
interesting approach, regardless of the banks’ legal form: By means of a
cluster analysis, the institutions ’automatically’ fall into four groups (1)
mortgage and intermediation banking, (2) retail banking, (3) wholesale
banking and (4) universal banking. The authors discuss in detail the
implications of adherence to a particular group.
Given the vast number of studies on bank efficiency it is rather
impossible to make general statements about the methods that have been
applied hitherto. We reviewed many more studies than our selection
presented here comprises. Insofar, we have good reason to assume that
most studies on international efficiency comparisons end in a static
efficiency ranking. Hence, we intend to put forward in the following
section two innovative methods that allow dynamic efficiency rankings per
year and country. As for the operationalization of financial production
processes we try to stick to the well-established standard procedure, in
close dependence on the most recent study by Girardone et al. (2009).
5Girardone et al. (2009): The financial structure index quantifies the degree of stock
market orientation of a financial system according to the three criteria relative
stock market capitalization, value of stocks traded in relation to private loans and
value of stocks traded multiplied with relative overhead costs in the respective
countries.
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5.3.1 The basic idea of productive efficiency
The derivation of cross-sectional methods in SFA has often been per-
formed in literature. The standard references are Aigner et al. (1977) and
Meeusen and van de Broeck (1977). So we just give a short introduction
to the idea of the model. For a comprehensive discussion of a maximum
likelihood approach versus a method of moments approach in the context
of a half-normally or exponentially distributed inefficiency term we refer
to chapter 4.
Let us assume cross sectional data for n units indexed by i (i = 1, ..., N)
using K (k = 1, ...,K) different inputs contained in the input vector
xi to produce a single output yi. The fundamental idea of stochastic
frontier technical efficiency can be formalized as the ratio of realized
output, given a specific set of inputs, to maximum attainable output
(Coelli et al., 2005, p. 244):
TEi =
yi
y∗i
= exp(g(xi;β)) · exp(vi) · exp(−ui)exp(g(xi;β)) · exp(vi) = exp(−ui) ∈ (0, 1]
with g(xi;β) as a log-linear production function (e.g. Cobb-Douglas,
Translog or Fourier Flexible Form), vi as random noise vi ∼ N(0;σ2v) and
ui ≥ 0 representing inefficiency. y∗i is the maximum attainable output
for unit i given xi.
The estimation of the deterministic part of the frontier function
g(xi;β) cannot be performed by OLS, as the error term is two-part and
asymmetrically distributed: εi ≡ vi − ui with E(ε) ≤ 0. In practice, the
maximum likelihood estimation leads to slope parameters similar to OLS
and a vertically shifted intercept.
The fundamental issue to any SFA estimation is now the disentangle-
ment of a two-component error term εi = vi − ui. As we only observe
a single deviation εˆi per firm i, it is virtually impossible to generate
two estimators vˆi and uˆi at the same time. An increasing sample size
N →∞ does not improve the accuracy of every uˆi.
For this reason, the application of cross-sectional SFA has to rely
on conditional expected values of inefficiency E(u|ε). Only multiple
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observations on the same firm provide the opportunity to overcome this
information problem. This is the case in a panel data environment with
Ti observations on every firm-specific inefficiency score ui.
We will not confine ourselves to the most simple case of time-invariant
inefficiency. In its most general form, the production model in terms of
panel data can be written as
yit = β0it +
K∑
k=1
βkitxkit + vit − uit (5.1)
with i = 1, ..., N firms, t = 1, ..., Ti years per i, yit firm i’s output in
t, xkit firm i’s inputs k = 1, ...,K in t, vit normal noise and uit ≥ 0
firm-specific inefficiency in t.
Obviously, the number of observations ∑Ni=1 Ti is insufficient to esti-
mate ∑Ni=1 Ti intercepts β0, (∑Ni=1 Ti) ·K slope parameters as well as
additional parameters characterizing the distributions of v and u. In
consequence, certain restrictions are to be imposed on the structure of
the model.
5.3.2 Fixed effects with time trend
A model with time-variant efficiency and common slope parameters
for all t and i is given as (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003, p. 108):
yit = β0t +
K∑
k=1
βkxkit + vit − uit (5.2)
with β0t as intercept of the production frontier for all i in t. A simple
approach to the estimation of this model is the ’fixed effects interpreta-
tion’:
β0it ≡ β0t − uit (5.3)
We simply defined the firm-specific amount of inefficiency in t as vertical
distance between a true but unobserved β0t constituting the efficient
upper (production) boundary and the firm specific effect in t. This leads
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to
yit = β0it +
K∑
k=1
βkxkit + vit (5.4)
So uit is no more part of the error term, but included in a firm- and
time-specific intercept (’effect’). For that reason, no particular ran-
dom distribution for uit has to be assumed. Thus we can speak of a
semiparametric treatment of inefficiency6.
In order to further limit the number of parameters, most authors
impose a certain deterministic structure on the varying intercept term
over time. For example, Cornwell et al. (1990, p. 192) propose a unit-
specific time trend of the form
β0it = β0i + ω1it+ ω2it2 (5.5)
Estimation of the model by either the within transformation or dummy
matrices is straightforward. But, as we deal with panel data where
the ratio N/T is rather large7, we simplify this idea to the estimation of
country-specific ω1l, ω2l, with every i belonging to one country l = 1, ..., L,
and with L N :
β0it = β0i + ω1lt+ ω2lt2 for i in l (5.6)
So the final model is
yit = β0i + ω1lt+ ω2lt2 +
K∑
k=1
βkxkit + vit for i in l (5.7)
In practice, the OLS estimation can be performed by construction of
appropriate time-index matrices of dimension ∑Ni=1 Ti × L. We obtain L
time trend functions and N intercepts βˆ0i. The time-dependent βˆ0it can
be recovered according to equation (5.6). Now firm-specific inefficiencies
uˆit can be estimated (equation 5.3). We set the most efficient firm per
year as 100% efficient. This is justifiable in the marginal case N →∞.
6An example of a non-parametric treatment is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
In DEA models, a random term does not exist at all.
7In cases the dummy matrices exceed computer capacity.
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Based on this assumption, Schmidt and Sickles (1984) proposed the
relative inefficiency estimator8:
βˆ0t = max
i
(βˆ0it) for t = 1, ...,max Ti
uˆit = βˆ0t − βˆ0it for i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ...,max Ti
T̂Eit = exp(−uˆit) for multiplicative production frontiers
This is the same as
T̂Eit =
exp(βˆ0it)
exp(βˆ0t)
∈ (0, 1] (5.8)
In practice (using data sets smaller than infinity), the max operator comes
along with a strong sensitivity towards outliers. This results in very poor
efficiency scores for the remaining units. For this reason, we recommend
replacing the max operation with a high quantile, for example 99% in
the case of production frontiers. The efficiency scores for units excessing
frontier production have to be adjusted to a 100% score.
So we can conclude: Panel stochastic frontier analysis based on the
fixed effects approach leads to consistent estimators for efficiency scores
T̂Eit as Ti →∞ and N →∞. No random distribution for inefficiency
uit has to be defined and it allows for correlation between effects and
regressors. If desired, inference to uit in so-called MCB-models (multiple
comparisons with the best) can be derived by bootstrapping procedures
(Greene, 2008, p.186).
5.3.3 Random effects with time trend
Kumbhakar (1990) developed a flexible approach to technical inef-
ficiency on the basis of a Random Effects approach9 which can handle
different types of time behavior, as well as time-invariant efficiency as a
special case.
8The authors originally discussed the case of time-invariant inefficiency
9I.e., a random distribution for the inefficiency term is explicitely defined.
5.3 SFA methodology 115
In equation 5.2, uit takes the form
uit = γ(t) · τi (5.9)
with τi ∼ iidN−(0, σ2τ ) a half normal firm-specific factor. γ(t) is a
deterministic function of time and is considered to take on a form with
two parameters
γ(t) = 11 + exp(ω1t+ ω2t2)
(5.10)
Obviously, γ(t) is bounded by the positive interval (0, 1). Multiplication
by τi ≤ 0 leads to inefficiency levels uit ≤ 0. In the case of ω1 = ω2 = 0,
inefficiency does not vary over time. As the rate of productivity change
is the same for all producers, the efficiency ranking between all i remains
unaltered for t = 1, ..., Ti. Thus, this approach turns out to be the
precursor of the more familiar Battese and Coelli (1992) model. The
authors assume a similar deterministic trend function:
uit = η(t) · τi
=
(
1 + η1(t− T ) + η2(t− T )2
)
· τi (5.11)
with T the last year in the sample and τi allowed to be truncated normal
with E(τi) 6= 0. The popularity of this alternative model – we found the
most recent application in Girardone et al. (2009) – arises mainly from
the fact that the authors published a freely available computer program
for estimation10. Unfortunately, the program is limited to the estimation
of just one time trend parameter η1. For this reason we continue our
description of the Kumbhakar (1990) approach.
The production function can be written as
yit = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkxkit + vit + γ(t)τi (5.12)
OLS estimation is inappropriate, because the expected value of the
composed error term vit + γ(t)τi is nonzero. The expected bias E(vit +
10http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/frontier.htm
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γ(t)τi) = γ(t) ·E(τi) may be corrected by a Method of Moments approach
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003, p. 113), but Kumbhakar (1990) suggests
Maximum Likelihood estimation.
Let εit = vit + uit, εi = (εi1, ..., εiTi)′ denote the resulting vector of
firm-specific residuals and Ti the number of years firm i is observed (for
an unbalanced panel). Since the vit are iid and independent of τi, the
joint density of (vi1, ..., viTi , τi)′ is
f(vi1, ..., viTi , τi) = f(vi) · f(τi) = f(εi − ui) · f(τi)
= f(εi − γ(t)τi) · f(τi)
with ui = (ui1, ..., uiTi)′. This is also the joint density of f(εi, τi). The
marginal density f(εi) can be obtained by integration with respect to
the range for τi, which is (Kumbhakar, 1990, p. 205)
f(εi) =
∫ 0
−∞
f(εi, τi)dτi
= 2σ
∗
i exp(−a∗i /2)
(2pi)Ti/2σTiv στ
· Φ(−µ∗i /σ∗i )
where
σ∗i =
σvστ(
σ2v + σ2τ
∑Ti
t γ
2(t)
)1/2
µ∗i =
∑Ti
t γ(t)εit
σ2v
· σ∗2i
a∗i =
1
σ2v
 Ti∑
t
ε2it − σ2τ
 Ti∑
t
γ(t)εit
2σ2v + σ2τ Ti∑
t
γ2(t)
−1

The objective function is the log-likelihood function for all producers
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i = 1, ..., N , each observed in t = 1, ..., Ti.
lnL =
N∑
i=1
ln(2σ∗i )−
1
2
N∑
i=1
a∗i −
(1
2 ln(2pi) + ln σv
)
·
N∑
i=1
Ti
−N ln στ +
N∑
i=1
ln
[
1− Φ
(
µ∗i
σ∗i
)]
(5.13)
Replacing11 εit = yit − β0 −∑k βKk=1xkit and optimization of equation
(5.13) by standard procedures yield estimated values βˆ0, βˆk, ωˆ1, ωˆ2, σˆv
and σˆτ . Firm-specific efficiency scores can be recovered by deriving the
expectation of τi|εi with respect to the conditional density:
f(τi|εi) = f(εi, τi)
f(εi)
= 1√
2piσ∗i
·
exp
(
− 12σ∗2i (τi − µ
∗
i )2
)
Φ(−µ∗i /σ∗i )
(5.14)
The extended Jondrow et al. (1982)-like estimator is
τˆi = E(τi|εi) = µ∗i − σ∗i ·
φ(µ∗i /σ∗i )
Φ(−µ∗i /σ∗i )
(5.15)
The time-variant inefficiency scores are
uˆi = γˆ · τˆi (5.16)
with γˆ = (γˆ(1), ..., γˆ(max Ti)). This leads to technical efficiencies in a
production frontier environment
T̂Eit = exp[E(τi|εi) · γˆ(t)] (5.17)
ML-estimation of the parameters provides consistent estimators of uˆi as
Ti →∞.
Up to this point, we have dealt with the case of a single common
efficiency trend for the whole sample. Just as we modified the classical
fixed effects approach to capture group-specific trend parameters, we
11The Jacobian of the transformation from (v, u) to (ε, u) has det = 1. Cp. Greene
(2008, p. 116).
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intend to develop the Kumbhakar (1990) model to handle group-specific
trends, too12.
γl(t) =
1
1 + exp(ω1lt+ ω2lt2)
for i in l (5.18)
The maximum likelihood procedure described above does not change at
all. By means of the same time index matrices applied in subsection
5.3.2, one can ensure that every firm i is assigned to the respective group
l.
5.4 Descriptive statistics of the database
We will now turn to our exemplifying application: the estimation and
assessment of bank efficiency scores. As indicated in chapter 5.2, we deal
with international data on banks’ balance sheets and income statements
as reported in the familiar Bankscope database13. The working data
set consists of commercial, savings and cooperative banking institutions
in eight OECD countries holding a major occurrence in the Bankscope
database. In particular, it comprises Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE),
Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Sweden (SE), Great Britain (GB)
and the USA (US). The length of the panel is eight years, from 2000 to
2007. So we cover the most recent data in all studies reviewed.
5.4.1 Data preparation and imputation
The major advantage of the Bankscope database is the aggregation
of nation-specific balance sheet items according to a global scheme, as
well as the disclosure in a common currency, e.g. US-Dollar (USD).
Inevitably, this functionality goes along with a diminished possibility to
inspect detailed information. Moreover, we encountered fragmentarily
administered data. To avoid losing too many observations we success-
fully tried to reconstruct some of the missing data. For this reason we
12This idea is based on the approach by Cuesta (2000), extending the Battese and
Coelli (1992) model by unit-specific trend parameters ηi.
13Bureau van Dijk.
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reconstructed basic balance sheet and income statement schemata on the
basis of the available variables. In cases where just one item in assets or
liabilities is missing, we were able to unambiguously recover more than
3.000 missing observations using unambiguous balance sheet identities.
Thereafter, we prepared a data set of all interesting variables. In cases
where observations on just one single variable per unit were missing,
a k−nearest-neighbour imputation algorithm was finally applied14. It
compares the units on the basis of the existing observations, identifying
the k = 10 units that most resemble each other. Eventually, the algo-
rithm calculates the missing value as the inter- or extrapolation of the k
existing observations. We performed this procedure in country-specific
subsets.
After deleting implausible values (we treat observations ≤ 0 in major
balance sheet items, e.g. total deposits, total costs, equity etc. as
implicitly missing), and excluding banks observed in only one year, we
find the number of banks per year and country given in table 5.1. In
figure 5.4 in the appendix we give an overview of how many banks are
observed over how many years, reaching a number of 4007 institutions.
Fortunately, most of the banks have recorded data for all years 2000
– 2007. Note that we excluded several dozen outliers per variable by
means of regression deletion diagnostics15. This procedure reveals the
observations which strongly bias the estimated parameters. We plotted
the corresponding density and graphically identified the outliers. After
all, we did not globally cut off any percentiles of data or replaced any
existing observations by more convenient values (refer to figure 5.5 in
the appendix).
We finally accessed SourceOECD Bank Profitability Statistics16 to
verify the coverage of the remaining data in comparison to the total
number of savings, cooperative and commercial banks in the respective
countries. We report the percentage of covered institutions in table
5.2: Unfortunately, it is obvious that in some countries a serious data
reassessment on a Bankscope-based data set finally reveals a rather
poor data management on the part of the publisher. Nevertheless, the
14Refer to http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/impute/impute.pdf for details.
15So-called ’leave-one-out deletion’ (Cook and Weisberg, 1982)
16www.sourceoecd.org.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 SUM
CH 147 193 242 256 293 291 294 286 2002
DE 1550 1544 1432 1328 1321 1568 1571 1431 11745
ES 17 17 14 10 65 138 140 87 488
FR 164 172 158 143 150 175 157 115 1234
IT 57 65 45 29 60 572 566 465 1859
SE 7 52 51 52 54 56 59 23 354
GB 30 31 34 37 65 71 69 54 391
US 385 394 374 351 312 303 285 253 2657
SUM 2357 2468 2350 2206 2320 3174 3141 2714 20730
Table 5.1: Observed banks per year and country
absolute number of banks will permit us to estimate cross sectional
frontier functions per year and country.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CH 43.88 59.02 76.58 85.05 97.99 98.64 102.08 100.00
DE 60.59 65.56 65.12 64.43 66.68 81.67 83.70 77.69
ES 6.05 6.05 5.09 3.72 24.44 51.30 51.47 31.07
FR 31.66 33.93 32.85 30.95 40.43 48.48 44.60 34.12
IT 6.78 7.83 5.53 3.68 7.71 72.96 71.37 57.69
SE 5.56 40.31 40.16 41.60 42.86 45.16 47.20 18.70
GB 7.33 8.05 8.95 10.39 18.79 21.19 20.54 16.12
US 4.03 4.24 4.13 3.94 3.58 3.53 3.38 3.05
Table 5.2: Net coverage final bankscope dataset (percent)
5.4.2 Modelling cost frontiers
Descriptive statistics
We refer to the classical Intermediation Approach by Sealey and
Lindley (1977) mentioned in chapter 5.2 to set up common and single-
equation cost frontiers17. We chose to assess cost efficiency rather than
17We abstain from a separate assessment of allocative inefficiency vs. technical
inefficiency. In that case, additional cost share equations according to Shephard’s
Lemma have to be estimated.
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profit efficiency, as one cannot assume all banks behaving according to
profit maximizing considerations. Especially institutions regulated by
public law (savings banks in Germany and France) and cooperative banks
are usually entrusted with structural or social development tasks. For this
reason, cost minimizing rather than profit maximizing behaviour seems
to be a common interest across our heterogeneous dataset. Moreover,
Bos and Koetter (2007) note that cost functions are problematic if firms
incur losses, since the logarithm of non-positive numbers is not defined.
Although the authors propose certain procedures to adjust the data and
the model, respectively, we would like to avoid the implications of this
discussion here.
The descriptive statistics for all variables included in the cost function
are given in table 5.3. All currency statements are converted to million
USD based on a single current exchange rate. This prevents revaluations
of currencies over time to bias our results. Moreover, all nominal values
are corrected for inflation with base year 2005.
mean median sd
cost 357.36 39.44 3022.26
loan 4361.00 468.02 29912.10
oea 3790.91 237.65 44390.77
obs 6335.23 52.92 137256.32
ptdep 0.04 0.03 0.23
ppers 0.01 0.01 0.01
ptfa 1.43 0.64 5.30
eqr 7.54 6.17 5.31
com 0.28 0.00 0.45
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics
We derive the dependent variable cost as the sum of personnel, interest
and other administrative expenses (Girardone et al., 2009). Furthermore,
the output variables loan as total loans in million USD, oea as other
earning assets in million USD and obs to account for the growing relevance
of off-balance sheet activities in nominal values. The input prices are
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ptdep as price of total deposits (ratio of interest paid to total deposits),
ppers as price of labour (ratio of personnel expenses to total assets18) and
ptfa as price of total fixed assets19. The control variable is eqr as equity
ratio in percent and serves as risk proxy (the higher the eqr, the lower
the risk of the bank, e.g. Bos and Schmiedel (2003, p.13)). Additionally,
we describe, but do not estimate, the variable com as control dummy for
commercial institutions20 in contrast to cooperative and savings banks
(the mean reflecting the share of commercial/private institutions in the
data set)21.
Country-specific environmental controls
In chapter 5.2, we discussed the importance of an adequate set of vari-
ables explaining country-specific environmental factors. Again, OECD
statistical databases deliver comprehensive information on economic,
social and regional particularities of all major industrial countries22.
To assure the availability of a full set of observations in all countries
and years, we chose to incorporate three environmental control variables
in a common frontier function, in the style of Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002,
p.64f.):
• The labour productivity growth rate in percent23 prod.growth.
As financial production mainly consists of provision of services,
supported by information and communication technology, the pro-
ductivity growth rate strongly affects banking productivity. We
expect labour productivity growth to reduce banking costs.
18It is certainly preferable to calculate labour costs as personnel expenses per employee,
but the number of employees is a rather poor administered variable in the Bankscope
database.
19Due to unavailable data on banks’ depreciation expenses, we calculated the ratio
of other administrative expenses on total fixed assets, see also Girardone et al.
(2009).
20Note that dummy variables cannot be estimated within fixed effects approaches.
21Table 5.9 in the appendix shows the share of commercial, cooperative and savings
banks in the respective countries, according to OECD data.
22stats.oecd.org.
23Labour productivity calculated as gross domestic product per working hour. See
OECD for details.
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• The gross domestic product per head gdp.head. It reflects the
wealth and the stage of development of a country. Lozano-Vivas
et al. (2002) suggest that a mature environment results in more
competitive interest rates and profit margins. Higher interest rates
paid typically increase banking costs.
• The number of branches per 1000 inhabitants branch.dens. The
impact of a denser branch network on banking costs is ambivalent:
On the one hand, it facilitates the access to financial services
throughout the population; but on the other hand, the capacity
of some branches might be underutilized. So Lozano-Vivas et al.
(2002) suggest that hight levels of branch density imply high costs
and tend to reduce bank efficiency.
Note that, as these variables are not only country-specific, but also
time-dependent, they will control for most of the bank-external produc-
tivity trends. After having controlled for macroeconomic effects, the
remaining ’net’ trend parameters we are going to estimate will be re-
flecting bank-internal productivity changes (managerial abilities, roughly
speaking) in a more authentic way.
Functional form
In conformity with the predominant part of the literature, we chose
to estimate a translog cost frontier, originally developed by Christensen
et al. (1973). With outputs ym,m = 1, 2, 3, input prices wk, k = 1, 2, 3
and control variables controlsp, p = 1, ..., 4, (three OECD environmental
variables and the risk proxy) given above, the translog cost frontier can
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be written as24:
ln costit = β0 +
3∑
k=1
αk lnwkit +
3∑
m=1
βm ln ymit
+ 12
3∑
k=1
3∑
j=1
αkj lnwkit lnwjit +
1
2
3∑
m=1
3∑
n=1
βmn ln ymit ln ynit
+ 12
3∑
k=1
3∑
m=1
γkm lnwkit ln ymit +
4∑
p=1
δpcontrolspit + vit + uit
To preserve our notation in the context of (upper) production frontiers,
note that symmetry of vit allows us to turn the sign
log(costit) = log (g(yit, wit);β)) + vit + uit |vit symmetric
⇔ − log(costit) = − log (g(yit, wit);β)) + vit − uit
In words: Mirroring all data in the origin enables us to estimate a
negatively shifted intercept by exactly the methods described above,
while leaving the slope parameters unchanged.
The existence of ’regular’ translog cost and profit frontiers depends on
certain regularity conditions (symmetry of the second-order derivatives;
linear homogeneity in input prices)25:
αkj = αjk and βmn = βnm for j, k,m, n = 1, 2, 3
and
α1 + α2 + α3 = 1
in the first order terms, as well asα11 + α12 + α13 = 0α21 + α22 + α23 = 0
α31 + α32 + α33 = 0
 and
γ11 + γ21 + γ31 = 0γ12 + γ22 + γ32 = 0
γ13 + γ32 + γ33 = 0

in the second order terms. With substitution for the third input w3,
24Note that inefficiency uit implies a positive deviation from the cost frontier.
25See e.g., Lang and Welzel (1996).
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the restricted translog frontier turns out to be (indices it omitted for
simplicity)
ln cost− lnw3 = β0 + α1(lnw1 − lnw3) + α2(lnw2 − lnw3)
+ β1 ln y1 + β2 ln y2 + β3 ln y3
+ α11
(1
2(lnw1)
2 − lnw1 lnw3
)
+ α12(lnw1 lnw2 − lnw1 lnw3 − lnw2 lnw3)
+ α22
(1
2(lnw2)
2 − lnw2 lnw3
)
+ γ11(lnw1 ln y1 − lnw3 ln y1) + γ21(lnw2 ln y1 − lnw3 ln y1)
+ γ12(lnw1 ln y2 − lnw3 ln y2) + γ22(lnw2 ln y2 − lnw3 ln y2)
+ γ13(lnw1 ln y3 − lnw3 ln y3) + γ23(lnw2 ln y3 − lnw3 ln y3)
+ 12β11(ln y1)
2 + β12 ln y1 ln y2 + β13 ln y1 ln y3
+ 12β22(ln y2)
2 + β23 ln y2 ln y3 +
1
2β33(ln y3)
2
+
5∑
p=1
δpcontrolsp + v + u
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5.5.1 Discussion of the estimated parameters
We estimated two SFA panel models with deterministic time trend
parameters on the basis of the fixed effects extension by Cornwell et al.
(1990) (Identifier : Fixed effects model FE) and Kumbhakar (1990) (Iden-
tifier : Random effects model RE) described above. As we expect all
banks in our database to act on an increasingly deregulated common
market in the early millenium years, it is virtually meaningless to account
for national borders in view of a distinctive international network of
financial institutions. For this reason, we can assume identical tech-
nology parameters of the cost frontier across all countries, and do not
estimate country-specific frontiers. A common frontier goes along with
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the possibility to set up efficiency rankings, as all banks are assessed
against the background of the same benchmark. Nevertheless, all banks
in a particular country, whether foreign or domestic banks, face the
same environmental conditions which can differ from country to country.
In chapter 5.2, we mentioned the recent findings of Berger (2007) who
emphasizes the importance of an adequate set of environmental factors
controlling for different economic and regional conditions in European
and US banking systems. The parameters of the environmental control
variables we introduced beside the technology parameters of the cost
function adjust country-specific cost frontiers to particular patterns of
demand. Moreover, we allow for heterogeneity in the efficiency trends.
A word concerning the optimization procedures: The Maximum-
Likelihood optimization for the RE model was implemented within the
R-Environment (R Development Core Team, 2010). Small simulation
studies on an unbalanced sample of 100 firms in eight years (at most)
let us expect the estimation of the trend parameters to be unbiased
(see figure 5.6 in the appendix; further details on the data generating
process are available upon request.). With respect to the FE model, OLS
estimation of demeaned panel data is always BLUE.
After optimization we found the parameters given in tables 5.4 and
5.526. In accordance with the literature we observe that the statistical
significance of the first- and second-order translog parameters is scattered
due to the multicollinearity problem. So we shall focus our discussion on
the economic meaning of the remaining parameters.
• The risk proxy affects costs in FE und RE in a negative manner.
In other words: The higher the equity ratio, i.e. the lower the risk
of the bank, the lower the costs. This is somewhat surprising, as we
expect equity to be one of the rather cost-intensive sources of bank
funding. But apparently, we undervalued the positive signalling of
a solid equity funding.
• The parameter of labour productivity growth is the same in both
26Note that dummy-variables (e.g., for commercial banking institutions) cannot be
incorporated within the estimation, because time-invariant elements disappear in
the course of fixed effects regressions.
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models: We observe a negative parameter, as expected: Positive
productivity growth reduces costs by trend.
• As anticipated by Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002), a higher gross do-
mestic product per head increases banking costs in both models
FE and RE.
• Surprisingly, the extra costs of more branches per inhabitant is
not definite in both models. In FE, the extra benefits are beyond
additional charges, reducing total costs. So we cannot confirm the
supposition by Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002). In RE, the corresponding
parameter is insignificantly positive.
• Additionally, we compared the mean efficiency gap between com-
mercial and non-commercial (public) institutions per country, using
the identifier com. Figure 5.1 shows the mean efficiency surplus
of public banks compared with commercial banks in both models
FE and RE. Our result corresponds roughly to the findings of
Girardone et al. (2009): The authors note that banks based on
mutuality might benefit from local monopoly power.
Figure 5.1: Efficiency gap between commercial and non-commercial
institutions
Now we turn to the results of the SFA efficiency estimation:
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• First, we discuss the time trend parameters ω1, ω2 for each country.
As we estimated two parameters (linear and quadratic), an (inverse)
u-shaped efficiency/intercept change is possible in both settings.
Our panel length comprises only eight years at most, so we abstained
from the estimation of an additional cubic trend. Figures 5.2 and
5.3 illustrate the country-specific estimated trends with reference to
a virtual base year ’0’. The resulting efficiency scores and rankings
will be discussed in detail below.
In the case of RE, the sign and value of the parameters can be
directly interpreted as inefficiency change. In the FE model, the
respective parameters describe the changing intercept. A negatively
shifted intercept is equivalent to reduced costs. As efficiency is
a relative concept in the framework of a fixed effects estimation,
no general statement about the resulting efficiency change can be
derived from the parameters. We tried to reduce the influence of
single outliers on the efficiency scores by setting all banks below the
1% cost quantile as 100% efficient, instead of orientation towards
the absolute minimum costs.
• Note that σˆτ and σˆv in the RE model are not moments of the
estimated values τˆi and vˆi, respectively, but estimators of the
parameters of the underlying asymmetric error term distribution
f(τ) · f(v) (cp. section 5.3). Insofar, it is the skewness in the data
that determines the estimated values σˆτ and σˆv. In terms of the
likelihood function optimization: The higher the deviance of the
one-sided random variable τ , the more skewed is the distribution
of the error term in the frontier function, and the more probable
the occurence of high inefficiency observations become.
• In that context, the inefficiency to noise-ratio λ ≡ (στ/σv) indicates
how much of the total standard deviation between realized costs
and frontier costs in the respective model is due to random noise
(good/bad luck) or managerial inefficiency. As we find a value
λ ≈ 1, inefficiency and noise are of about equal size in the deviance
from the cost frontier. This suggests a moderately skewed error
term. (In the extreme case λ ≈ 0, the SFA estimation methods can
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Figure 5.2: Trend of intercept change, fixed effects estimation
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Figure 5.3: Trend of efficiency scores, modified Kumbhakar model
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be replaced by OLS estimation, as the error term is not asymmetric
at all.)
• Finally, eps, the total deviation of the composed error term σε =√
σ2τ + σ2v reflects the total distance between the observations and
the frontier function.
5.5.2 Dynamic efficiency ranking
The estimation of a cost frontier enables us to calculate firm-specific
efficiency scores according to the procedures discussed in section 5.3.
Moreover, as we assumed the deterministic trend parameters to vary from
country to country, the firm ranking within a country remains unchanged
over the years, but the country’s mean efficiency score ranking alternates.
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the mean efficiency scores and the respective
ranking positions per country and year for both models FE and RE. It is
obvious that ranks do indeed switch, challenging the popular assumption
of a single common rate of efficiency change or even time-invariant
efficiency.
Note that the absolute value of the efficiency scores given in the
right columns of the tables can only be interpreted against the same
benchmark, i.e. within the same model FE or RE. Especially the FE
estimation causes the resulting efficiency scores to spread widely.
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
a1 0.5353 0.0102 52.4941 0.0000
a2 0.4855 0.0096 50.8161 0.0000
b1 0.4859 0.0106 45.6788 0.0000
b2 0.3971 0.0085 46.9072 0.0000
b3 -0.0179 0.0059 -3.0330 0.0024
a11 0.0810 0.0023 34.6711 0.0000
a12 -0.0664 0.0020 -33.7642 0.0000
a22 0.1055 0.0023 44.9666 0.0000
b11 0.1361 0.0020 67.5890 0.0000
b12 -0.1254 0.0015 -81.9574 0.0000
b13 0.0030 0.0010 3.0758 0.0021
b22 0.1305 0.0015 88.7413 0.0000
b23 -0.0037 0.0009 -4.2196 0.0000
b33 0.0024 0.0008 2.8955 0.0038
g11 0.0242 0.0018 13.6339 0.0000
g21 -0.0099 0.0017 -5.7238 0.0000
g12 -0.0239 0.0012 -19.4894 0.0000
g22 0.0273 0.0013 21.5762 0.0000
g13 0.0080 0.0011 7.0152 0.0000
g23 -0.0166 0.0011 -14.4806 0.0000
risk -0.0018 0.0003 -5.4816 0.0000
prod.growth -0.0082 0.0009 -9.5026 0.0000
gdp.head 0.0182 0.0039 4.6576 0.0000
branch.dens -0.1234 0.0208 -5.9264 0.0000
CH ω1 0.0131 0.0052 2.5212 0.0117
DE ω1 -0.0004 0.0030 -0.1252 0.9003
ES ω1 -0.0297 0.0137 -2.1677 0.0302
FR ω1 -0.0117 0.0054 -2.1627 0.0306
IT ω1 0.0309 0.0082 3.7764 0.0002
SE ω1 -0.0049 0.0120 -0.4115 0.6807
GB ω1 -0.0736 0.0090 -8.1780 0.0000
US ω1 -0.0269 0.0043 -6.3209 0.0000
CH ω2 -0.0016 0.0006 -2.8892 0.0039
DE ω2 0.0010 0.0003 3.5400 0.0004
ES ω2 0.0066 0.0011 5.8335 0.0000
FR ω2 0.0033 0.0006 5.5543 0.0000
IT ω2 -0.0008 0.0006 -1.2948 0.1954
SE ω2 -0.0010 0.0013 -0.7883 0.4305
GB ω2 0.0081 0.0009 8.7560 0.0000
US ω2 0.0068 0.0004 17.0022 0.0000
Table 5.4: Regression Results Fixed Effects
5.5 Cost efficiency estimation 133
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
intercept 1.7022 0.0493 34.5303 0.0000
a1 0.7182 0.0086 83.5802 0.0000
a2 0.3216 0.0182 17.6730 0.0000
b1 0.5109 0.0022 232.4112 0.0000
b2 0.4779 0.0013 370.2710 0.0000
b3 -0.0121 0.0054 -2.2412 0.0250
a11 0.0468 0.0019 25.0030 0.0000
a12 -0.0273 0.0018 -15.5417 0.0000
a22 0.0469 0.0044 10.6459 0.0000
b11 0.1607 0.0024 66.2222 0.0000
b12 -0.1538 0.0023 -65.5311 0.0000
b13 -0.0034 0.0015 -2.2500 0.0245
b22 0.1499 0.0006 242.1546 0.0000
b23 0.0020 0.0009 2.2179 0.0266
b33 0.0002 0.0024 0.0963 0.9233
g11 -0.0010 0.0051 -0.1853 0.8530
g21 0.0152 0.0052 2.9402 0.0033
g12 -0.0345 0.0053 -6.5773 0.0000
g22 0.0381 0.0037 10.2616 0.0000
g13 0.0229 0.0012 19.7350 0.0000
g23 -0.0372 0.0014 -27.0145 0.0000
risk -0.0048 0.0002 -19.9662 0.0000
prod.growth -0.0103 0.0013 -8.0112 0.0000
gdp.head 0.0036 0.0003 12.7804 0.0000
branch.dens 0.0201 0.0270 0.7439 0.4570
CH ω1 0.0145 0.0678 0.2136 0.8308
DE ω1 0.0083 0.0302 0.2752 0.7832
ES ω1 0.0280 0.1440 0.1943 0.8460
FR ω1 0.0160 0.0585 0.2739 0.7842
IT ω1 0.0261 0.0084 3.1067 0.0019
SE ω1 0.0299 0.2379 0.1257 0.9000
GB ω1 0.0159 0.0585 0.2727 0.7851
US ω1 0.0003 0.0690 0.0044 0.9965
CH ω2 -0.0175 0.0095 -1.8294 0.0674
DE ω2 -0.0579
ES ω2 -0.0236 0.0189 -1.2504 0.2112
FR ω2 -0.0128 0.0092 -1.3955 0.1629
IT ω2 0.0240
SE ω2 0.0290 0.0856 0.3384 0.7351
GB ω2 -0.0049 0.0090 -0.5468 0.5845
US ω2 -0.0283 0.0096 -2.9542 0.0031
sigma.noise 0.1227 0.0014 90.4152 0.0000
sigma.tau 0.1425 0.0014 98.9262 0.0000
lambda 1.1618
eps 0.1881
Table 5.5: Regression Results, Modified Kumbhakar-Model
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Discussion of the FE ranking
According to the FE model we identify the most efficient banking
systems in Sweden, Italy and the USA, and the most inefficient in Spain
(rank eight in all years). The mean efficiency score gap between best
and worst countries in all years is about 35%. Italian banks lose their
first ranking position in 2000 to the Swiss and the Swedish banking
systems and end in the third rank. This seems to be due to strictly
increasing costs, compared to the other countries (table 5.6 on page 134).
As Sweden is the only country exhibiting stictly decreasing costs, the
ranking position clearly ameliorates and ends in the first rank in 2007.
Germany and France hold moderate ranking positions. Especially the
distinctive u-shaped cost trend in GB strongly reflects the corresponding
ranking positions.
Discussion of the RE ranking
We now turn to the discussion of the ranking and efficiency scores
according to the RE model. As Sweden and Italy are the countries with
the strongest, strictly monotonic decreasing inefficiency (table 5.7 on the
previous page), the relative ranking positions level at first and second
position, respectively. The mean efficiency scores between both countries
do not differ much.
Except for GB (with insignificantly estimated trend parameters ω1 =
ω2 ≈ 0), all other countries exhibit increasing inefficiency, at most
in Germany and the USA. Consequently, both countries lose ranking
positions against France (with a rather low increase in inefficiency). The
worst ratings of GB banking systems (rank eight) and the Swiss banking
system (rank seven) do not alter over time.
In order to guard against misunderstandings we must underline that
we find only small differences in mean efficiency scores across countries
and years in the RE model. Actually, the range is no more than ten
percentage points from the most efficient to the most unefficient banking
system. Together with overall high efficiency values of about 90%, this
may allow the conclusion that all observations across the countries are
very close to the common frontier function. Our assumption of a common
European and US banking technology therefore seems to be justified.
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5.5.3 A note on the inter-model comparison
We presented the results of two different approaches. It is not sur-
prising that the estimated efficiency scores differ. In this regard, the
prevailing opinion in the literature agrees that inter-model comparisons of
efficiency scores are a rather problematic undertaking. But there is never-
theless the slight hope that efficiency rankings in different approaches are
more or less consistent27. With a view to tables 5.6 and 5.7 on page 135
we actually find some coherence between the FE and the RE rankings,
as well as the trend parameters. Although the assessments of the Swiss
and the US banking systems strongly differ, there is common evidence
that the British and Spanish banks perform rather poorly, whereas the
Swedish and Italian banks seem to be fairly cost efficient.
Now the question might arise which model is to be preferred? What
we can say is that the semiparametric Fixed Effects model rests on
less restrictive assumptions: In particular, no decision concering the
distribution of the inefficiency term has to be made, and correlation
between inefficiency and explanatory variables is permitted. So, as the
assumption of Random Effects might be violated, it shall be safer to
rely on the Fixed Effects estimation. However, efficiency estimates in
FE-models are known to be strongly dependent on outliers. We tried to
reduce this dependence using the 1% percentile as a benchmark, rather
than a single ’outlier’.
The application of two different methods in the course of our empirical
analysis resulted in similar findings in efficiency trends and rankings,
rendering our results more credible. For reference, we also quote similar
results derived by Girardone et al. (2009), Bos and Schmiedel (2003)
(table 5.10 on page 141 in the appendix).
27As the fundamental idea to any SFA method is the determination of an intercept
shift of the average cost/production function, given a set of slope parameters
identical or very similar to OLS, the vertical position of each oberservation relative
to each other is unchanged.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this study we estimated a cost frontier in accordance with the
standard procedure we presented in the literature overview (chapter
5.2). We put forward an alternative reasoning concerning the degree of
heterogeneity in international bank production/cost functions. The pre-
vailing approach to cross-country efficiency comparisons consists either
in estimation of a common frontier without heterogeneity in efficiency
trends or in the estimation of country-specific frontiers accounting for
perfect heterogeneity in trends and technology. In the latter case, ef-
ficiency differences among countries cannot be revealed and one loses
the possibility to rank the countries’ banking systems according to the
background of a common technological benchmark. Nevertheless, there
is clear agreement in the literature that efficiency rankings are more
informative than absolute efficiency scores.
We showed that a compromise between either approach is possible.
Beyond that, the results we obtained advise us to always consider specific
efficiency trends per country: Obviously, efficiency rankings are not as
static as often assumed, especially in consideration of the fact that panel
lengths of 5 years or more are usual in bank efficiency studies (cp. table
5.8).
Basically, non-parametrical efficiency trends can also be derived by
successive estimation of cross-sectional SFA models28. But we mentioned
that the resulting estimators uˆi are inconsistent and should be avoided
in favour of panel data methods. Admittedly, the implementation of the
modified Kumbhakar (1990) model allowing for country-specific efficiency
trends is cumbersome in the course of empirical analyses, because to our
knowledge, no publicly available software implementation exists. The
robust alternative is the simple fixed effects approach on the basis of
Cornwell et al. (1990).
28Or the successive application of DEA per year, cp. Casu and Girardone (2006).
5.7 Appendix 139
5.7 Appendix
Figure 5.4: Number of observed banks, per years
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Study Region
covered
Years Method Frontier
Al-Sharkas et al.
(2008)
CALL Report
USA
1986 – 2002 SFA,
DEA
Cost,
Profit
Altunbas et al.
(2001)
EU 15 1989 – 1997 SFA Cost
Bos and Schmiedel
(2003)
BEl, FRA,
GER, ITA,
NED, ESP,
SUI, GBR
1993 – 2000 SFA
Meta
Frontier
Cost,
Profit
Casu and
Molyneux (2003)
FRA, GER,
ITA, ESP,
GBR
1993 – 1997 DEA
(VRS)
Production
Casu and
Girardone (2006)
EU 15 1997 – 2003 DEA
(VRS)
Production
Dietsch and
Lozano-Vivas
(2000)
FRA, ESP 1988 – 1992 DFA Cost
Girardone et al.
(2009)
EU 15 1998 – 2003 SFA Cost
Goddard et al.
(2004)
DEN, FRA,
GER, ITA,
ESP, GBR
1992 – 1998
(balanced)
OLS Profitability
Lozano-Vivas et al.
(2002)
BEL, DEN,
FRA, GER,
ITA, LUX,
NED, POR,
ESP, GBR
1993 DEA
(SFA)
Production
Oliveira and Tabak
(2005)
41 Countries
worldwide
1995 – 2002 DEA
(VRS)
Profitability
Pastor et al. (1997) USA, AUT,
ESP, GER,
GBR, ITA,
BEL, FRA
1992 DEA
(CRS,
VRS)
Production
Pastor and Serrano
(2006)
AUT, GER,
BEL, DEN,
ESP, FRA,
GRE, ITA
1992 – 1998 DEA Production
Weill (2004) FRA, GER,
ITA, ESP, SUI
1992 – 1998
(balanced)
SFA,
DEA,
DFA
Cost
Table 5.8: Overview of selected bank efficiency studies
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commercial savings cooperative
CH 71.72 27.95 0.33
DE 8.50 23.54 67.96
ES 51.76 17.15 31.10
FR 69.22 0.00 30.78
IT 38.64 0.00 61.36
SE 41.39 58.61 0.00
GB 100.00 0.00 0.00
US 88.26 10.93 0.81
Table 5.9: commercial/public banking relation per country
Girardone et al. (2009) Bos and Schmiedel (2003)
Mean CE Rank Mean Metafrontier CE Rank
CH NA NA 87.95% 3
DE 77.53% 5 80.41% 6
ES 78.10% 3 89.38% 2
FR 79.79% 2 85.01% 4
IT 89.12% 1 95.19% 1
SE 77.79% 4 NA NA
GB 67.41% 6 83.05% 5
US NA NA NA NA
Table 5.10: Similar static ranking results
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Figure 5.5: Boxplots outputs and input prices, in logs
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6 Chapter 6Bank efficiency estimationbased on quantile cost
functions with fixed effects
6.1 Introduction
Driven by the outstanding importance of financial institutions for
economies worldwide, the assessment of national banking systems is in
the vital interest of financial policy makers, banking supervisors (au-
thorities) and economic science. The resulting glut of studies revealing
different determinants of efficient banking activities is rather intranspar-
ent for occasional readers. It is the merit of authors like Berger et al.
(1993) who early summarized the key messages of the studies hitherto
published. Over a decade later, Berger (2007) again outlined the recent
developments in measuring bank efficieny against the background of
common international financial markets.
Bank efficiency estimation basically consists of the modelling of pro-
duction, profit or cost functions of financial firms, using balance sheet
and income statement data. Different approaches exist to fit not only the
conditional mean function but an ’efficient frontier’ to the data. Among
the most popular approaches are the parametric Stochastic Frontier
Analysis SFA (Aigner et al., 1977, Meeusen and van de Broeck, 1977)
and the non-stochastic, non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis DEA
(Charnes et al., 1978). The respective methodologies have developed fast
in recent decades, and we have always observed empirical bank efficiency
studies soon applying recently introduced methodological improvements.
Moreover, even studies focused on efficiency methods often used banking
data to illustrate new approaches (Greene, 2005a, 2002). So it is our
supposition that the needs of applied bank efficiency estimation and
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literature on efficiency frontier methods have always enriched each other
mutually. We suppose this significantly accelerated the development in
both fields.
In the progress of this study, we are going to pursue the discussion on
the applicability of Quantile Regression QR (Koenker and Bassett, 1978)
in the course of efficiency estimations. Basically, Quantile Regression
focuses on the conditional quantiles of the dependent variable given a set
of explanatory variables. Insofar, it characterizes the whole conditional
distribution of the dependent variable without any assumptions regarding
the random noise. Consequently, QR can be seen as a generalization
of linear models aiming only at the conditional mean of the dependent
variable, thereby imposing certain restrictions on the random noise term
(e.g. Ordinary Least Squares).
As all efficiency methods seek to estimate an efficient frontier en-
veloping the ’data cloud’, it is only natural to consider high and low
conditional quantiles as frontier functions. The only approaches to bank-
specific cost functions we found are those of Guala (2008) and Behr
(2010). Both studies are based on cross-sectional data, estimating low
quantile cost functions that constitute the efficient cost frontier. The
authors note that resulting frontier cost function parameters considerably
differ from shifted mean regressions like SFA. If available, it is common
practise in efficiency estimation to make use of repeated observations, i.e.
panel data1. Quantile Regression for panel data has been introduced by
Koenker (2004), but was only rarely applied in economics. We only found
two applications to problems of labour economics, e.g. the estimation
of the Mincer Equation (Bargain and Kwenda, 2009, Kniesner et al.,
2009). To our best knowledge, Quantile Regression with panel data has
never been used for the purpose of efficiency estimation. So we are about
to explore the new opportunities it opens. In particular, we will put
forward an ’efficiency sector concept’, providing robust information on
time-variant firm-specific efficiency trends.
The weak extension of the suggested methods in empirical literature
may be traced back to the fact that optimization algorithms are not yet
1The DEA is the only efficiency method that does not make use of repeated observa-
tions.
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implemented in standard statistical software. The solution to Quantile
Regression problems with longitudinal data is not straighforward, even
though Roger Koenker provides some kind of ’prototype function’ to
users of the R Environment. Moreover, Koenker himself treats Quantile
Regression with longitudinal data as methodologically not mature: In
his comprehensive monograph (Koenker, 2005) we find this topic in the
chapter ’Twilight Zone of Quantile Regression’. So basically, we are now
facing two challenging tasks: First to estimate and interpret panel data
Quantile Regression parameters, and second to use the estimated param-
eters in the course of an efficiency analysis. For illustrative purposes, we
perform an application estimating bank efficiency in German and US
commercial banks for the years 2000 – 2007.
Although just a first attempt, we expect to see our study encouraging
a new discussion on the use of alternative efficiency methods like Quantile
Regression. Ideally, this would again lead to a mutual enrichment in
both fields. For these purposes the remainder of this study is composed
as follows: In chapter 6.2, we corrobarate efficiency estimation on the
basis of Quantile Regression with fixed effects by the recapitulation of
both components: Efficiency estimation in conditional mean models with
fixed effects (section 6.2.1) and efficiency estimation in cross-sectional
conditional quantile models (6.2.2). Our new proposition is described
in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.2. In chapter 6.3 we discuss the results of an
exemplifying application, using cost function data on German und US
banks. Chapter 6.4 finally contains the conclusion.
6.2 Methodology
In this chapter we lay down the basic principles of efficiency measure-
ment on the basis of firm-specific fixed effects estimations. Whereas the
traditional fixed effects approach in panel data analyses is a standard pro-
cedure, the cost frontier interpretation of a lower boundary constituted
by the minimum firm-specific intercept is rather unusual in empirical
literature. Nevertheless, this approach has already been discussed a long
time ago (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984) and has certain advantages over
Stochastic Frontier Analyses (Meeusen and van de Broeck, 1977, Aigner
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et al., 1977) based on the a-priori assumption of a specific parametric
inefficiency distribution.
6.2.1 Linear regression cost frontiers with fixed effects
The basic idea of efficiency estimation with panel data is described
in Schmidt and Sickles (1984, p. 368 f.). A log-linear cost function for
firms i = 1, ..., N in times t = 1, ..., T can be written as:
cit = α+
K∑
k=1
βkxkit + vit + ui (6.1)
with cit costs, α common intercept parameter (i.e. minimum possible
fixed costs), xkit the k = 1, ...,K time-varying explanatory variables with-
out a constant, vit ∼ iid.N(0, σv) random noise and ui ≥ 0 firm-specific
and time-invariant inefficiency without any parametric distributional
assumptions2. The vit are uncorrelated with xkit and ui, but the ui may
be correlated with the regressors.
As it is rather difficult to decompose the estimation of α and ui due to
perfect multicollinearity, we simply assume that the minimum ui equals
zero. I.e., the most cost efficient firm in the sample has fixed costs of
exactly α and inefficiency ui of zero. This assumption is asymptotically
justified in the case N → ∞. As a result, we define the firm-specific
amount of inefficiency as vertical distance between a true but unobserved
α constituting the efficient lower boundary and the firm specific effect
αi:
αi ≡ α+ ui (6.2)
This leads to the classical fixed effects model
cit = αi +
K∑
k=1
βkxkit + vit (6.3)
which can be estimated by either dummy variables indicating each i
or by groupwise demeaning (or first differencing) to ’get rid of’ the αi.
2At least, E(ui) and V ar(ui) exist.
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The estimated αˆi are consistent when T → ∞3. Efficiency scores CEi
can be recovered in the case of log-linear Cobb-Douglas cost functions
as:
ĈEi =
(exp(αˆi)
exp(αˆ)
)−1
∈ [0, 1] (6.4)
with αˆ = min(αˆi).
Obtaining information on the inference of the uˆi is not straighforward.
As typically N  T but far from ∞, the min operation considerably
matters. Upon certain terms Schmidt and Sickles (1984) suggest that
the assumption of a double-exponential distribution of the ui facilitates
evidence on standard errors and confidence intervals. But normally, there
is no way around bootstrapping procedures4.
Although uncomplicated and robust in estimation, the fixed effects
approach is not above criticism. As several authors note, some serious
drawbacks exist: Greene (2005a) gives us a warning of ’superficially’
treating the fixed effects approach to inefficiency as a ’trivial extension’
of the basic stochastic frontier model: ’[...] the model is not a simple
reparameterization, it is a substantive reinterpretation of the model
components’5. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003, p. 100) substantiate: The
fixed effects do not only capture technical efficiency, but also the effects
of all environmental phenomena. So if in fact T is fixed, Cornwell and
Schmidt (2008) expect efficiency scores to be biased downward due to
the min operation.
Even in the (hypothetical) case of a full specification of all environ-
3Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003, p. 107) state: ’The longer the panel, the less likely
it becomes that technology remains constant.’ Given the statement above the
contradiction is understandable: The longer the time period in the panel, the
better the estimator uˆi, but the less tenable the assumption of time independence
becomes (Greene, 2008, Cornwell and Schmidt, 2008). Against that background,
the statement of consistency of a time-invariant ui in the case T → ∞ is an
economic antagonism.
4We observe the same problem in the Distribution Free Approach (DFA) introduced
by Berger (1993). Here too, efficiency scores are calculated in comparison to the
’best-practice’ firm in the sample.
5Consequently, Greene puts forward a ’true fixed effects’ approach, not mixing up
inefficiency ui and firm-specific effect αi.
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mental variables, one might lose some other characteristics of the firm due
to a failure in the ’within optimization’ (Greene, 2008): In the presence
of time-invariant attributes of the firm, e.g. classification dummies, the
individual-mean correction leads to multiple observed zeros for the firm.
Omitting these effects from the model will cause them to reappear in the
fixed effects, masked as (in)efficiency.
6.2.2 Quantile regression cost frontiers
The cross-sectional case
Quantile regession is based upon the pioneering work of Koenker
and Bassett (1978). The authors introduced an optimization strategy
to define the median and other quantiles of sample observations as
a solution to a minimization problem of (a)symmetrically weighted
absolute residuals. The extension to conditional quantiles was obvious
and soon constituted an alternative to conditional mean regressions. A
comprehensive monograph also covering recent developments in Quantile
Regression can be found in Koenker (2005), and an accessible introduction
with details on optimization procedure and inference in Hao and Naiman
(2007).
Let us consider the classical least squares optimization rule with ci
again the endogeneous variable and xi a (K + 1)× 1-dimensional vector
of exogeneous variables, including a constant:
min
β∈RK
∑
i
(ci − µ(xi, β))2
This delivers the conditional mean expectation function E(c|x) = µ(x′β).
Otherwise, the minimization of absolute residuals leads to:
min
β∈RK
∑
i
|ci − ζ(xi, β)|
This is the conditional median function M(c|x) = ζ(x′β) (Hao and
Naiman, 2007, p.34). In general, any conditional τ -quantile function
Qτ (c|x) = ζ(x′β(τ)) with τ ∈ (0, 1) can be estimated by
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min
β∈RK
∑
i
ρτ (ci − ζ(xi, β)) (6.5)
The so-called check-function ρτ (z) is
ρτ (z) =
{
τ · z if z > 0
(τ − 1) · z if z < 0 (6.6)
Weighting positive deviations from the target value ζ with τ and
negative deviations with τ − 1 replaces the conventional calculation of
quantiles by means of sorting and counting. So we are facing a linear
optimization problem which can be solved by Simplex methods described
in detail in Koenker (2005, Chapter 6). The procedures are available
within most statistical computer programs.
As Koenker and Hallock (2000) state, the advantages of Quantile
Regressions compared to traditional mean expectation functions are
obvious. Just as we are not always pleased with information on sample
means, we would like to gain deeper insight into the whole sample
distribution. Information on every quantile of the sample distribution
allows us to calculate alternative measures on location (e.g. median) and
shape (e.g. skewness) (Hao and Naiman, 2007, p.12 ff.).
Moreover, in Quantile Regression we can abstain from any assumption
concerning the random noise. In particular, the assumption of iid.
Gaussian errors is rather restrictive. General least squares regression in
the case of heteroscedastic errors wipes out any further information. In
the same way, asymmetrically skewed disturbances remain undetected
when focusing on conditional means. Only Quantile Regression reveals
the characteristics of the noise distribution without the need to make
any a-priori assumptions.
The idea of efficiency measurement based on Quantile Regression for
cross-sectional data is described in Behr (2010). He and other authors
before (Bernini et al., 2004, Liu et al., 2008) noticed that frontier produc-
tion/cost function parameters (input-/output-elasticities) at high/low
conditional quantiles may strongly differ from the conditional mean
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estimates we find in SFA analyses6, for instance.
To our knowledge, Liu et al. (2008) is the first study interpreting
negative deviations from a τ = 0.8 production frontier as inefficiency.
And Behr (2010) is the first bank efficiency study not only estimating
quantile cost functions for multiple 0 < τ < 1, but also interpreting
positive deviations in costs relative to the best practice cost frontier as
inefficieny. In particular, he assumes a τ = 0.05 cost function to represent
the firms’ common benchmark. All observations lying below the cost
frontier are fully efficient, whereas observations above the frontier are
inefficient. The vertical distance has the same meaning as ui in equation
(6.1).
In comparison to SFA analyses, one might ask where we can find the
distinction between inefficiency and random noise. In fact, this approach
does not differentiate between good/bad luck and inefficiency. Normally,
this is not necessarily a problem, as non-econometric approaches to
efficiency measurement, e.g. the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), ba-
sically do not account for random noise, either. The typical consequence
we observe in non-stochastic approaches is the fact that inefficiency scores
usually tend to be larger than in Stochastic Frontier Analyses. This
observation is confirmed in every DEA-SFA comparison (Al-Sharkas
et al., 2008, Hjalmarsson et al., 1996, Bauer et al., 1998, Weill, 2004), as
well as in Behr (2010) for the Quantile Regression.
What we consider more critically is any efficiency measurement based
on cross-sectional data. Not only cross-sectional SFA leads to inconsistent
estimates of firm-specific inefficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003, p.78),
cross-sectional observations basically lack the chance to verify the data
consistency with respect to firm-specific ’unusual’ observations. Only
longitudinal data provide multiple observations on every firm to ensure
estimation of consistent efficiency scores, as we have seen above. The
extension of Quantile Regressions to panel data and the resulting new
opportunities for efficiency measurement will be discussed in the next
section.
6In simple terms, a stochastic frontier is just a vertically shifted mean regression line.
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Panel data structure with fixed effects
After having presented two completely different approaches to effi-
ciency analyses, it is about time to consider the potential benefits a
conditional Quantile Regression with longitudinal data may bring.
Koenker (2004), Lamarche (2006) propose the following model with
firm-specific fixed effects for all i = 1, ..., N :
Qcit(τ |X = xit) = αi + x′itβ(τ) (6.7)
which can be solved by minimizing (for the ease of notation let Ti = T
for all i)
min
(β,α)∈R(K+1)+N
Q∑
q=1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wqρτq(cit − αi − x′itβ(τq)) (6.8)
with ρτq the usual check function given in equation (6.6). All other
variables with the exception of wq are known. It is important to note
that the xit contain a constant. Obviously, Koenker suggests optimizing
several quantiles τq, q = 1, ..., Q simultaneously. The corresponding wq
does not adjust the relative weight of the respective Quantile Regression
on the estimation of the βk(τq), but on the estimation of the effects αi.
This facilitates the disentanglement of multiple intercepts specified in
model (6.8), as we shall soon see.
In particular, we are to estimate firm-specific intercepts αi as well
as Quantile Regression intercepts β0(τq). Koenker himself speaks of an
individual ’location shift’ of the whole conditional distribution c|x. But
thinking it over in more detail, especially when considering a τ -specific
αi(τ), he admits that the differenciation may actually ’strain credulity’.
Canay (2010), for example, notes that Quantile Regression already allows
the researcher to account for unobserved heterogeneity. So what do the
fixed effects stand for?
Kniesner et al. (2009) are on their way to a tentative possible ex-
planation: Quantile Regression with fixed effects allows the researcher
to disentangle two kinds of heterogeneity in the data: First, the latent
person-specific heterogeneity αi that we shall call ’econometric (techni-
cal, due to omitted variables) heterogeneity’, and second, the ’economic
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heterogeneity’ represented by the β0(τ).
So it seems evidently advantageous to collect as much information as
possible by estimation of multiple Quantile Regression lines simultane-
ously to disentangle the heterogeneity in the model: The estimation of
single Quantile Regressions one after the other would most likely lead
to non-conformity of the αi in each case, as we are encountering an
identification problem. Moreover, performing bootstrapping procedures
(Kato et al., 2010) on all parameters simultaneously delivers an estimated
variance-covariance matrix that allows the researcher to test for inter-
quantile differences of the respective βk(τq) (e.g. Wald-test, refer to Hao
and Naiman (2007, p.43 f.)).
Unfortunately, the optimization of the model is not straightforward.
Especially when N is large, the number of parameters αi tends to
exhaust computer capacity: As standard demeaning techniques cannot
be applied7, dummy matrices contain the index information on the αi’s in
N columns. As most entries of these matrices are zero, Koenker and Ng
(2005) discuss ’sparse’ linear algebra methods to solve the corresponding
linear programming problems. The procedures were made available for
the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2010) by the authors.
The contribution to efficiency estimation
Now the central question that arises is: Is the model a contribution
to efficiency estimation methods? We put forward our opinion that the
model given in equation (6.8) does not contribute to efficiency estimation.
In particular, we have to ask what the benefit of (6.8) in comparison
to conditional mean fixed effects (6.3) is. As Canay (2010) notes, the
αi in both models are the same, as we are talking about the same
distribution cit|xit, αi. So the efficiency interpretation of the firm-specific
fixed effects shares the same shortcomings discussed above and does not
lead to any new insight. Moreover, when (in-)efficiency is captured by
the heterogeneity in αi, what heterogeneity is represented by different
τ -quantiles? Obviously, the best-practice interpretation of lower cost
quantiles does not hold in this case.
7Canay (2010) alternatively suggests a two-step estimator with first differencing.
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So we suggest an alternative: Let the fixed effects capture any un-
observed heterogeneity that is outside the firms’ managements control.
Thus, we speak of any heterogeneity that affects the overall level of costs
but not the firms’ relative efficiency scores. Examples might be: Country
effects, specialization effects, ownership effects or time effects. Actually,
with our data at hand, it is obviously recommendable to estimate vertical
time-specific location shifts of the conditional Quantile Regression lines.
So we estimate αt for all t = 1, ..., T :
min
(β,α)∈R(K+1)+T
Q∑
q=1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wqρτq(cit − αt − x′itβ(τq)) (6.9)
This is equivalent to the assumption of a time-invariant shape (but
a time-variant location) of the conditional distribution cit|xit, αt. The
respective quantile slope and intercept parameters reflect the technical
aspects of highly efficient versus less efficient production and remain the
same in all years. The comparison of high quantile cost functions with
low quantile cost functions gives an impression of how inputs and outputs
should be optimally allocated in the firms’ production processes. We only
allow the level of costs, i.e. the vertical shift αt, to vary from year to year.
So when measuring inefficiency as vertical distance from a best-practice
low quantile cost function (Behr, 2010), shifted every year, we control for
unobserved environmental factors that affect all firms’ costs in the same
way in the particular year. This is the additional benefit we earn from
the use of longitudinal data in Quantile Regression efficiency estimation.
As we have T observerations per firm, measuring the distance be-
tween a low quantile cost frontier in t and the observations delivers T
unrestricted inefficiency scores uit for every i. Now the question arises
how we can consolidate the information contained in multiple inefficiency
scores to gain easily accessible results.
• On the one hand, it is possible to estimate an efficiency trend
function uit = f(t, t2, ...). According to the panel length, even
firm-specific trends fi are feasible. In this case, the empirical
distribution of the trend-parameters might be of interest.
• On the other hand, one can refer to the basic idea of the Distribu-
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tion Free Approach DFA (Berger, 1993): Assuming time-invariant
inefficiency for every i, the mean inefficiency scores 1/T ∑t uit
might be implicitely corrected for temporarily positive or negative
influences of the random noise. The author argues on the grounds
of the supposition that good and bad luck balance against each
other in retrospective after a few years.
As we see, multiple possibilities exist. To put forward a robust
estimation of time-variant efficiency, using the full information obtained
on cit|xit, we additionally propose the following ’efficiency sector concept’:
As Koenker (2004) suggests estimation of Q = 3 Quantile Regression
lines simultaneously, the conditional distribution cit|xit, αt splits into
four stacked sectors (that are vertically shifted every year). For example,
the most cost efficient sector lies below the τ = 0.10 regression line, the
fairly efficient sector between τ = 0.10 and τ = 0.5, the rather inefficient
sector above the median and below the τ = 0.90 regression line, as well
as the clear-cut inefficient sector above τ = 0.90.
Surely the precision of the sector concept can be improved by esti-
mation of more regression lines. Howsoever, the information contained
in the sector location of every residual is more detailed than a single
efficiency trend, assuming an identical behaviour for all firms in the
dataset; and less detailed than firm-specific trends that might provide
too much unstructured information.
In figure 6.1 we graphically illustrated the basic idea by means of
a stylized two-dimensional problem. If we let N = 10 and T = 2, the
observations in t = 1 are marked as triangles, in t = 2 as squares. The
slope as well as the (relative) intercept coefficients equal in both years.
Remember that in cross-sectional Quantile Regression about τ · 100% of
the observations lie below the τ− regression line8. Now note that the
basic property of panel Quantile Regression does not require τ · 100%
of the observations to lie below the regression line in every single year,
but jointly over all years. This is important as it allows us in our sector
concept to identify more efficient and less efficient years.
8Due to the employed optimization procedure, at least K observations lie exactly on
the regression line.
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Figure 6.1: Efficiency sector concept – schematic
The design matrix
We would like to complete this section with some technical details
concerning the optimization procedures. In our example, and with
Q = 3, the design matrix D of the problem (6.9), with
(
xit
)
the matrix
of independent variables including intercept, dimension (NT × (K + 1)),
and I a vector of ones of length N indicating the dimension of the fixed
year effects, takes the form (Koenker, 2004):
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D =

w1 ·
(
xit
) (
0
) (
0
) w1 · I 0 · · · 00 w1 · I ...
... . . . 0
0 · · · 0 w1 · I
(
0
)
w2 ·
(
xit
) (
0
) w2 · I 0 · · · 00 w2 · I ...
... . . . 0
0 · · · 0 w2 · I
(
0
) (
0
)
w3 ·
(
xit
) w3 · I 0 · · · 00 w3 · I ...
... . . . 0
0 · · · 0 w3 · I

(6.10)
The corresponding vector of the dependent variable c∗it has the length
Q ·NT :
c∗it =

w1 ·
(
cit
)
w2 ·
(
cit
)
w3 ·
(
cit
)
 (6.11)
Note that an OLS conditional mean regression of c∗ on D cannot
be solved by (D′D)−1(D′c∗) as the product matrix (D′D) is singular
due to the existence of multiple intercept indicators. Users of the R
language may simply pass cit, xit and a vector containing fixed effects
indices to the rq.fit.panel()-function available on the homepage of
Roger Koenker. Inference basically is not available and can at best be
derived from bootstrapping procedures (Kato et al., 2010).
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6.3 Empirical Results
Our exemplifying application covers the field of bank efficiency. It
is a common procedure to estimate cost functions for banking firms.
Concerning the inputs and outputs of a production process in banking,
we would like to abstain from the controversial discussion at this point.
Instead, we stick to one of the most recent studies, namely Girardone et al.
(2009), and model the production process according to the Intermediation
Approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977).
6.3.1 Data preparation
We accessed a Bankscope9 balance sheet and income statement dataset
of commercial banks in two countries, i.e. Germany (DE) and the USA
(US). We prepared all variables necessary to estimate usual cost functions
in banking, listed in the so-called ’Bankscope Global Format’. When we
restrict our observations to hold a positive figure > 100T USD in total
assets and a plausible figure in all other variables we are interested in,
we count a total of 3774 observations. The numbers sum up over the
years 2000 – 2007 as given in table 6.1.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 SUM
DE 146 147 143 140 141 141 143 129 1130
US 388 377 352 340 314 312 296 265 2644
SUM 534 524 495 480 455 453 439 394 3774
Table 6.1: Numbers of observations
The application of methods for panel data usually makes high demands
on the number of years each bank is observed (individual panel length).
Table 6.2 shows how many of the banks are observed in how many years.
Fortunately, most of the banks are observed over the full panel length.
So just as we simplified our notation to the case of a balanced sample,
we now restrict our analysis to 323 banks, 87 in Germany and 236 in the
USA.
9Bureau van Dijk, www.bvdep.com.
6.3 Empirical Results 159
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 SUM
DE 7 18 10 13 10 14 25 87 184
US 24 32 29 30 18 28 29 236 426
SUM 31 50 39 43 28 42 54 323 610
Table 6.2: Number of banks observed over a period of 1-8 years
All data are given in thousands of US-Dollar; EUR values were
converted by means of a single exchange rate to exclude floating effects.
Moreover, to avoid the measurement of inflation effects over the years,
we corrected all nominal values by OECD consumer price indices with
the base year 2005.
To ensure basic data consistency, annual growth rates of total assets
were calculated. We detected some single outliers (implausible annual
growth rates of about 6000%) and excluded the respective banks from
the sample. The distribution of the growth rates of the remaining banks
are plotted in figure 6.2. The box represents the interquartile-range, the
horizontal dash being the median.
We see that a predominant share of banks exhibit a positive growth
rate. In the USA, not even the first quartile of banks fall below the 0%
threshold. In Germany, especially in 2002 and 2003, nearly 50% of the
banks shrank in terms of total assets.
In figure 6.3, we prepared an overview illustrating the distribution
of bank sizes in Germany and the USA, each in 2000 and 2007. On the
left-hand side, the respective densities of the distributions of log total
assets show that banks in the USA tend to be bigger than banks in
Germany. Some huge banks do exist, though, in Germany (e.g. Deutsche
Bank, Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank). So obviously, the distribution of
total assets even in logs is still right-skewed and not normal.
Not surprisingly, the existence of very big banks in Germany is
reflected in common inequality measures like the Lorenz curve and the
related Gini coefficient (right-hand side of figure 6.3): The inequality
of total assets (not in logs) per bank in Germany is greater than in the
USA, but slightly decreasing from 2000 to 2007. Contrary, inequality in
the USA tends to increase. Together with our findings in figure 6.2, this
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gives us a hint that big banks in the USA are growing faster than small-
and medium-sized banks, whereas in Germany, big banks are likely to
grow more slowly than smaller banks.
6.3.2 Cost functions
According to the Intermediation Approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977)
and in line with recent literature (Girardone et al., 2009), the variables
of an indirect cost function (Coelli et al., 2005, chapter 2.4) are defined
as follows:
• c total costs: Interest expenses + other operating expenses +
personnel expenses
• y1 output 1: Loans
• y2 output 2: Other earning assets
• w1 price of labour: personnel expensestotal assets
• w2 price of fixed assets: other operating exp. (incl. depreciations)total fixed assets
• w3 price of deposits: interest expensestotal deposits
Descriptive statistics on the mean, median and standard deviation
for either country separately are given in table 6.3.
c y1 y2 w1 w2 w3
mean DE 1170.19 14978.56 17009.56 0.03 0.81 0.06
median DE 65.91 614.66 340.54 0.02 0.68 0.05
sd DE 5443.43 70462.08 76565.41 0.03 1.03 0.04
mean US 916.60 9412.93 5247.29 0.02 3.38 0.04
median US 137.97 1557.54 582.08 0.02 1.07 0.04
sd US 3528.78 32483.25 32220.64 0.02 15.61 0.06
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics, all variables
We see that the ratio of mean to median is very large. This is a typical
characteristic of variables describing banks’ key figures. Some authors
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mistake extremely large values for outliers, and therefore cut large banks
out of the dataset. We prepared another graphic which contains boxplots
illustrating the distribution of every variable over time (figure 6.6 in the
appendix).
We see that both outputs y1, y2 tend to increase over the years. Note
that we already corrected all values for inflation, so that we have to do
with real growth. While the price of labour and the price of fixed assets
slightly decrease over the years, the median interest paid on deposits
is U-shaped, just like total costs K, and reflects the interest levels (e.g.
EURIBOR) in the respective years.
Due to an insufficient number of observations and to ease the interpre-
tation of estimated parameters we abstained from estimation of a more
flexible translog cost function. But even a Cobb-Douglas cost function
must not be estimated without certain restrictions. Actually, regularity
conditions require that the input price elasticities sum up to 1. So we
divided all prices and costs by the price of total deposits, w3 (Lang and
Welzel, 1996):
c =eβ0 · yβ11 · yβ22 · wβ31 · wβ42 · wβ53
s.t. β3 + β4 + β5 = 1
⇔ β5 = 1− β4 − β3
c =eβ0 · yβ11 · yβ22 · wβ31 · wβ42 · w(1−β4−β3)3(
c
w3
)
=eβ0 · yβ11 · yβ22 ·
(
w1
w3
)β3
·
(
w2
w3
)β4
(6.12)
To detect ’real outliers’ in the context of a regression model, we
performed regression deletion diagnostics10. Estimating the pooled linear
regression with and without every single observation, this (Jackknife-
)procedure reveals the observations which strongly bias each of the
estimated parameters. We plotted the corresponding boxplots indicating
the respective bias in absolute values on the ordinate axis to graphically
identify the outliers (figure 6.7 in the Appendix). Obviously, we find a
10So-called ’leave-one-out deletion’ (Cook and Weisberg, 1982). The corresponding
procedures are available within the R Environment.
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considerable influence on the intercept parameters. To tell the truth, this
comes in rather handy, because Quantile Regression with fixed effects
is a tool to disentangle multiple forms of heterogeneity on the y-axis
(economic and econometric heterogeneity, compare our discussion in
section 6.2).
Finally, we splitted the dataset into two subsets: One for Germany
(DE) and one for the USA (US). We are well aware that under the as-
sumption of country-specific cost frontiers banks do not compete against
the same benchmark, and consequently efficiency comparisons between
both countries are not justified. On the other hand, assuming identical
benchmark technologies across numerous countries requires an appropri-
ate set of environmental control variables (Berger, 2007). To circumvent
the implications of this discussion in our study primarily focused on
methodology, we use the opportunity to apply the method to two dif-
ferent datasets. Comparing the results will not reveal any information
about efficiency advantages of banking firms in one country over the other
country, but it will provide more insight into the economic particularities
of the respective country.
6.3.3 Estimation
As we are about to estimate Quantile Regressions with fixed effects,
we first estimated the associated conditional mean models E(cit|xit, αt)
to obtain a first impression of the expected parameters. Tables 6.4
and 6.5 show the slope parameters for the German and the US dataset,
respectively. A direct comparison of both countries reveals that the
production of one percent more loans (y1) raises costs in Germany by
0.63%, but in the USA by only 0.55%. Regarding other earning assets
(y2), costs in Germany increase less than in the USA. The estimated
coefficients for w1 and w2 are adjusted to meet the regularity conditions
given in equation (6.12). This means that the missing parameters w3
can be calculated as 1− w1 − w2. As expected, all cost elasticities are
positive, telling us that the basic assumptions concerning the elasticity
of substitution are in conformity with the data11.
11Note that the restriction in equation (6.12) basically does not prohibit estimation
of negative price elasticities. In Behr (2010, Figure 9), we see that the same
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Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
y1 0.63 0.01 63.05 0.00
y2 0.35 0.01 37.13 0.00
w1r 0.21 0.03 7.54 0.00
w2r 0.12 0.02 5.87 0.00
Table 6.4: Fixed effects estimation DE
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
y1 0.55 0.01 76.37 0.00
y2 0.42 0.01 60.04 0.00
w1r 0.27 0.01 22.64 0.00
w2r 0.45 0.01 47.37 0.00
Table 6.5: Fixed effects estimation US
The corresponding time-specific intercept parameters are given in
table 6.6. They represent the location shift of the conditional mean
functions. So we see that the cost level is U-shaped in the USA, with
costs in the year 2004 being lower than in all other years. In Germay,
the cost level is lowest in 2000, and tends to increase in the subsequent
years. The maximum is in 2007.
The model in (6.9) was estimated by means of Koenker’s prototype
function. Q = 3 quantiles τ = (0.1, 0.5, 0.9) with Tukey’s trimean weights
w = 0.5− |τ − 0.5| were simultaneously estimated. The results are given
in table 6.7. The first six parameters are indexed by τ1 = 0.1, the next
six parameters by τ2 = 0.5 and the last six by τ3 = 0.9. Below, the
year-specific location shifts are given.
We see that the parameters slightly differ from quantile to quantile,
but the relative influence of the explanatory variables remains stable. So
in Germany, in line with the conditional mean regression above, we have
parameters at extremely high conditional quantiles (characterizing inefficient firms)
turn out to be negative. In this case, the data contradict the underlying assumption
of a substitutional cost function that is nondecreasing in input prices.
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DE US
2000 1.1672 0.2779
2001 1.1889 0.2370
2002 1.1828 0.1477
2003 1.1737 0.1187
2004 1.1774 0.1032
2005 1.1728 0.1547
2006 1.1922 0.2412
2007 1.1930 0.2667
Table 6.6: Fixed effects parameters
βy1 > βy2 and βw3 > βw1 > βw2 for all three quantiles. In comparison
with table 6.4, the conditional mean parameters rather resemble the lower
quantiles. As βw3 is rather large, banks in Germany seem to suffer most
from increasing deposit rates. Refering to figure 6.6, this proposition
is corrobarated by the syncronous development of deposit rates w3 and
costs c.
In the USA, we have also βy1 > βy2 for all quantiles and for the
expectation (table 6.5). But the relative influence of the price elasticities
differs among the quantiles. What we can state is that the deposit rate
does not exert much influence on costs as it does in Germany. Moreover,
especially in the median regression as well as in the conditional mean
regression, all cost elasticities are rather balanced.
From cost theory, we know that the sum of the parameters βy1 , βy2
reveals some information about the underlying dual production function.
So if βy1 + βy2 > 1 or < 1 in a cost function12, the corresponding
production process exhibits decreasing/increasing returns to scale, which
might be seen as an indication that firms are too large/small (Coelli
et al., 2005, p.18 f.). Obviously, in our case, βy1 + βy2 ≈ 1, so banks in
both countries seem to exhibit constant returns to scale.
The reported year effects at the end of table 6.7 differ from the effects
12If standard errors of the parameters were available, tests of βy1 + βy2 = 1 would be
possible.
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τ1 = 0.1 τ2 = 0.5 τ3 = 0.9
DE US DE US DE US
Int 0.62 0.42 1.33 0.40 2.47 0.72
y1 0.66 0.76 0.64 0.73 0.57 0.50
y2 0.38 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.43
w1 0.24 0.41 0.17 0.37 0.28 0.15
w2 0.11 0.21 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.58
w3 0.65 0.37 0.74 0.32 0.64 0.27
FE 2000 -0.24 -0.29
FE 2001 -0.22 -0.33
FE 2002 -0.21 -0.39
FE 2003 -0.19 -0.41
FE 2004 -0.18 -0.44
FE 2005 -0.18 -0.40
FE 2006 -0.18 -0.34
FE 2007 -0.19 -0.31
Table 6.7: Regression results DE and US
in tables 6.4 and 6.5 in terms of absolute values. But a closer look reveals
that all values are more or less just shifted relative to the conditional
mean FE parameters. So as a result, we again observe that the cost
level in Germany tends to increase, while the cost level in the USA is
U-shaped. Remember that U-shaped total costs in Germany are captured
by the high influence of w3. So it is a little bit surprising that we see the
particular development of costs being explained by β0 in the one case
and by αt in the other case.
6.3.4 Efficiency
The ’traditional’ approach to inefficiency in QR is to calculate the
residuals uit from the lower 0.1 cost frontier. As all variables are in logs,
uit = log(cactualit |xit, αt)− log(cfrontierit |xit, αt) is inefficiency measured as
percentaged cost surplus. We plotted all uit per year in figure 6.4.
10% of all points are negative, because 10% of the observations
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undercut the cost target. The solid lines for both countries indicate the
location of fitted linear time trend functions. In Germany, no positive or
negative efficiency trend exists, whereas in the USA, overall inefficiency
tends to increase. But as expected, the evidence found in this figure
is rather sparse: Does inefficiency for all firms in Germany remain
constant, or do ranking positions change? Is it due to single firms
in the USA that overall inefficiency increases? To gain some deeper
insight, we additionally estimated firm-specific linear trends of the form
uit = γ0i + γ1i · yeart + noiseit for all i. The distributions (histogram
and kernel density estimation) of the N trend parameters γˆ1 for both
countries are plotted in figure 6.5.
As the vertical dashed lines represent the interquartile-range, we see
that trend parameters for banks in both countries spread equally, whereas
in the USA, some ’outliers’ with strongly increasing inefficiency exist.
Consequently, it seems to be due to single banks in the USA that overall
inefficiency in figure 6.4 increases, too. But for the entirety of banks, we
can assume time-invariant inefficiency in both countries on average.
In section 6.2.2, we described our concept of efficiency sectors. As a
consequence of the existence of Q = 3 regression lines, we obtain NT · 3
residuals in the course of the estimation procedure. In R-code, a function
to assign the respective efficiency sector out of the three deviations per
observation from the τ1, τ2 and τ3 quantile function may look like:
sector <- function(x) { # input x: 3 deviations tau1, tau2, tau3
result <- NA
if(x[1]<=0 & x[2]<0 & x[3]<0) {result <- 1}
if(x[1]>0 & x[2]<=0 & x[3]<0) {result <- 2}
if(x[1]>0 & x[2]>0 & x[3]<=0) {result <- 3}
if(x[1]>0 & x[2]>0 & x[3]>0) {result <- 4}
return(result)
}
The resulting numbers of observations per sector and year are given
in tables 6.8 and 6.9. In Germany, we can now see in more detail that
the number of highly efficient banks increases, while the number of less
efficient banks (sector 2) decreases. In sectors 3 and 4, the number of
observations remains relatively stable. On the other hand, in the USA,
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we get the impression that the medium sectors 3 and 4 become less
important in favour of the extreme sectors 1 and 4.
Unfortunately, on the basis of these tables, we cannot draw any
conclusions about the interchange of banks in the respective sectors.
In fact, all sectors could be assigned every year to different banks, as
this is just a static survey. To capture the dynamic interchange, we
prepared another table (6.10 in the appendix). It is an example of an
extended analysis made possible by application of the sector approach:
The columns represent the four sectors in the year 2000. In the rows,
we find the number of banks having changed from the respective sector
in 2000 to another (or the same) sector in the subsequent years. So for
example, we learned from table 6.8 that we have five banks in sector 1 in
Germany in 2000. Table 6.10 now tells us that two of these banks fell off
in efficiency (sector 2) in 2001 and three banks remain in sector 1. Until
2007, another bank further declines to sector 3. As a matter of course,
the table can be extended to account for every year as a reference.
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6.4 Conclusion
In this study we discussed the Quantile Regression approach to inef-
ficiency measurement. Although cross-sectional methods have recently
been established in literature, repeated observations have remained un-
used so far. We picked up the panel data methods suggested by Koenker
(2004), and discussed the new opportunities in the course of efficiency
estimation. In particular, we had to cope with two problems: First, the
methodology of Quantile Regression with longitudinal data is technically
not mature. This is closely related to a fundamental difficulty when inter-
preting the parameters, especially when disentangling multiple intercept
parameters. The second problem was the transfer of the model to the
field of efficiency measurement. Nevertheless, we clarified the particular
advantages of the new approach over the customary components: (i)
conditional mean regression with firm-specific fixed effects indicating
relative inefficiency and (ii) robust QR cost frontiers without the ben-
efit of repeated observations. Using multiple Quantile Regression lines
simultaneously provides the basis for a robust efficiency sector concept,
using the full information we estimated to characterize the conditional
distribution of costs. In the course of our exemplifying application, we
estimated cost efficiency for German and US commercial banks during
the period 2000 till 2007. We demonstrated that the efficiency sector
concept does in fact work and, moreover, opens up new possibilities to
asses (bank) efficiency.
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00;1 00;2 00;3 00;4 00;1 00;2 00;3 00;4
01;1 3 3 1 10 8 2
01;2 2 30 5 11 68 18 1
01;3 5 27 2 1 17 75 5
01;4 1 8 2 5 13
02;1 2 5 1 8 9 3
02;2 2 28 6 12 61 23 1
02;3 1 5 25 3 2 24 68 8
02;4 1 1 7 1 6 10
03;1 2 4 1 8 13 5
03;2 2 25 8 1 9 52 29 1
03;3 1 10 22 5 4 28 57 8
03;4 2 4 1 2 9 10
04;1 2 8 1 1 8 11 4
04;2 2 21 6 1 8 57 27 2
04;3 1 10 22 4 6 26 60 8
04;4 3 5 1 9 9
05;1 2 7 1 7 10 2
05;2 2 23 6 2 10 57 29 3
05;3 1 8 24 3 5 26 59 7
05;4 1 2 5 2 10 9
06;1 3 7 1 9 14 2
06;2 1 20 9 2 7 53 30 3
06;3 1 11 20 4 5 23 51 7
06;4 1 2 5 1 5 16 9
07;1 3 5 2 12 16 4
07;2 1 23 8 2 4 49 30 4
07;3 1 11 18 2 5 19 47 7
07;4 4 7 1 11 19 8
Table 6.10: Contingency tables DE (left) and US (right)
7 Chapter 7Concluding remarks
7.1 The scope of this survey
The amount of literature on bank efficiency accrues from the need
to objectively assess the performance of banks against the background
of a rapidly changing institutional environment. Especially changes
in the legal framework (e.g. the introduction of EU law in former
socialist countries), the privatization of banks in a market economy, the
socialization of banks in the light of systemic risks, the loss of competition
resulting from merger activities, etc. give authors occasion to estimate
the respective impact on the efficiency of banks.
So as a result, the literature on bank efficiency estimation is one of
the most vividly growing branches of economic science. Readers trying
to get acquainted with this field of research rely on the existence of
comprehensive surveys which encompass the multiplicity of economic
issues, models, and methods covered. We found such pioneering works in
Berger and Humphrey (1992), Berger et al. (1993), Berger and Humphrey
(1997), Berger and Mester (1997), Berger (2007).
In order to characterize our own contributions to this literature, we
subdivided the existing studies into two lines for the sake of convenience:
First, studies dealing with several kinds of real economic problems men-
tioned above are issued, for instance, by authors from banking supervision
authorities (central banks), the International Monetary Fund, the OECD,
or the Bank for International Settlement. The efficiency methods typ-
ically applied in the course of these studies are standard procedures
implemented in econometric software packages. On the other hand, the
second type of studies focuses on innovations in exactly these methods.
The authors are – in the broadest sense – econometricians who need an
exemplifying application to illustrate the advantages of their proposals.
We did not find any explicit hints at macroeconomic problems that are
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being addressed in the course of these studies, but the announcement
that the new models are applied to bank efficiency data (Kumbhakar
and Tsionas, 2008, Greene, 2002, 2005b). So we can state that the scope
of bank efficiency literature goes even beyond questions regarding only
the economic performance of banks but is also a reference object for
methodical innovations.
In this survey we mainly contributed to the latter field of literature,
i.e. the econometrics of bank efficiency estimation. Nevertheless, we
first took into account the fact that econometric models are always part
of a scientific procedure called the ’Scheme of Adequation’ (figure 3.1
in section 3.2.1). This scheme put us in a position to substantiate the
existence of an ’information deficit observed’ (Brachinger, 2007) between
the general operationalization procedure and the interpretation of the
results in empirical studies mentioned in the former case. In the following
we focused on methodical innovations, i.e. the link between a formal
problem and a formal solution, without expatiating on the interpretation
of the formal solution against the background of a real economic problem.
Moreover, the operationalization of a commonly used production model
in banking (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) adopted from the literature was
employed to ensure the basic comparability of our formal results with
preceding studies.
7.2 Problems and solutions
7.2.1 Adequation
In the course of our methodical modules we used banking data to
illustrate our proposals. It was our aim to stick as closely as possible
to the existing operationalization procedures in the literature. Using
Bankscope data with unified identifiers, as most of the other authors
do, provides a very convenient way to reproduce the classic production
models. Nevertheless, we could not do away with the question in how
far the estimated results contribute to the explanation of macroeco-
nomic problems in the banking sector. In particular, we read about the
fundamental ’shotgun marriage’ reproach on the part of Stigler (1976).
Although this is a general criticism regarding every form of efficiency
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measurement, we had to ask ourselves whether it holds for the field of
bank efficiency estimation, too.
Stigler refers to situations in which the institution being assessed
is not aware of the performance standards it is to achieve or does not
agree to that benchmark. In the case of banks we learned that the usual
standard that had been used for years was the transformation of deposits
to loans and investments at minimum costs/maximum profit. Whatever
economic issue was addressed in the course of a study, the given standard
was applied.
Obviously, literature has come to the conclusion that banks cannot
agree to the production model according to Sealey and Lindley (1977)
any more. In recent decades, the product range of banks has considerably
diversified. As a result, banks, for instance, nowadays engage in risk
management activities and the trade with derivative products. Most of
these activities are not captured by balance sheet items, but are recorded
’off-balance-sheet’ (OBS). Authors make considerable endeavours to adapt
the classic operationalization by means of new data in order to meet the
banks’ own notion of an appropriate standard.
We considered this approach to be problematic. To substantiate our
supposition, we had recourse to the Scheme of Adequation (Grohmann,
1988): According to this fundamental scheme every empirical analysis
starts with the formulation of the economic problem. We learned that
the process of the formulation is determined by concepts that have to be
understood as ideal types. In other words: Economic problems are not
’observable’ in the sense of ’countable’. As a matter of fact, it falls to the
researcher to achieve a consensus in the way he describes the problem.
As this is typically a challenge which cannot be undervalued Weber
(1988) lays down the ’rules’ which form the requirements for a consensus
among the readers. In particular, we identified four requirements for
every ideal-type formulation (section 3.2.2):
1. Abstraction of reality (Utopia)
2. Absence of personal judgements
3. Imagination of typical conditions
4. ’Means to an end’
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So in the case of banks, we first had to ask ourselves what the
basic ’ideal-type’ characteristics are like. Or, more specifically, what are
banks supposed to perform? Only against this standard can we start
an empirical investigation on the economic problem why banks do not
perform as expected. We raised some suggestions about the expectations
one might impose on banks and considered how these aspects might
be quantified in ’concrete reality’ (section 2.2). We learned that the
standards associated with banks depend on the respective interest group
and are by no means congruent among the groups. This makes it all the
more important for authors to precisely lay down the basic goals they
pursue.
Amazingly, we never read about similar considerations in bank effi-
ciency literature. So consequently it is advisable to pose the question
whether the operationalization, i.e. the image of reality we encounter in
literature reflects the ideal-type conceptualization of banks immanent in
the formulation of real economic problems. In fact, to our knowledge,
the model by Sealey and Lindley (1977) is the last explicit ideal-type for-
mulation of bank activities we came across in the field of bank efficiency
literature. We already mentioned that this model is not considered to
be appropriate any more, but simple variations in the operationalization
do not constitute a new ideal type, because they do not meet the ’ob-
jectivity’ requirements mentioned by Max Weber. Moreover, we read in
studies (Tortosa-Ausina, 2002) that in fact data availabilty determines
our model of banks and not the consensus among the readers/researchers.
Concretely: We observed bank efficiency studies starting with the oper-
ationalization process and not with the ideal-type description of bank
activities constituting the economic problem.
So the results of our study definitely lead to the conclusion that the
principles of Adequation are violated. Consequently, the interpretation
of the formal results against the background of a real economic problem
cannot be assessed by the scientific standards postulated in Weber (1988).
It is exactly this ’adequation gap’ which can be perceived as an ’informa-
tion deficit observed’ (Brachinger, 2007) by the readers. The solution to
this problem is self-evident: A study assessing the performance of banks
has to start with a description of the basic tasks banks are supposed to
fulfill – and this does not necessarily mean that any economic problem
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always has to do with the transformation process of deposits to loans
at minimum costs. In our opinion, this is the natural option to put the
reader in a position where he can first judge the consensus on the de-
scription of the problem, and second where he can evaluate the adequacy
of the operationalization.
7.2.2 Methods
The first methodical issue we addressed was the question whether a
Stochastic Frontier model should be estimated by means of a numerical
Maximum Likelihood procedure or rather by a two-step Method of
Moments approach. In the context of cross-sectional data we performed
extensive simulation studies under various distributional assumptions,
including misspecification scenarios, thereby contributing to the existing
literature (Olson et al., 1980, Coelli, 1995). On the basis of the respective
results we derived the recommendation to favour the MOM approach in
small samples with little inefficiency. A parametrical decision support
was given in the form of ’rules of thumb’.
In the next step of our analysis we turned to the treatment of panel
data. In order to use the longitudinal structure of the data the modifi-
cation of a random effects approach by Kumbhakar (1990) allowed us
to estimate group-specific inefficiency trend parameters. This proved
to be an obvious compromise between economic plausibility and tech-
nical feasibility: The original model comes from the assumption of a
single common trend parameter which is surely easy to estimate but
hardly reveals additional economic information. The other extreme, i.e.
firm-specific trend parameters (Cuesta, 2000), probably demands too
much information, namely in practice the estimation of several hundred
parameters in the course of a numerical optimization procedure.
Furthermore, the panel data environment opens the possibility to over-
come the a priori-specification of a distributional assumption concerning
inefficiency. We learned that inefficiency is basically unobservable so that
there does not exist any reason to prefer a specific distribution to another
distribution. And as in fact the distributional assumption directly deter-
mines the estimated efficiency scores, the results seem to be arbitrary.
But Greene (1990) showed that the relative efficiency scores remain
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more or less unaffected by the choice of a distribution, so consequently
the implications of this conclusion are less serious than first expected.
Nevertheless, whenever setting a specific distributional assumption in
the course of a Stochastic Frontier Analysis, there remains a point open
to criticism. Beyond doubt, it would be better to basically abandon
unfounded assumptions as far as possible. In this context we showed that
the fixed effects approach to inefficiency as proposed by Schmidt and
Sickles (1984) overcomes this restriction. Moreover, our adaption of the
fixed effects model by Cornwell et al. (1990) to incorporate group-specific
trend parameters turned out to be both flexible and robust to estimate.
On page 37 we mentioned another ’red herring’ criticism by Før-
sund et al. (1980) referring to the questionable economic meaning of
an average frontier shifted to an extreme. We announced to keep this
objection in mind, and, indeed, we found a solution featuring an eco-
nomic value added: Our proposal to consider Quantile Regression with
fixed effects to be a real alternative to the classical SFA turned out to
be an innovation in efficiency estimation. Admittedly, we encountered
an identification problem between the heterogeneity in the fixed effect
and the technical efficiency, but this is by no means the unique fea-
ture of Quantile Regression: Greene (2005b) proposed the solution to
a ’true’ fixed effects model, separating a firm-specific fixed effect from
firm-specific inefficiency, thereby coping with exactly the same technical
difficulties. Another possible objection regarding our interpretation of
the fixed effects to capture the heterogeneity in time refers the fact that
this surely affects the resulting time trends of inefficiency. And again,
this is not a unique feature of Quantile Regression: On the contrary,
it is common practice to incorporate environmental variables into any
Stochastic Frontier model (cp. section 5.2). As these control variables
contain time trends, too, it is only natural to interpret inefficiency time
trends always conditional on environmental time trends that hold for the
whole peer group.
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